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INTRODUCTION 
While both Martin Heidegger and Emmanuel Levinas explicitly consider 
themselves phenomenologists and approach their divergent subjects accordingly, 
their gestures intimate that each of them in varying degrees and ways understands 
phenomenology and its limits quite differently. Nevertheless, when we consider 
their respective conceptions of phenomenology and its limits with specific regard 
to the question of time, we find that these two philosophers are actually much 
closer in both their concerns and their ultimate conclusions than they might 
otherwise appear--and certainly closer than either philosopher himself apparently 
realizes. In addition, we find that each philosopher's thought moves beyond 
phenomenology in such a way as to implicitly call its basic concepts into question 
and direct thinking toward what is thought in that excessive movement as what 
must be thought in any future attempt to revise those basic concepts, and thus 
genuinely ground phenomenology as a rigorous philosophical science. 
On the one hand, I will argue that Heidegger finds in the question of time 
a persistent and radical problem for phenomenology in general and for the 
hermeneutic of Dasein in particular. Specifically, he discovers the unaccountable 
trace of a dimension to time refractory to both the categorical thinking of 
metaphysics and the intuitive thinking of phenomenology, and thus discovers both 
Dasein and time to lie beyond the re<1ch of propositional thought. The discovery 
2 
of this trace proves problematic for phenomenology as a science because the basic 
concepts of phenomenology cannot be fully grounded until the meaning of being 
and the nature of Dasein are at least provisionally understood, and yet this 
understanding would seem to require both a transparent concept of time and, at 
the same time, a rethinking of the concept as such. The problem and the task is 
thus to think about time in such a way as to open the possibility of grounding 
phenomenology, without transforming time in the process or remaining with a 
kind of thinking in which the traditional understanding of the concept still remains 
intact or implicitly reasserts itself. 
Since the discovery of this trace thus interrupts the work of phenomenology 
on a radical level and moves both thinking and Dasein toward an essential 
transformation, I will ultimately suggest that its discovery occasions the 
phenomenological equivalent of a scientific crisis and thus demands nothing less 
than a radical revision of phenomenology and its basic concepts, a revision which 
must be accomplished before phenomenology can ever realize the end Heidegger 
envisioned for it in universal phenomenological ontology. I will also suggest that 
Heidegger finds relatively early in his work that the trace of this other time is 
linked to the trace of the holy, even though he does not fully explore that link and 
explicate thereby its ethical implications. I believe that Heidegger's explicit 
affirmation of the essential inadequacy of ontological thought to the temporal 
generosity animating the dynamic of time in its fugitive recession--which dynamic 
is thought in his later work as the movement of Ereignis-Enteignis in its 
3 
withdrawal from the thinking it draws along--indicates an attempt to find a way to 
think time and the source which grants it from within the exclusive persp~ctive 
opened by the ontological question of the meaning of Being, while preserving the 
integrity of time in that attempt. As Levinas will show that such an attempt is 
destined to failure as long as its point of departure is an ontological question, I 
will ultimately contend that the Heideggerian analysis implicitly opens upon the 
way toward a resolution of the crisis, even though it explicitly only reaffirms the 
limits of human finitude without recognizing that opening for what it is. 
On the other hand, I will argue that while Levinas seems comparatively 
disinterested in the critical implications of his work for phenomenology as a 
rigorous science of being, Levinas clearly recognizes in the concept of time the -
opening upon a redemptive escape from the finitude of being, and thus paves the 
way, I believe, toward a radical rethinking of phenomenology. Levinas, like 
Heidegger, sees in time the trace of an essential discontinuity in existence, but 
unlike Heidegger, Levinas finds a way to account for that trace. He discovers 
temporal discontinuity, or diachrony, to have its source in the ethical relation, the 
transcendent relationship with the personal other. Levinas finds this relation to 
be essentially different from all ontic, ontological, categorical, and even 
phenomenological relations--in other words, different from any of the possible 
care-ful comportments of human being understood as Dasein, or as what 
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Alphonso Lingis has appropriately called "deathbound subjectivity."1 This 
relation proves to be so unlike any other relation, in fact, that Levinas caJls it a 
rapport sans rapport. And yet, this relationship with what is otherwise than being 
is a relationship essential to both human nature and the meaning of being. While 
Levinas reaffirms Heidegger's contention that the question of time must be 
thought together with the question of human nature and the meaning of being, I 
feel he moves beyond Heidegger in showing precisely how and why: because the 
ethical relation with the Other fundamentally conditions the possibility of Dasein's 
existence by granting Dasein a true time in which it can exist as the primordial 
place of the disclosure of being. Insofar as Levinas' work thus determines that 
the relation of being and time can and must be understood alongside the 
fundamental hypostatic plurality of the Same and the Other, I will suggest that it 
effectively opens the way toward a revision of phenomenology and a resolution of 
the crisis effected by the ontological questionability of its basic concepts. 
In summarv, the bulk of this work is addressed to an analvsis of time in . . 
Levinas' early texts and in Heidegger's late texts and Hc5lderlin essays, mostly with 
an eye to showing the essential proximity of Levinas and Heidegger with respect 
to the question of the alterity of time and the inadequacy of phenomenology to 
think it. But in conclusion, I will suggest--and only suggest, as the limits of this 
1 Alphonso Lingis, Deathbound Subjectivitv (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1989). Though I somewhat disagree with Lingis' reasons for calling Dasein 
a subjectivity, which Heidegger patently does not understand it to be, I find the 
phrase aptly descriptive from the Levinasian perspective I will attempt to explicate 
in this text. 
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work preclude anything more--that in thinking what I will call the propriety and a-
propriety of time, Heidegger and Levinas provide us with a way to think through 
what subtly announces itself in their work as a crisis of phenomenology. 
PART ONE 
THINKING THE HYPOSTATIC PRESENT AND THE A-PROPRIETY 
OF TIME IN THE ONTOLOGY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS 
It will be the aim of the first part of this work to show that Levinas, like 
Heidegger, is concerned with the question of the meaning of being, but that, 
unlike Heidegger, he sees a need from the very beginning to go beyond 
phenomena and intuition in broaching an answer to that question. Furthermore, 
although there is no evidence that Levinas explicitly recognizes in this need the 
indication of a crisis of phenomenology, I will eventually suggest that this is 
ultimately what it amounts to. 
We will see that Levinas attempts to liberate a meaning for existence 
beyond that produced by a solitary subject in the intentional freedom and security 
of knowledge and enjoyment, for whom existence is found to be both ineluctable 
and tragic--and hence, fundamentally senseles-5.: Levinas affirms that the definitive 
subject escapes the senselessness of anonymous being by virtue of its 
definitiveness, but he shows as well that bv virtue of that same definitiveness the ., 
subject is immediately condemned to a burdensome, fatal present without a true 
future--from which there is then necessitated yet another escape. What Levinas 
ultimately discovers is that only time can effect this second escape. And yet, 
6 
Levinas also shows that time cannot be produced by the subject alone in the 
definitiveness of its solitary being, but is opened to the subject in a moment prior 
to the moment in which its definitive subjectivity is accomplished--in a moment 
prior to the moment of being, in other words. Finally, Levinas shows that as 
phenomenology and propositional thought cannot reach beyond being and 
phenomena, in order to effect that reach and account for time, one must then 
move beyond phenomenology. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE FIRST MOMENT OF HYPOSTASIS: 
EXISTENCE AND EVANESCENCE 
Levinas prefaces De l'existence a l'existant with the demarcation of a 
distinction between transcendence and what he calls "ex-cendence."1 He says the 
former refers to the act whereby an existent would realize a higher existence, a 
higher state of being, whereas the latter names the relationship with the Other, a 
movement toward the Good. In contrast with this economic transcendence, the 
movement of ex-cendence does not realize another mode of being; rather, it 
1 The reference to "ex-cendence" [ ex-cenclance ], and the opposition between 
"ex-cendence" and "transcendence," are effectively limited to this passage in De 
!'existence a l'existant. In Le temps et l'autre the word "ex-cendence" is never 
used (nor is it used again in either Totalite et infini or Autrement qu'etre ou au-
elem de !'essence), though an explicit differentiation is drawn in a number of 
places between the transcendence of temporality and the transcendence of space, 
light, and need--the former apparently corresponding in meaning to what Levinas 
earlier seemed to suggest by "ex-cendence." On two occasions in Totalite et infini 
Levinas uses a neologism apparently coined by Jean Wahl, "trans-ascendence" 
[trans-ascendance], which again seems to correspond in meaning to "ex-cendence," 
and seems to be used primarily to help clarify the meaning of transcendence in his 
text and deconstructively differentiate it from its historical counterparts (See TI 5, 
12/TAI 35, 41). Autrement qu'etre ou au-dela de !'essence begins by addressing 
precisely this confusion and says of transcendence, understood in this ex-cendent 
sense: "If transcendence has a meaning, it can only signify the fact that the event 
of heing. the esse, the essence, passes over to what is other than being .... 
Transcendence is passing over to being's other, otherwise than being. Not to be 
otherwise, but otherwise than heing" (AQAE 3-4/OTB 3). 
8 
9 
signifies an escape from being, a radical "dis-inter-estedness."2 But De !'existence 
a l'existant does not directly address this escape from being, as do the later works 
we will consider. Levinas says in the preface that ex-cendence and the Good 
necessarily have a "foothold" in Being and that De !'existence a l'existant is limited 
to an exposition of that foothold. Instead of directly addressing the departure 
from being realized by the social relation, this text addresses the position in being 
presupposed and required by that departure: "it sets out to approach the idea of 
Being in general in its impersonality so as to then be able to analyze the notion of 
the present and of position, in which a being, a subject, an existent, arises in 
impersonal Being through an hypostasis" (DEE 18/EE 19). Hypostasis, as we will 
see, is the passage from activity to substance accomplished in the event of the 
present. It is the instantaneous positing of an embodied, determinate subject 
which dominates and breaks up the anonymity of indeterminate existence, hut 
only at the expense of its own tragic fatality. 
In the radio interviews with Phillipe Nemo broadcast in 1981 and published 
as Ethique et infini the following year, Levinas characterizes De !'existence a 
l'existant as a text that deals with the phenomenon of impersonal being, the 
unsettling fact that "there is" [il y a]: 
My reflection on this subject starts with childhood memories. One sleeps 
alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the silence of his bedroom as 
"rumbling." ... It is something resembling what one hears when one puts 
an empty shell close to the ear, as if the emptiness were full, as if the 
silence were a noise. It is something one can also feel when one thinks 
2 See EI 51/EAI 52. 
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that even if there were nothing, the fact that "there is" is undeniable. Not 
that there is this or that; but the very scene of being is open: there is. In 
the absolute emptiness that one can imagine before creation--there is. (EI 
45-46/EAI 48) 
Levinas adds that the impersonal existence thematized by the French expression 
"il y a" is what is evoked in expressions like "it rains" or "it is night." He calls it at 
one point "the play of being which is enacted without players" (DEE 169/EE 98). 
In the preface to the second edition of the French text Levinas says that the turn 
to the "there is" is a return to "those strange obsessions one remembers from 
childhood and which resurface in insomnia, when the silence resounds and the 
emptiness is full" (DEE 10).3 The "there is," he explains, is neither being nor 
nothingness. Above all, it is neither joy nor abundance. Levinas' understanding 
of the "il y a" evolves in sharp contrast to his understanding of the Heideggerian 
expression "es gibt," which evokes generosity and plenitude. Levinas sees only the 
shadow of dread in the inevitable fact that "there is," and he finds only horror and 
panic in those experiences which phenomenally open to consciousness a glimpse 
of this impersonal being. 
Levinas tells Nemo that he first sought a solution to the horror of the 
"there is" by analyzing the event of hypostasis. Hypostasis is, of course, from a 
-, 
Greek philosophical term etymologically traceable to hvpo, a preposition meaning 
"under" or "beneath," and stasis, meaning "a placing," "a setting," or "a standing." 
Hypostasis thus evokes the image of "standing under," and ontologically 
.J 
3 This translation is my own. 
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understood in that way is quite literally translated by its Latin equivalent, 
suhstantia. When Levinas speaks of hypostasis, however, he means to express the 
event in which a substance, a substantial being, is accomplished out of the 
insubstantiality of the "there is,"4 the hypostatic passage from the activity of 
existing to the substantiality of an existent. This event is accomplished in a 
moment of definitive mastery over the "there is" which dreads in being, since in a 
moment of hypostasis the determinate existent is not borne by the "there is," but 
dominates it.5 Levinas' analysis of this virile moment of hypostasis thus marks an 
attempt to seek salvation for being ontologically, as he himself later noted: "Being 
which is posited, I thought, is 'saved"' (EI 50/EAI 51). ..J 
But Levinas finds the ontological search unsuccessful. He discovers that ' 
while the dominating existent succeeds in escaping impersonal being, it does so 
only at the cost of yet another captivity; an existent secures its definitive being 
only by "chaining" itself to itself in the closure of a burdensome, solitary and fatal 
existence. As Levinas shows, this tragic side to hypostasis manifests itself both on 
the level of the pure event and on the level of consciousness: 
4 As Richard Cohen remarks in a translator's footnote to Time and the Other 
(TO 53), Levinas uses the word "accomplish" very carefully, as he explains in 
Totalite et infini: 
The break-up of the formal structure of thought (the noema of a noesis) 
into events which this structure dissimulates, but which sustain it and 
restore its concrete significance, constitutes a deduction--necessary and yet 
non-analytical. In our exposition it is indicated by expressions such as "that 
is," or "precisely," or "this accomplishes that," or "this is produced as that." 
(TI >..'Vii/TAI 28) 
5 See EI 49-51/EAI 51. 
1 
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The hypostasis, in participating in the there is, finds itself again to be a 
solitude, in the definitiveness of the bond with which the ego is chained to 
its self. The world and knowledge are not events by which the upsurge of 
existence in an ego, which wills to be absolutely master of being, absolutely 
behind it, is blunted. The I draws back from its object and from itself, but 
this liberation from itself appears as an infinite task. The I always has one 
foot caught in its own existence. Outside in face of everything, it is inside 
of itself, tied to itself. It is forever bound to the existence which it has 
taken up. This impossibility for the ego to not be a self constitutes the 
underlying tragic element in the ego, the fact that it is riveted to its own 
being. (DEE 142-143/EE 84) 
A-; there proves to be no ontological salvation from both the horror of 
indeterminate being and the inescapable burden of determinate being once taken 
up, a remedy is called for which the "ontological adventure" cannot provide. 
Levinas thus says he subsequently sought salvation for being by following 
what he calls in Ethics and Jnfinitv "an entirely different movement" (EI 50/EAI 
52). This other movement turns out to be that belonging to the second direction 
taken by the philosophical spirit in the search for truth, which is described in "La 
philosophie et l'idee de la infini" as heteronomy. Levinas explains: 
To escape the "there is" one must not be posed, but deposed; to make an 
act of deposition, in the sense one speaks of deposed kings. This 
deposition of sovereignty by the ego is the social relationship with the 
Other, the dis-inter-ested relation. I write it in three words to underline 
the escape from being it signifies. I distrust the compromised word "love," 
but the responsibility for the Other, being-for-the-other, seemed to me, as 
early as that time, to stop the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being. 
It is in the form of such a relation that the deliverance from the "there is" 
appeared to me. (EI 50-51/EAI 52) 
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According to the interviews, then, De !'existence a l'existant traces the path of the 
first movement, or "adventure," while leading us to a point from which we may 
embark on the second.6 
6 Levinas finds in the course of his analyses that the movement of the 
diachronic relationship does not resemble the illuminating movement of an 
"intentional ray," and its distance is not that which separates noeses from noemata. 
We could say it detours from what he calls the ontological adventure by way of an 
ethical adventure, traversing without spanning the interval of transcendence, the 
infinite distance between the same and the Other. An understanding of the 
difference between these two adventures offers a provisional view of the 
difference between the two "times" traversed in each. 
In Totalite et infini Levinas likens what he calls in De !'existent a 
}'existence the ontological adventure to the journey of Ulysses: the illusory 
transcendence of knowledge and adequate thought. He says there, "the 
transcendence of thought remains closed in itself despite all its adventures--which 
in the last analysis are purely imaginary, or are adventures traversed as by 
Ulysses: on the way home" (TI xv/TAI 27). This ontological odyssey corresponds 
to the movement of autonomous philosophical research, which Levinas describes 
in La philosophie et l'idee de l'infini as "the reduction of the other to the same" 
and which he equates there with the conquest of being (DEHH 166/CPP 48). It 
identifies the diverse and dissolves the alterity of the other by inevitably returning 
to its point of departure only to find everything the same. The ethical adventure, 
on the other hand, in analogous to a journey toward the other. This journey 
leaves the intimate and familiar behind, never to return. Levinas shows that the 
metaphysical movement toward the Other takes the form of an insatiable desire 
that remains in a dimension foreign to that of the metaphysician--like Abraham, 
who in turning toward God leaves his country, his kindred, and his father's house 
to live a life at the limits of propriety, forever a stranger in a strange land, 
dispossessed and renouncing all possession. The sequence indicated in God's 
command to Abraham, recounted in Genesis 12:1, may be said to aptly indicate 
the peculiarity of this transcendent journey: Abraham is not instructed to first 
leave his father's house, then his kindred, and finally his country--which would 
reflect the order of a geographic departure; his journey is not an autonomous 
expedition, and it accordingly originates beyond its point of departure, leaving last 
that which is ontologically closest. 
Both these journeys figure as types in Levinas' work and correspond to the 
difference between the proper, economic time of the "I" and the a-proper time of 
transcendence: whereas the former movement is broken into moments and thus 
breaks up the eternal into a derivative time of subjective captivity, the latter 
opens upon an infinite future and thus constitutes true ex-perience. Levinas says 
14 
While succinct and helpful, this brief recapitulation of the first search fails 
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mention a number of crucial discoveries made in the course of that sea,rch, 
discoveries which must be addressed if one is to properly understand the 
liberating deposition of which Levinas speaks. 
First, there is the question of why a being must be deposed in order to be 
saved, or redeemed, from anonymous being. The startling answer is that a subject 
must be deposed in order to be redeemed because of itself it cannot produce a 
time with a true future, that is, a time wherein the radically new is possible, and 
only such a time can effect a redemption from the definitiveness of being.7 Thus, 
the first important discovery made in De !'existence a l'existant is that the solitary 
subject is condemned in being a definitive existent because as such it is without 
true time! Granted, the subject has what one might call a time of its own, an 
economic time of reconciliation and commerce, but this economic "time" is 
without a true future and thus is not true time. Or, if this timeless time of the 
in a footnote to the preface of Le temps et l'autre that diachrony is "the very 
length of time" traversed in awaiting and desiring the Other (TA 12/TO 33). He 
refers the reader particularly to the essay "God and Philosophy," where the 
proximity of the Other "remains a dia-chronic break, a resistance of time to the 
synthesis of simultaneity" (CPP 167). It is thus that Levinas can say that the 
diachronic relationship with the Other is a dialogue which ultimately has to be 
thought "in terms other than those of the dialectic of the solitary subject"--a 
diachronic dialogue, he says, which "will furnish us with a set of concepts of a new 
kind" (DEE 160/EE 93-94). 
7 The word "deposition" must be understood, I think, in the context of the 
hypostatic situation of a conscious being, the situation that Levinas says in "God 
and Philosophy" is "overturned" in the catastrophic awakening to the responsibility 
for the Other. In other words, I think Levinas uses the terms "deposition" and 
"catastrophe" somewhat analogously. 
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world is considered to warrant the name "time" simply by virtue of convention, 
tradition or fiat, then we must say that in order to have a future the subject must 
be granted an other time, an a-proper time. In effect, we could say that in 
investigating the relation between an existent and existence Levinas discovers the 
present to be the hypostatic constitution of an existent, that event which in its 
accomplishment roots and bases a being in the anonymous rustling of existence. 
But we must, then, also say that he thereby finds the present to be but an 
"apparition" at grips with this existence, and the creature given place by this 
creative present to be nothing more than the substantiated dynamism of an arche 
which animates an "eternal presence to oneself' (AQAE 144/0TB 113). Hence, 
what the first search reveals, in effect, is that the definitively posited subject has 
no "virginal" beginning and no "true future" (DEE 40/EE 29); in order to redeem 
being there must be a time with a true future, an other time, a time other than 
the economic 'time' of the solitary subject. The radicality of this necessary 
alternative is perhaps most clearly visible when it is contrasted with the efforts of 
Husserl and Heidegger to understand time in terms of a synthesis of past, present, 
and future. Levinas would maintain in this regard, as Richard Cohen so aptly 
observes, that no inner-time synthesis is capable of accounting for either the non-
identity of the diachronous instant or the alterity of a true future: "for Levinas the 
alterity of time's dimensions--the pastness of the past and the futurity of the 
16 
future--must be linked to an absolute alterity precisely beyond even the most far-
f h b. 118 reaching syntheses o t e su Ject. 
Levinas ultimately finds that redemptive alterity in the future granted by 
the Other in the ethical relation. This is the second decisive discovery Levinas 
makes: that this other time is the very relationship with the Other. This other 
time proves to be true time, and will be hereafter referred to simply as time, since 
the proper time of the "I" and its variants are shown to be founded modes of this 
a-proper time. 
The third discovery of immediate importance to us is that if Levinas is 
right ontology, even a fundamental ontology, cannot comprehensively account for 
this other time, since it requires the Other, and thus has its source beyond the 
reach of either ontological thought or phenomenology. With specific regard for 
the question of time and the problem it poses for phenomenological thought, 
then, we must say that what De ]'existence a l'existant actually uncovers in its 
phenomenological analyses is not time itself, but the exigency and trace of time in 
being. 
Thus, the real significance of the ontological solution sought in De 
!'existence a l'existant, at least with respect to the question of time and the crisis 
of phenomenology, lies among the possibilities for thought opened up in moving 
beyond it. This is not to say the analysis of anonymous being and the exposition 
8 Richard A. Cohen, review of Existence and Existents, by Emmanuel Levinas, 
in Man and World 12 (Winter 1979): 522. 
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of the hypostatic present are unimportant; no, it is to say that the "foothold in 
being" this text thematically addresses has its full significance as a step on the 
upwards climb beyond being which is undertaken in the texts to follow. Within 
the perspective afforded by those texts we can say that the actual result of 
Levinas' investigations in De !'existence a l'existant, expressed in negative terms, is 
a twofold response to the assumptions and conclusions of the existential analytic 
carried out in Sein und Zeit--a response which clearly anticipates the more 
comprehensive critique to be undertaken in Totalite et infini: first, Levinas 
intimates that for a solitary, definitive existent there could be no primordial 
enjoyment or true separation, and no salvation from either anonymous existence 
or the paradoxically burdensome care for existence every existent must shoulder 
even in refusing it; and second, Levinas shows that without the Other the existent 
could only exist as a solitary, definitive existent, instantaneously posited without a 
true future in the current of anonymous being. In positive terms, Levinas 
indicates that this solitary and tragic existence bears in itself the trace of a remedy 
to be found in the relation with the Other, as both the lag operative in the very 
event of existing and the hesitation operative in consciousness and living in the 
world manifest the nothingness that comes from the Other, and thus reveal the 
trace of a redemptive future and the possibility of a meaning to existence beyond 
that inscribed on either the horizon of an eternal present or that of a proper, 
ecstatic temporality. 
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Levinas notes at the outset of his text that the difficulty in conceiving Being 
apart from beings and the tendency to envisage the one in the other are not 
accidental--they are due to our habit of situating the instant outside any event. By 
an event, Levinas means the event of being, the incomparable event of beginning 
effected in the act by which an existent takes up its existence. (\Vhen this event is 
effected as the effervescence and situation of a conscious subject in the world he 
will call it the instant of hypostasis.) This mistaken conception of the instant as 
incidental to the event of being constitutes a degradation of the instant: according 
to Levinas, philosophy has traditionally conceived of the instant as a "simple and 
inert" element of time, but by subordinating the instant to the dialectic of time, 
itself misunderstood, philosophy has failed to recognize that the instant has a 
dialectic of its own. 
Levinas says that being and a being are not two independent terms, and 
that the event of being does not link them up as such; the being of a being is 
realized in an action, an action exercised over being: "'A being' has already made 
a contract with Being; it cannot be isolated from it. It is. It already exercises 
over Being the domination a subject exercises over its attributes. It exercises it in 
an instant, which phenomenological analysis takes as something that cannot be 
decomposed" (DEE 16/EE 17). In opposition to this erroneous assumption 
Levinas will show that the instant is not outside the event of hypostasis, but in a 
"hidden event" is both the outcome and the effectuation of that event, and thus 
can be decomposed along with it.
9 
He begins by affirming that an instant is articulated, and by claiming that 
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this articulation is what distinguishes it from the eternal, conceived as simple and 
foreign to events (DEE 17 /EE 18). Thus, in order to understand the articulation 
of the instant, we must understand the event of being which constitutes an instant, 
and see that it is no simple act, but has a double structure. Levinas describes it as 
both the activity of being and the possession of being. That is, the action 
exercised by a being over being is not pure activity, but a being doubled up with a 
having. In the first place, an existent exercises over being a certain domination; in 
the event in which a substantive takes up its being, it effects an act over being, it 
masters being. And yet, reason would demand that in the domination of existence 
by an existent, being is not that which can be mastered by what is not yet. 10 It 
would seem that being is that which can be mastered only by what already is by 
virtue of a present inherited from the past. Despite the apparent reasonableness 
of this demand, it is wrong. It cannot be the case that the being is prior to the 
instant of its being. Levinas is very clear about this: 
Before linking up with the instants that precede or follow it, an instant 
contains an act by which existence is acquired. Each instant is a beginning, 
a birth .... of itself an instant is a relationship, a conquest, although this 
relationship does not refer to any future or past, nor to any being or event 
9 This particular formulation appears on p. 30 and is echoed on p. 35 of EE. 
10 We will see in the next chapter that prior to accomplishing a definitive 
mastery over being, there is time to "be" otherwise than a virile subject. 
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situated in that past or future. An instant qua beginning and birth is a 
relationship sui generis, a relationship with and initiation into Being .... 
What begins to be does not exist before having begun, and yet it is what 
does not exist that must through its beginning give birth to itself, come to 
itself, without coming from anywhere. (DEE 130/EE 76) 
This paradoxical duality of the instant has by and large escaped philosophical 
attention precisely because of the impossible demand articulated above which 
confuses the problem of origin with the problem of causality. Levinas notes that 
"even in the presence of a cause, that which begins must bring about the event of 
beginning in an instant, at a point after which the principle of contradiction ... 
will hold, but for whose constitution it does not yet hold" (DEE 131/EE 76). So, 
in the second place, being is taken up as an inescapable burden by that which 
somehow comes to exist in the very act of taking up its existence. Levinas 
describes this paradoxical beginning and seemingly imperative conquest of being 
as a continual recommencement of cumbersome existence issuing as if out of 
notbingness. 11 
This articulation of the act of being is phenomenally evident in moments of 
fatigue and indolence. Levinas examines these phenomena precisely because the 
adherence of existence to an existent appears in them, prior to any reflection, like 
a "cleaving." Thus, these moments grant phenomenology a means of accessing the 
event of being in its articulation and separation. 
11 See DEE 27 /EE 22. We will see, in fact, that the instant does issue out of 
nothingness--but only insofar as nothingness itself is produced in the relation with 
the other and is understood as something more than the dialectical opposite of 
being (DEE 160/EE 94). 
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Fatigue and indolence, Levinas explains, are positions taken up with regard 
to existence--specifically, positions of impotent refusal. These positions are not 
mental states, but events of recoil before existence which make up that existence. 
In weariness, he remarks, "existence is like the reminder of a commitment to exist, 
with all the seriousness and harshness of an unrevokable [sic] contract. One has 
to do something, one has to aspire after and undertake" (DEE 31/EE 24 ). 
Weariness is thus the impossible refusal of this obligation to act, aspire after and 
undertake. Weariness is the weariness of being, and fatigue is the "condemnation" 
of being (DEE 44-46, 50/EE 31-32, 35). In the case of indolence--which, like 
fatigue, is an aversion toward existence--the position of refusal is taken with 
particular reference to the beginning of existence, as if existence were not there 
immediately, but preexisted that beginning: 
Indolence is an impossibility of beginning, or, if one prefers, it is the 
effecting of beginning. It may inhere in the act that is being realized, in 
which case the performance rolls on as on a ill-paved road, jolted about by 
instants each of which is a beginning all over again. The job does not flow, 
does not catch on, is discontinuous--a discontinuousness which is perhaps 
the very nature of 'a job."' (DEE 34/EE 26) 
In both these peculiar existential stances toward existence, existence is refused 
and broken up, but only in the very instant it is already taken up and possessed. 
Levinas' provisional analyses of fatigue and indolence affirm that the event 
of being is an act which is not pure activity, but is indeed an act in which being is 
doubled up with a having which is possessed and possesses, and which succumbs 
under this burden. He says that "the beginning of an act is already a 
belongingness and a concern for what it belongs to and for what belongs to it. 
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Inasmuch as it belongs to itself it conserves itself, and itself becomes a 
substantive, a being" (DEE 36/EE 27). And yet, the phenomenological analysis 
also shows that "existence drags behind it a weight--if only itself--which 
complicates the trip it takes. Burdened with itself ... it does not purely and 
simply exist. Its movement of existence which might be pure and straightforward 
is bent and caught up in itself, showing that the verb to he is a reflexive verb: it is 
not just that one is, one is oneself' (DEE 38/EE 28). It is before this reflexive 
enterprise of being oneself that indolence is indolent; it is a joyless aversion to the 
burdensome task of existing as oneself. What fatigue abhors, indolence refuses: 
the burden of one's own definitive existence taken up ineluctably in existing. The 
dialectic of the instant consists in this very struggle for and against existence. 
Levinas can say the instant is articulated along with the event of being 
because the latter constitutes the former and thus the structure of the former 
mirrors that of the latter. The paradoxical being and having of existence is 
reflected in the initiation and possession of the instant. Levinas says, "in the 
instant of a beginning there is already something to lose, for something is already 
possessed, if only the instant itself' (DEE 35/EE 27). In existing, being proceeds 
out of a having; in an instant, the beginning proceeds out of the instant itself. 
Being is to begin to be--it is to begin instantaneously in the inalienable possession 
of oneself.12 
12 In Totalite et infini Levinas says: "The absolute indetermination of the there 
is, an existing without existents, is an incessant negation, to an infinite degree, 
consequently an infinite limitation. Against the anarchy of the there is the 
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While these analyses of being and the instant are phenomenologically 
important in and of themselves, their full significance lies in what they reveal in 
response to the question of time: while there is no instant that is not a beginning, 
there is also no instant that is of itself a "virginal" beginning; that is, there is no 
instant which alone constitutes a true beginning, a true future. At the end of the 
preliminary analyses of fatigue and indolence Levinas says: 
What is essential in indolence is its place prior to a beginning of an action, 
its way of being turned to a future. It is not a thought about the future, 
followed by a holding back from action. It is, in its concrete fulness [sic], a 
holding back from the future. The tragedy of being it reveals is then the 
more profound. It is a being fatigued by the future. Beginning does not 
solicit it as an occasion for rebirth, a fresh and joyful instant, a new 
moment; it has already brought it about beforehand as a weary present. It 
perhaps indicates that the future, a virginal instant, is impossible in a 
solitary subject. (DEE 39-40/EE 29) 
Although Levinas can discover in the instant itself no true future for the solitary 
existent constituted in and by the act of existing, he does discover a significant 
structural element belonging to the event of being: an interval created in taking 
up an instant--an interval by virtue of which an existent is always not quite yet 
present. This interval is significant because it opens upon the possibility of a true 
future by manifesting the trace of an other time and a non-instantaneous present. 
In the more detailed investigation of fatigue that follows in De !'existence a 
l'existant, Levinas turns to precisely this phenomenon of the "not yet," although he 
will not adopt this way of speaking about it until much later in his writings. When 
existent is produced, a subject of what can happen, an origin and commencement, 
a power" (TI 257 /TAI 281). 
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he uncovers it here in De !'existence a l'existant, at work in the act of existence--
and subsequently in the act of consciousness--he calls it simply a lag, a delay, a 
hesitation, an interval--and at one point, the "hidden event of which an instant is 
the effectuation and not only the outcome" (DEE 42/EE 30). 
In broaching this phenomenon of essential interruption, Levinas says that 
in order to clarify the connection between being and action, the philosopher must 
put himself into the instant of fatigue, scrutinize it, and examine the way it comes 
about and the internal dialectic which structures it. What he discovers in doing so 
is a lag, a kind of gap between a being and what it remains attached to. He finds 
that fatigue is, in fact, this slackening, this letting slip while taunt with effort; 
there is fatigue only in effort and labor, and the principle characteristic of fatigue 
is this lag or slack between a being and itself. With obvious reference to 
Heidegger's analysis of the world of work involvements as a totality of reference 
relations ultimately converging on Dasein, Levinas says that in labor we are not 
only attached to a goal and it is not only a possibility that is incumbent on our 
will. The instant of effort reveals a subject in subjection to existence itself. This 
subjection immediately compromises our freedom as it shows human labor to 
presume a commitment to which it is already "yoked," "delivered over," and 
"forsaken." These are strong words and Levinas uses them intentionally in order 
to emphasize that "despite all its freedom effort reveals a condemnation; it is 
fatigue and suffering" (DEE 44/EE 31). In effort, which dialectically surges out 
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of itself and falls back into fatigue, existence is shown to be an event of subjection 
in the very instant it occurs. 
But in this surge and relapse the hypostatic instant realizes, as we have 
seen, a creative moment. It is a moment of force. We recall that an existent 
masters being by shouldering its existence in an instant, in a beginning which 
appears to issue as if out of nothingness. Force describes this creation ex nihilo in 
which the instant of effort "somehow ventures beyond a possession whose limits 
and onerousness are marked by fatigue, which holds back its thrust" (DEE 44/EE 
31). Though this "venture beyond" does not of itself escape the closure of the 
hypostatic self, it does constitute an advance over oneself--and more importantly 
for this analysis, it marks an advance over the present. Levinas says: 
In the ecstasy of the leap which anticipates and bypasses the present, 
fatigue marks a delay with respect to oneself and with respect to the 
present. The moment by which the leap is yonder is conditioned by the 
fact that it is still on the hither side. What we call the dynamism of the 
thrust is made up of those two moments at the same time and is not 
constituted by the anticipation of the future, as the classical analyses, which 
neglect the phenomenon of fatigue, would have it. Effort is an effort of 
the present that lags behind the present. (DEE 44-45/EE 31) 
The present is that which, in the interruption and recommencement of the 
eternity of being, accomplishes across that lag a situation in being, a subject. 
Levinas explains this very clearly in Le temps et l'autre: 
The present is the event of hypostasis. the present leaves itself--better still, 
it is the departure from self. It is a rip in the infinite beginningless and 
endless fabric of existing. The present rips apart and joins together again; 
it begins; it is beginning itself. (TA 32/TO 52) 
The present is beginning itself and the instant marks an advance over this 
beginning. 
We must pause to underscore two important points here: first, the instant 
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of effort does not in and of itself produce or even anticipate a future, it only 
anticipates what it ineluctably constitutes: the "present"; but in addition, the 
"present" anticipated and bypassed by effort is a peculiar present, because despite 
that leap, it is always not yet present. As Levinas explicitly points out later in the 
text, because the present thus begins in itself and refers only to itself, it refracts 
the future and can have no duration. The situation the present brings about is 
exceptional in that it allows us to name an instant and conceive it as a substantive, 
but on the basis of that fact alone we cannot say that it is an instant in time: "Of 
itself time resists any hypostasis; . . . The present is a halt, not because it is 
arrested, but because it interrupts and links up again the duration to which it 
comes, out of itself .... It breaks with the duration in which we grasp it" (DEE 
125-126/EE 73). Again this is stated very nicely in Le temps et l'autre: 
Positing hypostasis is still not to introduce time into being. Although giving 
us the present, we are given neither a stretch of time set within a linear 
series of duration, nor a point of this series. It is not a matter of a present 
cut out of a current, alreadv constituted time, or of an element of time, but 
of the function of the present, of the rip that it brings about in the 
impersonal infinity of existing. (TA 32/TO 52) 
Human labor thus follows its work "step by step," Levinas says. The duration that 
belongs to effort is not the continuous, self-possessed duration of a melody--the 
model for Bergson's conception of time. According to Levinas, there are no 
instants present in Bergson's pure duration, only elements of a playful whole that 
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exist as instants only artificially and only in passing away. Effort, to the contrary, 
suspends all play and condemns the existent to the seriousness of a pulsating, 
punctiform performance to be carried out anew in every instant: 
The duration of effort is made up entirely of stops. It is in this sense that 
it follows the work being done step by step. During the duration of the 
work, the effort takes on the instant, breaking and tying back together 
again the thread of time. It struggles behind the instant it is going to take 
on; it is then not, as in the case of a melody, already freed from the 
present it is living through, transported and swept away by it. (DEE 48/EE 
33) 
Nevertheless, while effort lags behind the present, it is at the same time already 
involved and "inter-ested" in the present: "It is caught up with the instant as an 
inevitable present in which it is irrevocably committed. In the midst of the 
anonymous flow of existence, there is stoppage and a positing" (DEE 48/EE 33-
34 ). Thus, while the "present" the instant struggles toward is inevitable, the 
instant must nevertheless inevitably struggle toward it across the very distance 
opened in that struggle! Moreover, it is only in this stuttering struggle that a 
being realizes a determinate position in Being--a situation, a hypostasis. A being 
secures existential determinacy only in being not yet present! 
On the one hand, then, there is a condemnation to fatigue which is not 
merely to be found in the resistance of matter to the activity of body or mind; it is 
not simply the despair of a finite being incapable of ever reaching its ambitions or 
fully grasping its possibilities. Effort bears a condemnation because one is yoked 
to the task of continually taking up one's own existence. Thus, the condemnation 
effort bears is not effort's condemnation, it is the condemnation of being. Or 
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more specifically, it is the fatality of being posited as a material being, but as a 
material being not yet fully present--that is, as the apparition of a subject; 
To act is to take on a present. This does not amount to repeating that the 
present is the actual, but it signifies that the present is, in the anonymous 
rumbling of existence, the apparition of a subject which is at grips with this 
existence, in relationship with it, takes it up. Action is this taking up. 
Action is then by essence subjection and servitude, but also the first 
manifestation, or the very constitution, of an existent, a someone that is. 
For the lag of fatigue in the present opens a distance in which a 
relationship takes form; the present is constituted in taking charge of the 
present. (DEE 48-49/EE 34) 13 
We must carefully consider what is being thought here. 
Action is the taking up of the present. Moreover, action is the very event 
which constitutes a someone that is, a personal human being. But the present is 
not the actual, it is the apparition of a subject taken up in action. What does this 
mean? Does it mean that since the present taken up in action is never fully 
actualized thereby, but always remains not yet present, it is taken up only as an 
apparition, only as a spectral present in the lag or distance between an existent 
and itself? But, if the taking up of this spectral present is action, and if action 
constitutes a human existent and posits it in being, then what does this suggest 
about the being thus constituted, situated and posited as not yet present in this 
13 I have altered the translation of the Lingis text, which is oddly ordered and 
omits a crucial reference to the subject. The French text reads: "Ce qui ne 
revient pas a repeter que le present c'est l'actuel, mas que le present est, dans le 
bruissement anonyme de !'existence, !'apparition d'un sujet qui est aux prises avec 
cette existence, qui est en relation avec elle, qui l'assume. L'acte est cette 
assomption" (DEE 48-49; emphasis mine). 
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action? Does it not suggest that the determinate being always not yet present is 
itself a kind of apparition in the nominal sense--a kind of phantom being? 
It would be misleading to translate ]'apparition here as simply 
"appearance," which would belie both the peculiarity of the usage and the true 
sense of the word. Apparition is the appearing of what can dis-appear; it does not 
explicitly refer to an appearance in the nominal sense, nor to a dissembling or 
semblance. The English word "apparition" admirably conveys some of the same 
duplicity that is at play in the French word, which according to the Littre 
primarily means the manifestation of a phenomenon, the action of making 
something visible, the birth or commencement of visibility. 14 But the word also 
conveys a sense of the supernatural and religious. The Littre traces the word 
back to a twelfth century ecclesiastical use and says it can refer to a divine or 
phantom appearance--that is, a sudden appearance in the realm of the visible of 
the invisible or immaterial. 
While !'apparition understood as a "manifesting" effectively describes the 
birth or commencement of the subject, what of the other meanings--especially the 
last one, which initially seems entirely inappropriate in this context. Would it 
make any sense to say the birth or hypostasis of the subject, and hence, the 
present, has a divine or spectral quality? Perhaps a great deal! Let us remember 
that the event under scrutiny is precisely the event in which a pure activity 
14 Emile Littre, s.v. "Apparition," in Diccionnaire de la Langue Francaise 
(Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1963). 
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becomes a substance capable of bearing a name, the event in which an existent 
becomes a substantial being, surging up into existence as if out of nothingness and 
lapsing back into it--like the moon waxing and waning, like a spirit appearing and 
disappearing. Toward the end of De !'existent a l'existence Levinas again uses the 
word apparition to describe the event of hypostasis: 
We are looking for the very apparition of the substantive. To designate 
this apparition we have taken up the term hypostasis which, in the history 
of philosophy, designated the event by which the act expressed by a verb 
became a being designated by a substantive. Hypostasis, the apparition of 
a substantive, is not only the apparition of a new grammatical category; it 
signifies the suspension of the anonymous there is, the apparition of a 
private domain, of a noun. (DEE 140-41/EE 82-83) 
Clearly, !'apparition here means here the mysterious appearance of something 
nominal and substantial out of the verbal and insubstantial. Does this not, 
indeed, suggest a kind of phantom or spectral quality to the appearance of the 
subject, as it is precisely the making present of something substantial where there 
was before nothing substantial, a making visible of the previously invisible? 
\Vhile not frequently, Levinas uses the word apparition elsewhere in his 
texts, but almost always with reference to the epiphany of the Other in a face. In 
"La philosophie et l'idee de l'infini" the apparition of the infinite being is explicitly 
described in the text as an epiphanie (DEHH 173/CPP 55). An epiphany, like an 
apparition, is not just a sudden manifestation, but a spiritual, ghostly, or divine 
manifestation, a manifestation as sudden, unaccountable and unsettling as the 
startling appearance of a divine being in the midst of a profane world or a spectre 
in the night. Interestingly enough, the only place besides the passages already 
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quoted where Levinas uses the word apparition in De !'existence a l'existant is in 
a reference to the epiphany of a God in the world of primitive religion, and it is 
followed by a reference to Banquo's ghost (DEE 99-101/EE 61-62). But should 
we really understand the apparition of the subject in this way, as a divine 
appearance on the one hand, or a ghostly appearance on the other? Or in so 
doing are we taking the meaning too far? 
While a reference to divinity seems very appropriate when made with 
regard to the Other, it appears oddly out of place with regard to the 
substantiation of a condemned subject. Unless, of course, the signification is 
entirely ironic--which may in fact be the case, since Levinas does describe the 
moment of force which gives birth to this "apparition" of a subject as a creation ex 
nihilo. If this is the case, this reference would certainly suggest an interesting 
twist to the condemnation associated with this moment, since it would then subtly 
characterize the creative act of hypostasis which ends in eternal self-reference and 
must realize itself anew in each instant as a tragic parody of the divine creation. 
This irony does seem to reinforce what Levinas says about the incapacity of the 
instant to dynamically move beyond itself, and it does so in a way which dovetails 
nicely with Levinas' distinction between the hypostatic creature who must struggle 
for existence in every new beginning and the divine Creator: 
What is profound in Malebranche's views is that instead of situating the 
true dependence of creation on the Creator in its origin and in its liability 
to be reduced to nothingness by a new decree of the Creator, Malebranche 
places it in its inability to preserve itself in existence, in its need to resort 
to divine efficacy at each instant. Here Malebranche catches sight of the 
drama inherent in an instant itself, its struggle for existence, which 
mechanism fails to recognize when it takes an instant to be a simple and 
inert element of time. Malebranche brings out a happening in an instant 
which does not consist in its relationship with other instants. (DEE 129/ 
EE 75) 
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So it seems that the divine sense of apparition may be somewhat appropriate here 
after all. 
But what of the ghostly? Levinas' reference to Banquo's haunting spectre 
in Macbeth occurs in the section on existence without existents, where we are 
called to imagine the reversion to the nothingness of the "there is," and where we 
are told that night is the very experience of the "there is" (DEE 93-94/EE 57-58). 
At night the silence of nothingness submerges every person and thing, dissolving 
their forms. At night the darkness invades like a tangible presence, opening a 
nocturnal space of universal absence. Levinas says this nocturnal space proper to 
the night delivers us over to being, as it reduces the things of the day world to 
horrible phantasms which sight and consciousness cannot grasp. This reduction is 
precisely the disappearance of materiality and form and substantiality--a reduction 
vividly experienced in the impersonal vigilance of insomnia. But how is the 
subject ghostly if in the instant of its being it is precisely the dominating upsurge 
of a substantial existent in the midst of the nocturnal, insubstantial, impersonal 
"there is"? Moreover, while Levinas says that action is the taking on of the 
apparition of a subject, explaining later that action is the "first manifestation" of a 
"someone that is," it seems strange to think of that appearance as startling or 
unexpected, like the apparition of a ghost, when the present is taken up, we recall, 
as an inevitable present; would it not seem, rather, that the inevitability of the 
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activity would contaminate the appearance of the subject, no matter how sudden 
or surprising it might otherwise be? And yet that is precisely how the subject 
does appear in the anonymous current of existence: as a surprise--not because the 
manifestation is merely unexpected, but because that occurrence is beyond natural 
expectations and without anticipation and history. Then again, it can only appear 
anew in each instant precisely because it dis-appears in each instant! Each instant 
is a death as surely as it is a birth. 
In short, it seems that in every possible translation of the word are the 
disseminate traces of the other possibilities, and predominantly the trace of what 
first appeared as the least applicable and most problematic meaning: that of a 
spectral appearance. In any use of the word apparition, whether it is meant as an 
effervescence of the invisible in the realm of the visible or as a divine or phantom 
epiphany, a trace of the "ghostly" remains--haunting the word with the same 
unsettling presence with which the subject apparently haunts the present--bearing 
in itself, like a corpse, its own phantom--presaging its own return. "This return in 
presence of negation, this impossibility of escaping from an anonymous and 
uncorruptible existence," writes Levinas, constitutes the "tragedy" and "fatality" of 
irremissible being (DEE 100-101/EE 61). The subject which surges out of itself 
only to lapse back into itself, appearing and disappearing and positing itself as 
substantial in the tension of that insubstantial lapse, is indeed present only with 
the fleeting substantiality of a phantasm. A subject and a present which surge up 
in existence as if out of nothingness are both, to a large degree, phantastic and 
spectral--haunted by insubstantiality even at their most substantial. 
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Hence, it would seem that we must say of action--now understood as the 
taking on of the spectral present by a phantom subject--that it is the very event 
which constitutes an existent. If we now recall that for Levinas the distance in 
which the relationship between a being and its being takes form is opened by the 
lag of fatigue in the present, and if we recall as well that in action or force a 
being, while not yet present, is nevertheless posited in being--and posited in 
traversing the very space opened up by the delay of that schematic hesitation, 
then we can begin to see why the present taken up in action is taken up only as 
an apparition, only as a spectral present in the lag or distance between an existent 
and itself: because the present, and hence the subject, is never fully actualized 
thereby, but always remains essentially not yet present. This is perhaps why 
Levinas immediately follows the description of the present as the apparition of a 
subject with this recognition of the inherent futility of solitary being revealed in 
effort and fatigue: "Effort is hence a condemnation because it takes up an instant 
as an inevitable present. It is an impossibility of disengaging itself from the 
eternity upon which it has opened" (DEE 49 /EE 34 ). 
The instant in which effort is spent, says Levinas, is the same instant effort 
brings about. There is no alterity or plurality in an instantaneous existence, and 
here lies the crux of the analysis--an instantaneous existence is phantastic and 
tragic, since where there is no alterity or plurality there is also no time: the 
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subject that appears in the present is a being condemned to an eternal existence 
within a timeless dialectic of the same. As has been implied by the use of the 
word apparition, the being thus constituted and posited as not yet present in this 
action is itself always not yet present; the existent subject is itself, in its hypostatic 
solitude and definitiveness, a kind of apparition, a spectral presence. In fact, as 
we will see in the next chapter, insofar as the existent is fundamentally a social, or 
ethical, being, it is precisely not a solitary and definitive subject. 
This is of no small consequence for phenomenology, for insofar as the 
present and the subject are both a kind of apparition, or phantom appearance, the 
phenomenon itself--the very matter to which the phenomenological gaze must 
address itself, and a matter determined as such within the intentional structure of 
appearance or presence to a conscious subject--must be fundamentally 
reconceived. But we will say more of this later. For now let us note that Levinas 
demonstrates in De !'existence a l'existant that to be--if being is to be determined 
only ontologically--is to be not yet present. We are condemned in being not yet 
present, and thus in being at all, not because we are never fully definitive (for that 
will be our very salvation), but because for a being thus constituted there is no 
true time. There is only a dislocation of the I from itself, a lag between an 
existent and the performance of its existential task. 
Human existence is the activity given place by and in this interval of 
dislocation. This dislocative lag of an existent tarrying behind its existing is what 
constitutes the present; the present is this lag, this distance in existing. Levinas 
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says it is precisely because of this distance that existence can be a relationship 
between an existent and itself. Existence is the upsurge of an existent in the 
midst of this lag, it is an activity given place by the distance of this hesitation. 
Hence, the only substance proper to the hypostatic being ~ubstantiated in that 
inscription is the sub-stance effected in. the tension of a "hovering" position 
stretched between the leap over the spectral present and the lag behind it--a 
position hollowed out by the hesitation of that lagging leap, and the only time 
proper to this solitary subject is the "time-lag," as Levinas calls it, produced in this 
playless program of leap-frog with the spectral present. 
Levinas ends chapter two with a summary of the analysis carried out thus 
far and an anticipatory indication of a reticent dimension to hypostasis which 
points the way toward the "second movement" he will make in seeking salvation 
from senseless being: 
If the present is thus constituted by the taking charge of the present, if the 
time-lag of fatigue creates the interval in which the event of the present 
can occur, and if this event is equivalent to the upsurge of an existent for 
which to he means to take up being, the existence of an existent is by 
essence an activity. An existent must be in act, even when it is inactive. 
This activity of inactivity is not a paradox; it is the act of positing oneself 
on the ground, it is rest inasmuch as rest is not a pure negation but the 
very tension of a position, the bringing about of a here. The fundamental 
activity of rest, foundation, conditioning, thus appears to be the very 
relationship with being, the upsurge of an existent into existence, a 
hypostasis. This entire essay intends only to draw out the implications of 
this fundamental situation. (DEE 51-52/EE 35-36) 
Existential effort is a condemnation because the time proper to an existent so 
situated in the anonymous current of Being and inscribed in the time-lag of the 
not yet present is no time at all, but an eternal and radical recurrence of the same 
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burdensome beginning. The existent is not saved from impersonal existence in 
being posited, it is condemned. But . . . in that position and that lag there is 
the trace of a redemptive possibility. \Ve find that the "implications of this 
fundamental situation" are basically twofold: since the existent is not a pure event, 
but takes up existence in the world in which there is the Other, existence is not 
fundamentally ontological, and thus solitary; and since we are primordially related 
to the Other. the possibility of a true future is granted to us thereby. What we 
will find is that the very lag that gives to the definitive subject its spectral quality, 
also gives to the subject the possibility of a space in which it can escape its 
definitiveness without lapsing back into the radical indefiniteness of the "there is." 
First we must see that a being is not just a pure determinate event relative 
to an indeterminate "there is;" it is posited; an existent is not only related to its 
own existence. it is grounded; said in yet another way, a being does not just exist, 
it exists as a bodily substance in the world. This is not to say that simply to take 
up being is to enter into the world. Levinas explicitly denies that conflation of 
events: he says, "the ontological problem arises before the scission of being into 
an inside and an outside. Inscription in being is not an inscription in the world" 
(DEE 173 /EE 100). But by virtue of the position in being secured by the present 
a human being has a body, which is the advent of consciousness, and is thus in the 
world of which it is conscious. In other words, while the present does not have a 
position (because it is the very effecting of a position), thought does. A being that 
is posited is a conscious being. In the portion of De !'existence a l'existant we 
considered before with reference to the meaning of the apparition, Levinas says 
the following about this discovery: 
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We have not sought, in the subject that pulls itself up from the anonymous 
vigilance of the there is, a thought, a consciousness, or a mind. Our 
investigation did not start with the ancient opposition of the ego to the 
world. We were concerned with determining the meaning of a much more 
general fact, that of the very apparition of an existent, . . . But although 
we have looked for the hypostasis and not consciousness, we have found 
consciousness. (DEE 140-141/EE 82-83) 
What Levinas finds is that to live is to be in a world as an effervescent substance 
or scintillating light--a consciousness. 
To be an ego is to be attached to things, to possess them, to have an 
appetite for them, to enjoy them. Levinas begins the chapter entitled "Le monde" 
with this clarification: "in the world we are dealing with objects. Whereas in 
taking up an instant we are committing ourselves irreparably to existing in a pure 
event which does not connect up with any substantive, any thing--in the world, 
substantives bearing adjectives, beings endowed with values offered to our 
intentions, are substituted for the vicissitudes of be-ing, in the active, verbal sense 
of the word" (DEE 55/EE 37).15 
The world of objects is a world of intentions--not the disembodied 
intentions of Husserlian phenomenology, but sincere intentions, intentions 
15 For the sake of clarity I have altered Lingis' translation of this passage in an 
attempt to more closely reflect the structure of the French text, in which the 
insubstantiality of existing as a pure event is contrasted with the substantiality of 
existing as a being essentially involved in a world of things, and not as a pure 
event. 
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animated by desire. In dealing with and intending objects within the world, the 
existent is not a disembodied glance, an impassive locus of relations and . 
meanings, hut a conscious "I" sincerely absorbed with those objects and intentions, 
and turned toward them expressly as things which are desirable, and not just 
meaningful. For Levinas, sincerity is saturated with desire, and being in the world 
is alwavs sincere: Levinas emphasizes and reemphasizes that consciousness is 
precisely a sincerity. 
The world of objects is also a world of phenomena, a world of light and 
knowledge. A form is that by which a being shows itself to us and is graspable in 
its givenness. In attending to these forms, intentionality breaks the ego up into an 
inside and an outside. Intentionality is thus the origin of sense, that which orders 
the relation between the exterior and the interior. For Levinas, sense is 
permeability for the mind--or rather, it is luminosity. Phenomenologically, light is 
the condition for phenomena and for their meaning as phenomena because light 
makes objects into a world of definitive beings we can possess (DEE 74-75/EE 
48). Light makes possible an "enveloping" of the exterior by the interior. But by 
la lumiere Levinas does not mean simply visibility to the eye; he means the clarity 
and illumination of thought. He says: "The miracle of light is the essence of 
thought: due to the light an object, while coming from without, is already ours in 
the horizon which precedes it; it comes from an exterior already apprehended and 
comes into being as though it came from us" (DEE 76/EE 48). It is existence in 
the world qua light that makes desire possible. 
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But while objects are desired by me and destined for me by virtue of that 
desire, they are also, by virtue of that same desire, distant from me. Through 
intentionality, explains Levinas, "our presence in the world is across a distance" 
(DEE 72/EE 46). Intentionality is possession at a distance. The exteriority of 
things is affirmed in our reach for them. An object may be given, but it awaits 
our reception of the gift. In desire this distance is always already implied. This 
observation may seem to be a mundane one, as it is affirmed throughout the 
history of philosophy. Plato's Socrates, after all, points out that my desire for the 
prolongation of a satisfaction or the ability to possess eternally that which I now 
momentarily enjoy, only affirms the fact that I do not desire what I already have, 
just what I lack. But Levinas is not reaffirming this character of desire simply in 
order to superimpose it over the intentional structure of consciousness, he is 
attempting to highlight its hidden function and trace its ultimate source. 
Let us first attend to its hidden function. There is a distance in the desire 
I feel for the world and its riches because, while I am in the world, I do not 
possess it. Not yet, anyway. The world is given to me, but not yet. When this 
interval or distance (which we have already examined in the pure event of the 
present as the lag between an existent and its existence) is opened in the concrete 
world of substantial relations, it appears as the delay between my desire and its 
satiation, between me and that which I desire. Levinas says, "in everyday 
existence, in the world, the material structure of the subject is to a certain extent 
overcome: an interval appears between the ego and the self. The identical subject 
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does not return to itself immediately" (TA 45/TO 62). This delay is the hesitation 
of consciousness itself--or more accurately, the hesitation in being that 
consciousness effects. It functions as the space in which an existent can be 
posited as a conscious subject, and not merely a being. 
For Levinas, consciousness and the power to suspend it in withdrawing 
from the world of visible forms into the interval of the present transforms a being 
into a conscious subject and posits that subject in the world. An existent stands 
out against the "there is" as a conscious subject by withdrawing from the exterior 
world in inwardness and by withdrawing from the impersonal continuity of being 
by interrupting it with unconsciousness. The sincerity of worldly relations which is 
consciousness, and thus, the possibility of suspending consciousness, are two 
moments of the same capacity, and this capacity is given place by the hypostatic 
distance opened up by existing in the world. While consciousness is a mode of 
being, consciousness is also, and essentially, a hesitation in being. It is only 
because of that hesitation that a situation in that hesitation is possible. In other 
words, since the present, in the effort which constitutes it, lags behind the present, 
and since the inwardness of consciousness realizes this lag in the world and not in 
a pure event, consciousness can retreat into that interval. 
The fundamental situation presupposed by that retreat is not a spatial 
grounding which would be an objective "here"--even in sleep. Although to sleep is 
indeed to limit oneself to a place, the spatial positioning that is effected in lying 
down to sleep presupposes the more fundamental position required by 
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consciousness even when it is not unconsciousness. Levinas says expressly, "it is 
not a question of contact with the earth: to take one's stand on the earth is more 
than the sensation of contact, and more than a knowledge of a base. Here what 
is an "object" of knowledge does not confront the subject, but supports it, and 
supports it to the point that it is by leaning on the base that the subject posits 
itself as a subject" (DEE 120/EE 70). Levinas says this position precedes every 
act of understanding, every horizon, and all time. Consciousness is an origin and 
as such, unlike the present, it does have a point of departure--a position in being. 
The body is the "advent of consciousness" precisely because embodied 
consciousness is this position (DEE 122/EE 71). 
The radical positing to which Levinas has reference is that discovered by 
Descartes. Levinas writes: 
The cogito does not lead to the impersonal position: "there is thought," hut 
to the first person in the present: "I am something that thinks." The wmd 
thing here is admirably exact. For the most profound teaching of the 
Cartesian cogito consists in discovering thought as a substance, that is, as 
something that is posited. Thought has a point of departure. There is not 
only a consciousness of localization, but a localization of consciousne~s, 
which is not in turn reabsorbed into consciousness, into knowing. There is 
here something that stands out against knowing, that is a condition for 
knowing. (DEE 117 /EE 68) 
Thought collects itself into a personal "here," from which it is never detached. As 
localized thought, consciousness is always based or conditioned in this way: 
"Consciousness is precisely the fact that the impersonal and uninterrupted 
affirmation of 'eternal truths' can become simply a thought, that is, can, in spite of 
its sleepless eternity, begin or end in a head, light up or be extinguished, and 
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escape itself' (DEE 118/EE 69). The localization of thought is an inward event, 
an "uneventful event," to use Levinas' own words. Unconsciousness is a retreat 
into the lag of the present, a fainting away of luminosity, a lapse in intentionality. 
Nothing is present to the unconscious being. But in the lapse there is position 
and rest, and one can limit oneself to a place in sleep only because consciousness 
itself comes out of this more fundamental rest: 
Through position consciousness participates in sleep. The possibility of 
resting, of being closed up in oneself, is the possibility of giving oneself 
over to the base, of going to bed. It is contained in consciousness 
inasmuch as consciousness is localized. Sleep, a withdrawal into the 
plenum, takes place in consciousness as position. But position is the very 
event of the instant as a present. (DEE 124/EE 72) 
Consciousness itself comes out of rest, Levinas says, out of this radical position 
which is a unique relationship with a place. It is in this sense that consciousness 
has a base or condition, and this "having," he says, is the only sort of having that is 
not an encumbering (DEE 120/EE 70). Consciousness is "here" in the sense that 
it is posited, and it is by being posited that the subject is a subject. 
Life in the world is thus consciousness inasmuch as it provides the 
possibility of existing in a sincere withdrawal from existence. \Vhile sincerity is a 
hesitation in being, inasmuch as the desire which animates it resembles the 
neediness of a task to be taken up, a subject arises out of that hesitation. The 
ontological adventure in the world is irreducible to either a self-enclosed event or 
an authentic care for existence; it withdraws into inwardness and enjoys an 
exterior world. Levinas says that to be a subject is to be this very power of 
unending withdrawal, this ability to recover oneself behind whatever happens, this 
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power to detach oneself and remain free (DEE 78/EE 49). This is why insomnia 
is a phenomenologically significant moment. When one is freely exercising the 
power of withdrawal that is consciousness, whether in evanescence or in sleep, 
one is posited as a subject. But when one loses that control, as in insomnia, 
where it is expressly not the ego that stays awake, the subject dissipates and the 
ego is "swept away by the fatality of being" (DEE 110/EE 65). In short, to be in 
the world as a consciousness is to live through the hesitation or interval in 
existing, to fill up that interval and maintain it through the light. For this reason 
Levinas maintains that life is essentially neither an inauthentic pantomime nor an 
anxious care for survival: 
Our existence in the world, with its desires and everyday agitation, is then 
not an immense fraud, a fall into inauthenticity, an evasion of our deepest 
destiny. It is but the amplification of that resistance [sic] against 
anonymous and fateful being by which existence becomes consciousness, 
that is, a relationship an existent maintains with existence, through the 
light, which both fills up and maintains the interval. (DEE 69-70/EE S l) 
To be in the world is to existentially realize the non-coincidence of the subject 
with its own existence, its own idea of itself, its objects and its history, and to 
neutralize that non-coincidence by appropriating and possessing the world, thereby 
identifying the subject in the space of that discontinuity. 
Within this understanding of how the interval of consciousness functions, 
we can now begin to see how Levinas has phenomenologically traced out its 
source. The interval transpired in consciously existing in the world, like the 
interval of the present effected in the pure event of being, is significant for 
Levinas primarily because of its relation to yet another interval: the future, the 
space of postponement hefore death in which I can be for the Other. The 
analvses of De !'existence a l'existant open upon this interval of postponement 
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that hoth reveals the poverty of the other intervals and redeems them--it opens 
upon the interval of true time. This is not to say that in the pure event of existing 
the "future" that is struggled for is a true future. But the lag in existing does 
involve time, because the discontinuity effected in the apparition of the present 
can he redeemed by the Other and become a time to be for the Other. Similarly, 
it is because desire involves this distance, that it also involves a "time ahead of 
me" (DEE 59/EE 39); the desire of sincere relations in the world of light and 
objects involves this distance as a presupposition. We say "involves" this distance, 
because it does not travel it--the distance traversed by the desire of intentions is 
not the distance between the same and the Other, it is the spectral form of that 
distance which can be closed by satisfaction and comprehension. The alterity of 
the Other is lost sight of in the search for satisfaction. But, although the desire of 
conscious intentions does not recognize the source of the time opened to it in 
separation, it presupposes that time and operates within it. 
Thus, the common thread that links together the lag of the present in 
which there is no plurality or desire, the distance of consciousness in which there 
is desire, but also nullifying satisfaction, and the space of postponement before 
death in which there is absolute desire without the possibility of satisfaction, is the 
time of the "not yet"--the "nothingness necessary to time, which the subject cannot 
produce" (DEE 160/EE 94). This is the time opened in the social, or ethical, 
relation. This is true time. 
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Levinas says in the last section of the book, entitled "Vers la temps" ("On 
the Way to Time"), that the fundamental theme of the analyses recounted therein 
is this, that "time does not convey the insufficiency of the relationship with Being 
which is effected in the present, but that it is called for to provide a remedy for 
the excess of the definitve [sic] contact which the instant effects. Duration, on 
another plane than that of being, but without destroying being, resolves the tragic 
involved in being" (DEE 147 /EE 86). The retreat carried out by consciousness 
and unconsciousness is not an escape from being, only from the indefiniteness of 
anonymous being. In an uncommonly eloquent description Levinas says that the 
hope of freedom voiced in this unsuccessful escape "knocks on the closed doors of 
another dimension; it has a presentiment of a mode of existence where nothing is 
irrevokable [sic], the contrary of the definitive subjectivity of the 'I.' And this is 
the order of time" (DEE 152/EE 89). The hope of an order in which the ego 
could be liberated from itself does not have the power to realize that order. 
What produces the "thrust" of hope is the gravity of the present. 
But the economic time that is proper to life in the world cannot redeem or 
repair the present, it can at best compensate for it. Economic time, the time of 
the "I," is a time of compensation, and that is not enough for hope. Levinas says: 
It is not enough that tears be wiped away or death avenged; no tear is to 
be lost, no death be without a resurrection. Hope then is not satisfied with 
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a time composed of separate instants given to an ego that traverses them 
so as to gather in the following instant, as impersonal as the first one, the 
wages of its pain. The true object of hope is the Messiah, or salvation. 
(DEE 155-156/EE 91) 
Hope demands salvation from being, not just compensation for being; it is a hope 
for the redemption of the irredeemable present, for a future where the present 
will have the benefit of a true recall" (DEE 156/EE 91). 
The essence of time is to be found in responding to this exigency for 
salvation. The future is above all a resurrection of the present. The condition for 
the rebirth and resurrection of the "I" in fecundity is its death in the interval of 
the present, the interval opened in the lag of existence. It is precisely because the 
subject is an apparition--that is, always not yet present and haunted by that 
indefinitiveness--that the subject can be redeemed from the definitiveness of the 
present it does effect in its ironic mockery of divine creation; in the radical 
discontinuity of the lag in taking up one's own existence, the instant itself 
conditions redemption and consolation. This is why the instant must be 
understood in terms of its own dialectic in which the "indispensable interval of 
nothingness" is opened. That opening is effected, however, only in sociality. The 
"I" cannot endow itself with the alterity of a time in which it can recommence as 
genuinely other than itself. It is impossible to save oneself by oneself. While the 
definitive instant and its rupture from within can condition salvation, that 
salvation must come from beyond it. Levinas says "alterity comes to me only from 
the other. Is not sociality something more than the source of our representation 
of time: is it not time itself? . . . And the nothingness necessary to time, which 
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the subject cannot produce, comes from the social relationship" (DEE 160/EE 93-
94). The result of the first movement is thus the discovery that time is the key to 
escaping being and that the alterity of a true future is fundamentally linked to the 
alterity of the Other. 
Having thus explored the "foothold in being" effected in the instant, we are 
now in a position to move beyond it and consider the structure and constitutive 
moments of time itself, the time opened in the relationship with the Other. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE SECOND MOMENT OF HYPOSTASIS: 
TIME AND TRANSCENDENCE 
According to the 1979 preface, Le temps et l'autre reproduces the 
stenographic record of four lectures bearing that title which were given at Jean 
Wahl's Philosophical College in 1946 and 1947 (TA 7 /TO 29). In Ethique et 
infini Levinas says that Le temps et l'autre is a preparatory study of transcendence 
thought as diachrony: 
Time and the Other is a study of the relationship with the Other insofar as 
its element is time; as if time were transcendence, the opening par 
excellence onto the Other and onto the other. This thesis on 
transcendence, thought as dia-chrony, where the Same is non-in-different to 
the other without investing it in any way--not even by the most formal 
coincidence with it in a simple simultaneity--where the strangeness of the 
future is not described rightaway in its reference to the present, where it 
would be to-come [a-venir] and where it was already anticipated in a pro-
tention, this thesis (which preoccupies me much today) was, thirty years 
ago, only glimpsed. In Time and the Other it was treated starting from a 
series of more immediate evidences, which prepared some elements of the 
problem, such as I see it now. (EI 56-57 /EAi 56) 
The evidences of which Levinas speaks are to be found principally in the 
"mysterious" relationship with death and in several unique relationships with the 
Other: the erotic and the paternal. But before we address those evidences and 
the transcendent function of the time they are evidences for, I want to clarify and 
highlight the revolutionary nature of the insight that humbly announces itself in 
49 
the very first sentence of Le temps et l'autre, which declares the aim of the 
lectures to be a remarkable rethinking of time: Levinas says there that his. 
intention is "to show that time is not the achievement of an isolated and lone 
subject, but that it is the very relationship of the subject with the Other" (TA 
17 /TO 39). 
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Levinas argued in De !'existence a l'existant and will maintain in Le temps 
et l'autre that time cannot be a purely objective phenomenon, composed of 
separate and successive instants to which the "I" remains exterior and aloof.1 Nor 
can it be a completely subjective phenomenon, wholly internal to either the "I" or 
the instant; indeed, the solitude of hypostasis is due precisely to the absence of 
time.2 It is true that Levinas recognizes a "time" of concrete existence, which he 
calls the time of economic life. But this turns out to be a derivative and founded 
time.3 Moreover, because it is a time of mere reprisal and reciprocity where 
1 See, for instance: DEE 157-158, 160/EE 92, 94; TA 32/TO 52. 
2 Levinas says specifically: "Solitude is an absence of time. The time given, 
itself hypostatized and studied, the time the subject travels by carrying its identity, 
is a time incapable of loosening the tie of hypostasis" (TA 38/TO 57). While 
Alfonso Lingis, in the translator's introduction to Existence and Existents, says 
that "Time is the inner structure of subjectivity, that is, of the movement of ex-
isting" (EE 11 ), strictly speaking this is true only if we recognize that for Levinas 
the inner structure of subjectivity is not an accomplishment of the subject alone, 
but of the relationship of the subject with the Other--this is partly why, in 
Autrement qu'etre ou au-dela de !'essence, Levinas describes the subject as the 
very incarnation of the Other. It is inner not because it is immanent, but because 
it is accomplished by the dialectic of hypostasis. 
3 It will become apparent in due course that if a phenomenology of economic 
time were to be thought alongside the schematic structure of hypostasis, economic 
time may very well manifest itself to be the time of the solitary subject when 
actively exploiting the power discovered and seized in the first moment of 
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alterity is neutralized and every present, while haunted by insubstantiality, is 
nevertheless irrevocable, in a very real sense it is a privative and inauthentic time 
which recognizes no indebtedness and relation to alterity, and thus to true time. 
Levinas indicated at the end of De !'existence a l'existant that economic time, in 
which instants are equivalent and the "I" circulates across them only to link them 
up into a monotonous current of commerce and compensation, is not true time, as 
it is not time enough to endow the instant with a true future. He says the same 
thing in this text--that the economic time of the world has no true future and 
offers no salvation from the tragic structure of being. So strictly speaking, the 
economic "time" Levinas recognizes as proper to the solitary subject is time only 
in a very qualified sense. 
True time must repair the irreparable and resurrect the present in the 
irretrievable moment of its own death, says Levinas. Time must accomplish an 
escape from being and a remission of identity, it must grant a true future that can 
lead us beyond being and beyond ourselves. The question of time thus leads us 
quite literally elsewhere: ontologically speaking, in order for time to redeem us 
from being and lead us beyond it, time must itself be otherwise than being; 
hypostasis. This would explain why any analysis of this time alone would fail to 
penetrate the duplicitous obscurity produced when the relation between the ego 
and its existence is wrongly assumed to be the relationship fundamental to all 
others, including the relation to the other and the Other. This might also explain 
why the decisively biblical language of condemnation is used to characterize the 
attempt to ontologicallv escape the solitude of being--that is, the attempt to 
circumvent the Other and take by force what can only come through the 
generosity of the social relation and tht ethical responsibility it entails. 
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properly speaking, time must be a-proper to being--not simply improper, but 
refractory to the very categories of propriety and power that characterize all ontic 
and ontological relations.4 But is there such a time? The thesis of Le temps et 
J_jiutre, that time is the very relationship to unattainable alterity, is an affirmative 
and groundbreaking response to precisely that question. In brief, what Levinas 
attempts to do in this text is show that time is this a-proper event of redemption 
from being, and then show that this event is accomplished as the social 
relationship--a relationship so unlike any economic or causal relationship that he 
calls it a "relationship without relation" (TA 13/TO 35), but a relationship 
nevertheless. 
In a nutshell, this is what makes Levinas' "concept" of time truly 
revolutionary, and not just another theory of time. By thinking time as the 
relationship with the absolutely other--as the relationship itself, and not as the 
medium or mediator of that relationship, nor as the meaning of the being of the 
beings in that relationship--Levinas breaks radically with every other concept of 
time the philosophical tradition has authored, as well as from the assumption that 
4 It is precisely this fact that is covered over in many of the current readings 
of Levinas' concept of time as a "time of the Other," as if time could be thought 
within the boundaries of propriety, as if time could be a possession or attribute of 
either the Other or the relationship with the Other, rather than that very 
relationship itself. But it cannot: because of the phenomenological status of the 
Other, and hence, of the relation, time resists all possible categories of propriety; 
the subject can subsequently "have" a time that is essentially and primordially not 
his nor hers only because there prove to be two moments of hypostasis. 
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time can be reduced to a concept in the conventional sense.5 In addition, as we 
will later see more explicitly, by thinking time and the relationship with the other 
and the Other in terms other than those of intentionality, Levinas moves 
definitively beyond even the most radical phenomenology as well. 
Though it retraces some of the ground already covered, Le temps et l'autre 
essentially begins where De !'existence a l'existant ended. In the latter Levinas 
established through a series of phenomenological analyses of unusual and 
objectless phenomena that the existent has a position in being by virtue of which 
it escapes the horrible anonymity of an indeterminate and impersonal existence, 
but only at the cost of an ineluctable materiality; the existent realizes its escape 
from the anonymity of the "there is" only by committing itself in a moment of 
hypostasis to the definitive, identical, timeless existence destined for it by its 
present. Levinas thus established the first escape to be conditioned by yet 
another form of captivity: solitary subjectivity.6 Levinas explains in Ethique et 
5 I believe the concept of time that takes shape in Heidegger's later works 
may be an exception, but in order to see it as such one must read Heidegger in a 
way that remains faithful to his work but breaks from the traditional reading of 
that work, and certainly in a way that breaks from Levinas' own reading of 
Heidegger's work. The last part of this text will attempt to suggest the path such 
a reading could take, and by attending specifically to Heidegger's last texts, will 
attempt to show not only that such a reading remains faithful to Heidegger, but 
that Heidegger himself directs his reader along precisely that path. 
6 The solitude that the ego so desperately hopes to escape in every instant is 
not loneliness, the solitude of a being isolated from others, the solitude contingent 
upon a former mitsein, but the solitude of being itself. Levinas makes this quite 
clear in the interviews with Nemo, where he explicitly says: "It is not a matter of 
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infini that Le temps et l'autre accordingly represents the attempt to find a second 
~
escape--an escape from the isolation of being that constitutes the existential result 
and condemnation of the first escape.7 
This second escape is attempted in two stages, according to Levinas. The 
first stage seeks deliverance from the solitary being of the self through knowledge 
and nourishment, only to discover, on the one hand, that knowledge is in reality 
an immanence, an adequation between thought and what it thinks, and is 
therefore powerless to rupture the isolation of being, and on the other hand, that 
the enjoyment constitutive of nourishment likewise only eludes the self, and does 
not actually escape it. In other words, the ontological transcendence effected by 
both knowledge and nourishment is determined to be but a circulation within the 
closed economy of being: every autonomous movement away from the solitude of 
being inescapably returns to it by ending in appropriation and identification; the 
transcendence of space, light, and need--all moments of the ontological adventure-
-end up dissolving the alterity the subject seeks in a solution of propriety, identity 
and unity, and thus reveal themselves to be purely illusory forms of transcendence, 
and not an absolution at all.8 And yet, while this escape from the bonds of 
escaping from solitude, but rather of escaping from being" (EI 60/EAI 59). 
Similarly, in this text he explains: "Solitude is not tragic because it is the privation 
of the other, but because it is shut up within the captivity of its identity, because it 
is matter" (TA 38/TO 57). 
7 See EI 57-58/EAI 57. 
8 Levinas emphasizes in a number of places that the world of light and 
nourishments, while offering a certain kind of freedom, does not free the ego 
from the condemnation and captivity of its own existence. For example, in De 
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definitiveness cannot be achieved by the subject alone, who is definitively him- or 
herself and whose conscious existence constitutes the very work of identity, the 
definitive subject nevertheless manifests in each exigent recommencement of 
being the hope for a "miraculous fecundity" by virtue of which the instant could 
recommence as other that itself. In every instant the existent manifests the need 
!'existence a l'existant he says: 
The freedom of knowledge and intention is negative; it is non-
engagement. But what is the meaning of non-engagement within the 
ontological adventure? It is the refusal of the definitive. The world offers 
me a time in which I traverse different instants, and, thanks to the 
evolution open to me, I am not at any moment definitive. Yet I always 
carry along my past whose every instant is definitive. But then there 
remains for me, in this world of light, where all is given but where 
everything is distance, the power of not taking anything or of acting as 
though I had not taken anything. The world of intentions and desires is 
the possibility of just such a freedom. But this freedom does not save me 
from the definitive character of my very existence, from the fact that I am 
forever stuck with myself. And this definitive element is my solitude. 
The world and light are solitude. These given objects, these clothed 
beings are something other than myself, but they are mine. Illuminated by 
light, they have meaning, and thus are as though they came from me. In 
the understood universe I am alone, that is, closed up in an existence that 
is definitively one. (DEE 143-44/EE 84-85) 
In a similar passage from Le temps et l'autre Levinas says essentially the same 
thing: 
Self-forgetfulness and the luminosity of enjoyment do not break the 
irremissible attachment of the ego to the self when one separates this light 
from the ontological event of the subject's materiality, where it has its 
place, and when, in the name of reason, one elevates this light into an 
absolute. The interval of space given by light is instantaneously absorbed 
by light. Light is that through which something is other than myself, but 
already as if it came from me. The illuminated object is something one 
encounters, but from the very fact that it is illuminated one encounters it 
as if it came from us. It does not have a fundamental strangeness. Its 
transcendence is wrapped in immanence. The exteriority of light does not 
suffice for the liberation of the ego that is the self's captive. (TA 4 7 /TO 
64-65) 
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for a time which could actually "unravel" the definitive knot tied in the taking up 
of an exigent present, the demand for an order where the chains that bind the ego 
to the self, chains forged and fastened in the present, could be broken. Hence, 
the first stage reaffirms the findings of the earlier analyses, and moves beyond 
their discoveries primarily in preparing the way for the second stage by 
demonstrating that despite the fact that the subject definitively posited in being 
cannot free itself from the enchainment of identity and timeless presence, it 
nevertheless bears the trace of alterity and time, a trace the solitary ego cannot 
account for.9 
Levinas promised in De !'existence a l'existant that a later analysis would 
show the dynamism of the "I" which resides in the presence of an exigent present 
to be capable of ex-cending that resident captivity in the relation with the 
Other, 10 and thus to be capable of existing within the dimension of a true time 
where fecundity and salvation from being is not only possible, but essential. 11 
The second stage of the analysis in Le temps et l'autre finally fulfills this promise. 
It both affirms the "I" to be "the very ferment of time in the present" (DEE 
158/EE 92), and shows time--understood as sociality, the relationship with the 
9 This is clearly part of the reason why Levinas considers the Cartesian 
analyses so significant: like the idea of the infinite, the hope for a redemptive 
time--which the ego of itself could not even imagine, were it not for the 
relationship with alterity--reveals an ontological order different from the 
epistemological order that "discovers" it. 
10 See note 1, chapter 2. 
11 See DEE 157 /EE 92. 
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Other--to be the way of escaping, or ex-cending the captive economics of the 
present. That is, Le temps et l'autre shows that the second escape is conditioned 
by the hypostatic event of evanescence, but realized only in another hypostatic 
event--the event of temporal transcendence. 
Before considering Levinas' analyses of the concrete situations wherein this 
temporal transcendence is occurs, a few cautionary measures are necessitated by 
the very radicality of the way temporality is thought in his text. First, we must 
keep in mind that as one of the "terms" of the social relation is essentially 
unthematizable, the time constituted by that relation lies beyond the grasp of any 
adequate representation, and thus can be spoken of as a "concept" only if the 
word is understood under a kind of erasure so as to at least mark the unavoidable 
transformation of the time that will inevitably fail to be thought as a concept in 
any attempt to so think it.12 
One must also keep in mind that despite the radical break with traditional 
ontology attempted by Levinas in his rethinking of time, he nevertheless thinks 
and speaks about time in virtually all of his work ( and especially here) with 
particular reference to being, and this reference leaves its mark, though in 
different ways, upon both the analyses and the character of time that emerges 
from those analyses. Of the seminal books only Autrement qu'etre ou au-dehl de 
!'essence even begins the attempt to think the social relation in a context which 
12 It is, as we shall see, precisely this irreducibility of time to a concept that 
problematizes time for phenomenology and contributes to the demand for a 
revision of its basic concepts. 
would approximate its own element. Le temps et l'autre, like De !'existence a 
Wistant and Totalite et infini, remains firmly oriented within a concern for 
securing an escape from being, and more problematically, within a certain 
opposition to Sein und Zeit. For instance, in De )'existence a l'existant Levinas 
effectively conducted his analyses within the same parameters he seems to have 
understood Heideggerian fundamental ontology to have mistakenly imposed on 
the existential analytic of Dasein: the limits belonging to a solitary existent 
fundamentally related only to its own existence and death.13 In fact, we could 
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say that De !'existence a l'existant was, in a very real sense, Levinas' ironic 
contribution to fundamental ontology.14 Totalite et infini, in like manner, will 
unfold in many respects as if in direct opposition to Heidegger's analysis of Being-
in-the-world in division one of Sein und Zeit and to Heidegger's attempt in 
division two of Sein und Zeit to think time as the meaning of being. Le temn~ et 
l'autre also opposes those analyses, but does so within the ontological perspective 
established in De !'existence a l'existant. The result is an exposition of time that 
somewhat obscures the radicality of the thinking that is actually broached therein: 
while opposing Heidegger, Le temps et l'autre primarily continues the task of 
seeking an escape from being, and thus thinks time while oriented within this 
13 See TA 57-58, 89/TO 70-71, 93. 
14 Cohen notes in his review of Existence and Existents, in Man and World 12, 
no. 4, ( 1979): 521, that "it is a book devoted to what Heidegger might have called 
'fundamental ontology' if its theses did not radically contest Heideggerian 
ontology and propose a daring alternative for contemporary thought." I agree with 
this assessment. 
particular relation to being, rather than in a way more appropriate to its own 
structures--and Levinas himself is very careful to point this out. 15 In other 
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words, despite the radicality of what is thought in this work, the way it is thought 
remains tied to Heidegger's work, Levinas' initial response to that work, and to 
Levinas' own early ontological concerns, especially the concern for tracing out the 
dialectic of hypostasis and freeing the material existent from the solitude of 
definitive being. 
Having once resituated us within the discourse begun in De !'existence a 
l'existant, Le temps et l'autre proceeds to subtly expand the scope of that prior 
investigation. We remember that despite the lag in taking up existence, the 
positing of a phantom subject in the apparition of the spectral present is in and of 
itself insufficient to account for time. In the first lecture of Le temps et l'autre 
Levinas recalls and elaborates on this insufficiency: 
Positing hypostasis as a present is still not to introduce time into being. 
Although giving us the present, we are given neither a stretch of time set 
within a linear series of duration, nor a point of this series. It is not a 
matter of a present cut out of a current, already constituted time, or of an 
element of time, but of the function of the present, of the rip that it brings 
about in the impersonal infinity of existing. It is like an ontological 
schema. On the one hand, it is an event and not yet something; it does not 
exist; hut it is an event of existing through which something comes to start 
out from itself. On the other hand, it is still a pure event that must be 
expressed by a verb; and nonetheless there is a sort of molting in this 
existing, already a something, already an existent. It is essential to grasp 
the present at the limit of existing and the existent, where, in function of 
existing, it already turns into an existent. (TA 32/TO 52) 
15 See, for example, TA 87 /TO 92. 
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Toe function of the present, Levinas now explains, is to rip and rejoin the 
beginningless and endless fabric of impersonal existence. Hence, the task for 
thought at the limit of existing and the existent--at the limit of this instantaneous 
severance and de-severance--is to attend to the dynamism of that interruptive 
"turn" from a pure activity "into" a substantial being. It is essential to grasp the 
present and examine its function at this limit because it is there that we see the 
present is a way of accomplishing a beginning without receiving anything from the 
past: the present has no duration and does not endure, so it cannot receive 
anything from something preceding it, nor give anything to what follows it. 
This is important because it shows that the present is essentially "the 
departure from self," the "starting out from itself' of an evanescence. In fact, 
Levinas describes this evanescent present as "the essential form of beginning" (TA 
33/TO 53), since in severing and de-severing the continuity of existence, the 
present is beginning, or evanescence, itself. The present is itself the beginning of 
a departure from the self. Levinas says this evanescence results in an existent by 
a dialectical reversal that describes, rather than excludes, the "I": thought at the 
limit of existing and the existent, the ego is the very function of hypostasis, a 
mode of existing that does not itself exist, but turns into an existent in the course 
of performing its function; the present and the "I" turn into existents, but the "I" is 
not initially an existent; the "I" is both moments together, separated and joined by 
an interval of nothingness. The resultant possibility is that, since the "I" is not 
initially an existent, and thus not initially condemned to the solitude of being, then 
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in the interval of that turn before the "I" becomes a solitary existent there is time 
h. h 16 to be somet rng ot er. 
Although in the passage across that interval the present and the "I" become 
existents, and can then be formed into a time so they then have time like an 
existent, Levinas points out that the resultant time they form and have is an 
economic, hypostatized time that is, and no longer "time in its schematic function 
between existing and the existent, time as the pure event of hypostasis" (TA 
34 /TO 54 ). What, then, is time as the pure event? It is the time between event 
and substantiality, and the very granting of that time; it is the opening of the 
interval of postponement before definitive mortality and death, the space of 
nothingness traversed by the phantom subject in passing from the pure event of 
existing toward the materiality and definitiveness of a being that is, and is thus 
mortal! Time of the pure event cannot be reduced to hypostatized time for much 
the same reason that the event of saying cannot be reduced to what is said in that 
event: the granting of time is never appropriate to nor comprehensible within the 
time that is granted--there is always an essential excess. The "time" one "has" is a 
16 Totalite et infini tells us what there is time to be: an ethical being 
"responsible for the Other" (TI 213/TAI 236). There is time to be an ego that 
existentially recognizes it is always already in a relationship with the Other by 
virtue of the schematic time of the pure event, in a relationship of responsibility 
for the Other, and thus not fundamentally an ego. In the interval of the turn 
there is time to be for the Other. But this responsibility is not that of a burden 
which can be assumed; it involves--as we shall see--a veritable trans-substantiation 
of the subject. 
62 
time which is hypostatized in the appropriative spanning of the interval, whereas 
the time of the pure event is the very opening of the interval itself.17 
In effect, then, what Levinas discovers by attending to the dialectic of 
hypostasis at the limit of the dynamism of the turn from existing into an existent is 
that the celebrated freedom and power realized in the turn that accomplishes a 
mastery of existence and an apparition of the present conceals another moment of 
hypostasis that is not an event of mastery and presence: the event of temporal 
transcendence, the ethical relationship with the Other. As present and "I," 
hypostasis is indeed the freedom of beginning, the discovery and exertion of the 
virility, power, and mastery of a subject. It is this moment which condemns its 
accomplishment to tragic definitiveness by committing the subject to a material 
existence and to an economic movement of perpetual self-identification within 
that existence--and thus to the captivity, solitude, and fatality of being. But there 
is another moment and another movement. The evanescence of the existent, the 
beginning constituted by the apparition of the phantom present and accomplished 
in the substantiation of a spectral, though virile subject, marks only the one 
moment in the dialectic of hypostasis, and there are two. In addition to the first 
moment and its accomplishment the dialectic of hypostasis realizes the ex-cendent 
transcendence and radical dis-inter-estedness anticipated in the existential analyses 
of De !'existence a l'existant: the diachronous relation to the Other. This is the 
transcendent liberation effected by time, a movement that does not return the ego 
17 See note 4. 
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to the self, but turns it toward the Other and the Good. 18 This second moment 
of hypostasis thus realizes the liberation rooted in being and hoped for in the 
phantom present--not a pure liberation of the ego from the self, which is 
impossible for a material subject without destroying the ego's identity and thus 
nullifying the escape, but a liberation which realizes a relationship with a1terity 
while maintaining the ego's identity. To summarize: thinking the dialectic of 
hypostasis at the limit of the turn reveals hypostasis to be more than present and 
"I"; it reveals existence to be pluralist, and the "I" substantiated and thereby 
invested with power in the first moment to be, in a second moment, primordially 
related to the Other, who lies beyond all power and presence. 
This explains how the subject can bear the trace of time in the present 
while being powerless to produce it therein, despite the power realized and 
celebrated in mastering existence: while time is impossible for the subject 
alone, 19 the capacity for time belongs primordially to the ego as a function of 
hypostasis--or more specifically--by virtue of a certain moment of hypostasis, which 
accomplishes a relation that precedes all exercise of power and freedom granted 
by that mastery. The ego to which time is granted is not irremissibly condemned 
to solitude, for it is an ego primordially related to the Other--related to the Other 
in the event of its evanescence as an existent. It was for this reason that Levinas 
said in De !'existence a l'existant that the existent is the very "ferment" of time: 
18 See, for instance, TI 24 7 /TAI 269. 
19 See TA 64/TO 77. 
because the dynamism of the "I" needs a nothingness and alterity evanescence 
cannot supply, a time in which it can miraculously recommence as other than 
itself, and because this need belongs to the very structure of the present: 
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In place of the "I" that circulates in time, we posit the "I" as the very 
ferment of time in the present, the dynamism of time. This dynamism is 
not that of dialectical progression, nor that of ecstasy, nor that of duration, 
where the present encroaches upon the future and consequently does not 
have between its being and its resurrection the indispensable interval of 
nothingness. The dynamism of the "I" resides in the very presence of the 
present, in the exigency which this present implies. (DEE 158/EE 92) 
This need for a non-definitive recommencement in being is the residence of the 
dynamism of time, Levinas says--in part because time is granted in the 
recommencement of an absolutely other instant, and also because the very 
presence of the present, the existence of that which recommences, is presence 
across the interval in which time is granted, the "indispensable interval of 
nothingness." The reason why this interval is indispensable, and the reason why 
the dynamism of time is said to "reside" therein, is that the nothingness of this 
interval not only purges a being of residual instants and their definitiveness, it 
opens the space in which the relationship with the Other, which is time itself, can 
take place. 
In De !'existence a l'existant Levinas explained that the nothingness 
necessary for both the event of evanescence and the social relation comes from 
the Other with whom the subject is hypostatically related: 
How indeed could time arises [sic] in a solitary subject? The solitary 
subject cannot deny itself; it does not possess nothingness. If time is not 
the illusion of a movement, pawing the ground, then the absolute alterity of 
another instant cannot be found in the subject, who is definitively himself. 
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This alterity comes to me only from the other. Is not sociality something 
more than the source of our representation of time: is it not time itself? If 
time is constituted by my relationship with the other, it is exterior to my 
instant, but it is also something else than an object given to contemplation. 
The dialectic of time is the very dialectic of the relationship with the other, 
that is, a dialogue which in turn has to be studied in terms other than those 
of the dialectic of the solitary subject. The dialectic of the social 
relationship will furnish us with a set of concepts of a new kind. And the 
nothingness necessary to time, which the subject cannot produce, comes 
from the social relationship." (DEE 160/EE 93-94) 
Levinas notes that time is exterior to the instant. And yet, we have seen that the 
interval and the time it grants is also spanned and thus appropriated, after a 
fashion, by the instant, which results in an hypostatized time and a definitive 
subject.20 The apparent paradox that manifests itself here is due to the 
misguided insistence on a time that is either objective or subjective. Levinas says 
"traditional philosophy, and Bergson and Heidegger too, remains with the 
conception of a time either taken to be purely exterior to the subject, a time-
object, or taken to be entirely contained in the subject" (DEE 160/EE 94). What 
Levinas is able to show, to the contrary, is that time is neither exclusively 
objective or subjective. Neither is it proper to the subject or the other. It is the 
a-proper, intersubjective relationship itself.21 The 1979 preface accordingly 
20 With good reason, this structure resembles Descartes' idea of the infinite, 
where it can be said that the "I" simultaneously thinks the Infinite and does not 
think it, contains the idea and does not contain it, since in thinking the idea of the 
Infinite the ideatum surpasses the idea and the "I" thinks more than it thinks. See 
DEHH 171-72/CPP 53-54. 
21 I do not think the inclusion of Heidegger among those make this mistake is 
justified, as Heidegger most certainly thinks time outside the boundaries of 
objective or subjective propriety. This is especially clear in the later works, but is 
evident even in the early texts. 
66 
announces that Le temps et l'autre is but the "birth and first formulation" of the 
project to which Levinas still adheres: the vital problem of thinking time as dia-
chrony, as the relationship of finite being to the "beyond being" (TA 8-11/TO 30-
33). 
Thus, Levinas later explains in Ethique et infini that time appeared to him 
in Le temps et l'autre as both an "enlargement" of existence and a "dynamism" 
that leads us beyond ourselves.22 The solitude of being, while tragic, results 
from the fact that the present comes only from itself; "the subject is alone because 
it is one," Levinas says, and this solitude is necessary in order for there to be an 
existent at all (TA 35 /TO 54 ). Although necessary and tragic, it is not ultimately 
and inescapably tragic, because the second moment of hypostasis involves a 
dialectical reversal of the existent's mastery over being, and thus, of the solitude 
and condemnation that attaches to it.23 This is the reversal by which the subject 
finds itself to be in time, and to be in time, says Levinas, is to "shatter" the 
enchainment of matter and thus the finality of the first moment of hypostasis (TA 
38/TO 57). The subject who takes up existence may be "one," and thus bear the 
tragic chains of a solitude which is that very unity, but the existence that the 
22 See EI 62-63/EAI 61. 
23 One must be careful not to confuse, at this point, the tragic reversal of 
materiality, the reversal that occurs within the momentum established by the first 
moment, by which the subject's sovereignty over being is effaced in an enslaving 
return to itself, with this more fundamental reversal of the first moment, a 
reversal that occurs at the limit of evanescence and by which the ego finds the 
first moment to have a remission in the second, and what is "posterior" to have an 
"anteriority." 
subject takes up is not a unitary existence, but a pluralist existence--and thus an 
existence in which time is possible from the very beginning. 
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The first lecture ends with these groundbreaking conclusions. The 
remaining lectures pull back from these schematic considerations and concentrate 
on thinking through the concrete situations in which the granting of time is 
phenomenologically evident, those situations which actually accomplish the 
dialectic of hypostasis, and thus the liberation of the ego with which everyday life 
is constantly preoccupied.24 In other words, they examine those situations in 
which time appears precisely as diachrony, as a mode of the "beyond-being" [l' "au 
dela de l'etre"]:25 initially, where it appears as a "mysterious" relationship with 
death--that is, with the other, with alterity itself; and finally, in the erotic and 
paternal relationships with the Other, the personal other. 
The analysis of death is sketched out in Le temps et l'autre alongside an 
analysis of light and knowledge, and prior to addressing eros and paternity, 
precisely in order to show that the relation with alterity is not intentional, and in 
24 Levinas points out explicitly that the analysis of time in its schematic 
function takes us beyond phenomenology: "In positing the present as the mastery 
of the existent over existing, and in seeking in it the passage from existing to the 
existent, we find ourselves at a level of investigation that can no longer can 
qualified as experience. And if phenomenology is only a method of radical 
experience, we will find ourselves beyond phenomenology." (TA 34 /TO 54) 
25 Levinas often calls this temporal relation to the beyond-being "religion," in 
order to indicate the liminality of this thinking: the fact that he is attempting to 
think this relationship at the very limit of relational thinking--as a relationship 
without terms, a relation sans relation, a relationship of height and proximity with 
the Infinite and Invisible which assures the non-indifference of the Infinite and 
Invisible to thought while preserving its alterity. See TA 8-13/TO 31-35. 
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order to follow the movement of hypostasis itself. Levinas explicitly indicates that 
this analytic progression is not phenomenological, but is designed to lead us 
through the dialectic of hypostasis to those situations that accomplish it.26 This 
strategy also leads us very effectively from the other to the Other while drawing 
an important contrast between the asymmetrical, diachronic structure of the 
relationship with alterity, and the symmetrical, contemporaneous structure of 
intentional and ontological relationships. What it eventually shows is that the 
former takes us beyond intentionality, both experientially and analytically. 
Levinas admits that the intentional relations constitutive of conscious 
existence in the world mark an undeniable triumph over the anonymity of 
impersonal existence, insofar as in everyday existence the materiality of the 
subject is to a certain degree overcome. As we saw earlier, this overcoming is 
effected in the realization of an interval between the ego and the self, an interv~tl 
opened by the delay and distance constitutive of sincerity. But this is only another 
way of saying that the structure of intentionality is ecstatic: the subject leaves itself 
and does not immediately return; there is a delay prior to satisfaction, a distance 
between desire and desired; the world of objects ~ffers itself to the subject, and 
the subject separates from itself in comprehending or enjoying those objects. This 
freedom of separation is the very accomplishment of a subject, says Levinas, since 
it effects a forgetfulness of self, and thus, a kind of subjective freedom. 
26 See TA 87 /TO 92. 
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And yet, insofar as this freedom is a freedom of self-forgetfulness alone, 
and not a definitive escape from the self, it is only an illusory transcendence--a 
transcendence compromised when the subject is inevitably recalled to itself. The 
ecstacy of existence in the world of light and desire is limited by the object 
offered to the subject: Levinas insists, "Human life in the world does not go 
beyond the objects that fulfil [sic] it. . . . It is an ecstatic existence--being 
outside oneself--but limited by the object" (TA 45-46/TO 63). The subject does 
not return to itself immediately, but it does return; the subject is in space and thus 
at a distance from the objects it illuminates, desires, and enjoys, but that distance 
is always eventually closed. And because the interval produced in the world of 
light and nourishments is always eventually closed, the illuminated or desired 
object cannot retain its difference and alterity. The simple fact of the matter is 
that in intentional relations the desired or intended object never has a 
fundamental alterity with respect to the subject. Rather, the difference between 
the subject and the object affirmed by the intentionality of consciousness is a 
difference that is dissolved in the completion of the very move that first 
constitutes it; the object is other than the subject, but only during the interval it 
takes for the subject to return to itself in knowledge or satisfaction and re-identify 
itself thereby. Hence, the illuminating or desiring subject cannot realize an 
absolute exteriority through desire and intentionality, and the transcendence of 
self-forgetfulness that intentionality realizes does not definitively break the ego's 
enchainment to the self and does not overcome the tragic solitude of material 
being. 
But as we have glimpsed in De !'existence a l'existant, material life is not 
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entirely self-forgetfulness. It is also and essentially pain, sorrow, fatigue, and 
suffering--and unlikely as it may seem, we find here in a roundabout way an 
opening upon the liberation Levinas has been seeking, for in suffering there is the 
proximity of death, and hence a relationship with what is not and cannot be 
intended.27 In pain, sorrow, fatigue, and suffering we once again encounter the 
finality of solitude, but here the ecstasis of intentional relations and enjoyment 
cannot surmount it. \Vhat is phenomenologically interesting about physical 
suffering is that in suffering the material being "experiences" both the impossibility 
of nothingness (because in suffering one is directly exposed to being, without the 
possibility of a withdrawal, refuge or retreat) and, at the same time, a call to this 
impossible nothingness (because in suffering one also encounters the fact that 
suffering can end in death, and more concretely, the mysterious approach of death 
itself). In other words, when we are in pain, exhausted, or overcome by sorrow or 
suffering there is both the absolute absence of death and the absolute proximity of 
death. There is a relationship with death, but as it is a relationship with what is 
27 This is not to affirm the seemingly obvious and mundane fact that in death 
the cares and pains of existence are once and for all escaped. Despite the 
pervasiveness of this belief, strictly speaking it is not true, for in this "escape" 
there is nothing that escapes--the subject is no more. In death the subject indeed 
ceases to be, but because of that very fact the cessation of the subject in death 
cannot comprise an escape from being for the subject, as in death there is no 
longer a subject left to escape. 
essentially absent and with what cannot be known or intended, it cannot be an 
ontological relationship, since nothing that is present has such a character. The 
relationship with death is the relationship with alterity itself. 
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The principal characteristic of death that emerges in Le temps et l'autre is 
this essential alterity. Death is unknowable: it does not appear and cannot 
appear. It does not and cannot belong to the world of light and phenomena. But 
what is more, it does not belong to the world of activity and power. Levinas will 
later say in Totalite et infini that death is unforeseeable because it does not lie 
within any horizon, nor is it open to grasp; in the struggle with death one 
contends with the invisible itself (TI 210/TAI 233). Death is ungraspable: it 
occasions and manifests a subjective passivity beyond all passivity that is simply 
the negation or failure of activity, as in death the subject is absolutely 
overwhelmed, but overwhelmed by what, in an instant that is not its own, comes 
to it from elsewhere.28 In dying the subject loses its very subjectivity. Levinas 
says: "The unknown of death signifies that the very relationship with death cannot 
take place in the light, that the subject is in relationship with what does not come 
from itself' (TA 56/TO 70). The proximity of death announces an event outside 
all light, and thus beyond the very structure of intentionality and power, an event 
that renders the ego incapable of returning to itself. And yet, in its inexorable 
28 Levinas says: "My death comes from an instant upon which I can in no way 
exercise my power" (TI 211/TAI 234). 
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approach we are related to death nevertheless. In Levinas' words, the relationship 
with death is thus the "relationship with mystery" (TA 57 /TO 70). 
Levinas contrasts the death that is approximated in suffering to the death 
evoked in Heidegger's being-toward-death--or at least, in Levinas' understanding 
of it. 29 He says that being-toward-death for Heidegger is a supreme lucidity and 
hence a supreme virility: "It is Dasein's assumption of the uttermost possibility of 
existence, which precisely makes possible all other possibilities, and consequently 
makes possible the very feat of grasping a possibility--that is, it makes possible 
activity and freedom. Death in Heidegger is an event of freedom, whereas for me 
the subject seems to reach the limit of the possible in suffering. It finds itself 
enchained, overwhelmed, and in some way passive" (TA 57-58/TO 70-71). 
Levinas therefore insists that any analysis of death must begin, not with the 
nothingness of death, for of that nothingness we know and can know nothing; 
instead, it must begin with the recognition that in death we encounter the 
absolutely unknowable and ungraspahle. So when Levinas says that the subject 
seems to reach the limit of the possible in suffering, this "limit" cannot be a limit 
in the sense of a boundary that belongs to what it limits and is proper to it. The 
"limit" which is approximated in suffering and which appears as death is alterity 
itself, which lies on the hither side of any proper delimitation or end. It is for this 
reason Levinas rejects Heidegger's understanding of death as the ultimate horizon 
29 As we will note later, Heidegger recognizes a constitutive moment to death 
that Levinas does not credit him with recognizing, and this recognition makes a 
considerable difference when it is accounted for. 
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of possibility, the impossibility of any further possibility and propriety, explaining 
that in order for death to serve such a proper economic function, death must be 
drawn into the realm of the possible--which denies its absolute mystery and 
alterity. He thus exclaims in a famous footnote to part III of the text: "Death in 
Heidegger is not, as Jean Wahl says, 'the impossibility of possibility,' but the 
'possibility of impossibility"' (TA 57 /TO 70). According to Levinas, in death we 
are seized by that which renders even the assumption of possibility impossible, by 
that which is absolutely refractory to all categories of the possible, including the 
impossible. Death, understood in this way, can only be properly spoken of as 
radical alterity itself: "This approach of death," Levinas says, "indicates that we are 
in relation with something that is absolutely other, something bearing alterity not 
as a provisional determination we can assimilate through enjoyment, but as 
something whose very existence is made of alterity" (TA 63/TO 74). 
\Vith respect to death, then, we are in relation with what does not belong 
to any of the domains or categories of being. We are in relation with alterity 
itself, with what is essentially otherwise than being. What is more, as otherwise 
than being, and unlike all beings and phenomena, death "is" precisely when it is 
not. "Death is never a present," Levinas observes (TA 59/TO 71). This is not 
due to any evasion or diversion, but to a fact already noted: death is ungraspable 
and absolutely beyond any power of the subject granted by the evanescence of its 
being--which power constitutes the present. Levinas explains, 
The now is the fact that I am master, master of the possible, master of 
grasping the possible. Death is never now. When death is here, I am no 
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longer here, not just because I am nothingness, but because I am unable to 
grasp. My mastery, my virility, my heroism as a subject can be neither 
virility nor heroism in relation to death. (TA 59 /TO 72) 
In the proximity of death the subject's activity is reversed into radical passivity 
precisely because in the presence of death there is nothing present over which the 
subject can exercise any of the power and virility which constitutes its subjectivity. 
If a subject is determined by its mastery, then in relation to death, the subject is 
in relation to something that is essentially not present, and thus cannot either be 
mastered or fail to be mastered; death cannot be related to at all in terms of 
power. 
But, in addition, death is "not present" in a peculiar way: it is not present, 
but coming. This is what accounts for its proximity. Levinas points out that death 
is never assumed, it comes. Death is not present in the sense of being always not 
yet present. This approach belongs to the essence of the relationship with death. 
Levinas therefore concludes that our relationship with death is not only a 
relationship with alterity, but is nothing less than "a unique relationship with the 
future" (TA 59/TO 71). Death is: 
The eventuality of the event at the point of making an irruption within the 
Sameness of immanence, of interrupting the monotony and the tick-tock of 
solitary instants--the eventuality of the wholelv other, of the future, the 
temporality of time where diachrony precisely describes the relationship 
with what remains absolutely outside." (TA 13/TO 35) 
Death, understood as alterity, is pure futurity. 
The reversal of the subject's activity into passivity is the consequence of 
this peculiar temporality opened in the inexorable approach of death. Let us 
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consider this temporality. Since death marks the limit of the virility and mastery 
made possible by the first moment of hypostasis and manifest in the phenomenon 
of the present, and thus marks the moment at which the subject no longer has the 
power to have power, it marks the moment at which the possibility of all 
projection and ecstasis ceases. This is so not only because of the death of the 
subject, but because of the essential absence of that over which the subject would 
exercise power. Thus, strictly speaking, it would appear as if we could have no 
relation at all to the pure event of death. But let us attend again to the fact that 
the death with which we are in relation is a death over which we now and forever 
do not yet have power. Why? Because it is always not yet present. Death may 
be imminent, but in that imminence is opened a margin, and it is within this 
margin that hope and relationship is possible. What tragic heroes seize prior to 
death, says Levinas, is this hope or last chance before death comes, not death 
itself. That last chance is seized in the margin or interval opened by death's 
imminence, and thus by death's futurity. In Totalite et infini Levinas explains this 
more clearly. 
The time that separates me from my death dwindles and dwindles without 
end, involves a sort of last interval which my consciousness cannot traverse, 
and where a leap will somehow be produced from death to me. The last 
part of the route will be crossed without me; the time of death flows 
upstream; the I in its projection toward the future is overturned by a 
movement of imminence, pure menace, which comes to me from an 
absolute alterity. Thus in a tale by Edgar Allen Poe, as the walls that 
imprison the narrator close in inexorably, he looks upon death with a look 
which as a look has always an expanse before it, but perceives also the 
uninterrupted approach of an instant infinitely future for the I who awaits 
it--ultima latet--which, in a countercurrent movement, will efface this 
infinitesimal--but untraversable--distance. This interference of movements 
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across the distance that separates me from the last moment distinguishes 
the temporal interval from the spatial. (TI 211-12/TAI 235) 
Death is such that its proximity opens upon the temporality of an interval which is 
not ecstatic or otherwise proper to the subject, a temporal interval in which one 
can have time. By virtue of this interval, the existent is a temporal being, not just 
a mortal being--and a temporal being has time of detente, where "nothing is 
definitive yet, nothing consummated" (Tl 200-201/TAI 224) 
Levinas says that the event of death indicates that "we have assumed 
existence in such a way that an event can happen to us that we no longer assume, 
not even in the way that we assume events" (TA 62/TO 74 ). What is it about the 
"way" that we have assumed existence that accounts for this passivity, futurity, and 
relationship with alterity? It is that we assume existence in a hypostasis that has 
two fundamental moments, one of which constitutes a transcendence of the 
existence accomplished in the other. The approach of death indicates that we are 
in relation from the very beginning with something whose very essence is made up 
of futurity and alterity, and that this relationship is conditioned hy hypostasis 
itself. What this means is that existence itself is pluralist! This is the apex of 
Levinas' argument: 
. . . Existence is pluralist. Here the plural is not a multiplicity of 
existents; it appears in existing itself. A plurality insinuates itself into the 
very existing of the existent, which until this point was jealously assumed by 
the subject alone and manifest through suffering. In death the existing of 
the existent is alienated. (TA 63/TO 75) 
An entire chapter of Totalite et infini is devoted to this pluralism. Levinas 
describes it there as a "multiple existing [ un exister multiple]," and a "radical 
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multiplicity" (TI 195/TAI 220). He says this multiplicity is the ultimate event of 
being. 
For a multiplicity to be maintained, there must be produced in it the 
subjectivity that could not seek congruence with the being in which it is 
produced. Being must hold sway as revealing itself, that is, in its very 
being flowing toward an I that approaches it, but flowing toward it 
infinitely without running dry, burning without being consumed. But this 
approach cannot be conceived as a cognition in which the knowing subject 
is reflected and absorbed .... but rather as the surplus of the social 
relation, ... The social relation itself is not just another relation, one 
among so many others that can be produced in being, but is its ultimate 
event. (TI 196/TAI 221) 
Existence itself is pluralist, and it is the production of this pluralism that 
accomplishes the dialectic of hypostasis and effects a true escape from the 
condemnation of solitary being! 
Levinas says that what we can infer from the discovery of pluralist 
existence is that "only a being whose solitude has reached a crispation through 
suffering, and in relation with death, takes its place on a ground where the 
relation with the other becomes possible" (TA 64/TO 76). Only a being for 
whom death is proximate and existence is pluralist can have a relationship with 
the other, which is beyond all intentionality and power as it is the future itself. 
But to have a relationship with the other is not, in and of itself, to have a 
relationship with the Other. The latter, the social relation, makes possible the 
former. But death and the other come from the same region, Levinas tells us in 
Totalite et infini30--this is why the relationship with the Other can condition the 
30 In Totalite et infini the analysis of time takes place, as one might anticipate 
following a careful reflection upon the title, within a phenomenological analysis of 
relationship with the other, and this is perhaps why the Other is feared and 
instinctively associated with the threat of death.31 But of more importance to 
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this analysis is the fact that since the other and the Other are not the same, 
neither is their function with regard to hypostasis. Levinas has been seeking an 
escape from being for the solitary subject, a situation in which the subject can still 
remain a self and in which the freedom acquired by hypostasis can be maintained-
-not a situation, as in death, where the ego and its freedom would be destroyed 
and definitive existence would revert back into anonymous existence. As Levinas 
the Same and the Other as the two terms of a very specific relationship--a 
relationship characterized by a transgressive movement at the limits of 
immanence: time appears within the subjective perspective of the Same--that 
existent determined as Same in relation to the Other, that being determined as 
Same not by the totality fixed in its identity, but by the peculiar means and 
character of its absolution from that totality--as the space of postponement 
opened by the interruptive retreat of the limit which defines and demarcates the 
totality. 
31 The following passage is a relevant excerpt from Totalite et infini: 
The Other, inseparable from the very event of transcendence, is situated in 
the region from which death, possibly murder, comes .... Death threatens 
me from beyond. This unknown that frightens, the silence of the infinite 
spaces that terrify, comes from the other, and this alterity, precisely as 
absolute, strikes me in an evil design or in a judgement of justice. The 
solitude of death does not make the Other vanish, but remains in a 
consciousness of hostility, and consequently still renders possible an appeal 
to the Other, to his friendship and his medication. The doctor is an a 
priori principle of human mortality. Death approaches in the fear of 
someone, and hopes in someone. "The Eternal brings death and life." A 
social conjuncture is maintained in this menace. It does not sink into the 
anxiety that would transform it into a "nihilation of nothingness." In the 
being for death of fear I am not faced with nothingness, but faced with 
what is against me, as though murder, rather than being one of the 
occasions of dying, were inseparable from the essence of death, as though 
the approach of death remained one of the modalities of the relation with 
the Other. (TI 210/TAI 234) 
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Vs "the acuity of the problem lies in the necessity of maintaining the I in the sa., , 
transcendence with which it hitherto seemed incompatible" (TI 253 /TAI 276) 
The "attempt to vanquish death" is one such situation, suggests Levinas, for it 
requires one to "face up to" the event--that is, to relate to it in its alterity as an 
event of transcendence (TA 67 /TO 78). But we must understand why this is so, 
for we are not seeking a situation that is still dialectical, still schematic; rather, we 
are seeking a concrete situation, one that concretely accomplishes time. \Ve have 
seen that the relationship with impersonal alterity, with the other, is the 
relationship with the future, but pure futurity is not yet time. How then does it 
become time? 
Levinas stipulates that for the future to become time, it must enter into a 
relationship with the present (TA 68/TO 79). This does not mean it must 
become present; Levinas has already explained that the future is what is not 
grasped. To appropriate the future would be to transform it and to deny its 
alterity. The "future" grasped in anticipation and in projection are two such 
transformations of the future, as they are not the "authentic future," but forms of 
the "present" of the future.32 The concrete situation in which the future enters 
into a relationship with the present, with the virility of the ego, is the situation 
that accomplishes a presence of the future in the present--a presence proper to 
the future, a presence of essential absence. This situation is concretely 
accomplished only in the intersubjective relationship, the "face to face with the 
32 See TA 64/TO 76-77. 
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Other," the "encounter with a face that at once gives and conceals the Other" (TA 
6g.69 /TO 79). In this relationship the multiple terms are in relation, while still 
maintaining their separation. In Totalite et infini Levinas says they are "partially 
independent and partially in relation" (Tl 198/TAI 223). How then is the victory 
over death concrete, and not just schematic? Because it is concretely 
accomplished in sexuality and paternity--situations in which there is time, and in 
which the ego is both liberated from itself and preserved in that liberation. 
It is not necessary to survey the entire analyses of eros and paternity in 
order to see how this is so, but we must consider them at least briefly. They 
begin with the question of whether there is not a situation where alterity appears 
within the domain of being in its pure form, a situation where it is borne by a 
being as its essence. Levinas' answer is yes: in eros, in the relationship with the 
Other as feminine. 33 The very pathos of love, he observes, consists in the 
insurmountable duality of beings, a duality conditioned by the difference of the 
sexes and accomplished in the desire for what in the beloved withdraws into its 
33 There are those who, in not attending carefully enough to the context of 
Levinas' remarks regarding the feminine and its transcendent role with specific 
regard to the dialectic of hypostasis, and later with regard to dwelling, have 
interpreted Levinas' reference to the feminine as a reference to the female human 
being. Clearly this is not the case. Not only does he explicitly deny this 
possibility in Ethics and Infinitv, where he says that participation in the masculine 
and feminine is the attribute of every human being (EI 71/EAI 68), but such a 
narrow reading of the text would necessitate ignoring the very point Levinas is 
making: that the relationship with what withdraws in mystery from any attempt to 
grasp it, and does so essentially--that is, with what has traditionally been 
associated with the female--regardless of the politics animating that association, is 
a modality of the relationship with the Other that accomplishes the dialectic of 
hypostasis in every mortal being. 
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mystery. Levinas describes the feminine as this mystery or modesty of withdrawal: 
"the feminine is not merely the unknowable, but a mode of being that consists in 
slipping away from the light. . . . It is a flight before light" (TA 79 /TO 87). 
This modesty comprises the very alterity of the Other in the erotic relation. In 
the duality of love, the beloved bears alterity as an essence. The subject as lover--
regardless of gender--thus realizes in love a relationship that does not end in a 
return to the self, but in a transfiguration of the self: 
Voluptuosity, as the coinciding of the lover and the beloved, 
transfigures the subject himself, who henceforth owes his identity not to his 
initiative of power, but to the passivity of love received. . . . The subject 
in voluptuosity finds himself again as the self (which does not mean the 
object or the theme) of an other, and not only as the self of himself. (TI 
248 /TAI 270) 
Levinas says that amorous subjectivity is a trans-substantiation--the "effemination" 
of the heroic and virile (TI 248-249/TAI 270-271). Thus, as Levinas explicitly 
explains, "it is an event in existing different from the hypostasis by which an 
existent arises" (TA 81/TO 88). In other words, it is an accomplishment of 
hypostasis in a moment other than the moment of evanescence; it is the 
accomplishment of a term which is other than the subject and otherwise than 
being: "the feminine is not accomplished as a being [etant] in a transcendence 
toward the light," Levinas points out, "but in modesty" (TA 81/TO 88). Eros 
thereby differs radically from possession, power, and knowledge: as it names a 
relationship in which one of the terms withdraws from both the illumination of 
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consciousness and the grasp of appropriation, it is a relationship that cannot be 
accounted for as either intentionality or enjoyment.~ 
\Ve have seen how the "I" becomes encumbered with the self in the first 
moment of hypostasis. In transfiguring the "I," the erotic relationship delivers the 
"I" from this encumberment and stops the return of the "I" to itself. This is 
possible precisely because in the erotic relationship there is time. The withdrawal 
of the feminine is a temporal withdrawal, a relationship with what is not yet there, 
a relationship "with what cannot be there when everything is there" (TA 81/TO 
88), it is a relationship with the future--but a relationship in which the encounter 
with alterity is survived and in which the subjectivity of the subject is maintained! 
Levinas explains that the relationship with the Other is precisely the absence of 
the other--not the absence of nothingness, he says, but "absence in a horizon of 
the future, an absence that is time" (TA 83-84/TO 90). In Totalite et infini 
Levinas explains it this way: 
Eros does not only extend the thoughts of a subject beyond objects and 
faces; it goes toward a future which is not vet and which I will not merely 
grasp, but I will he--it no longer has the structure of the subject which from 
every adventure returns to its island, like Ulysses. The I springs forth 
without returning, finds itself the self of an other: its pleasure, its pain is 
pleasure over the pleasure of the other or over his pain--though not 
through sympathy or compassion. Its future does not fall back upon the 
past it ought to renew; it remains an absolute future by virtue of this 
subjectivity which consists not in bearing representations or powers but in 
transcending absolutely ... (TI 249/TAI 271) 
~ Levinas says, for example, "to love to be loved is not an intention" (TI 
247 /TAI 270), to which he later adds that the transcendence of fecundity realized 
in ems "does not have the structure of intentionality, does not reside in the 
powers of the I" (Tl 249 /TAI 271 ). 
In eras the subjectivity begun in the first moment of hypostasis is maintained in 
the second while accomplishing a relationship with what is otherwise than being, 
thus redeeming the "I" from the condemnation of being through a temporal 
transcendence. 
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In the erotic relationship with the Other there is both being and time, but 
here the terms are reversed: there is time and then being, there is time before 
being--and thus, before definitiveness and death. The dialectical reversal of the 
existent's mastery over being, in which the enchainment of matter and the 
condemnation of being is shattered, is this very reversal of being and time which 
opens an interval before the birth that accomplishes the definitive present. 
Levinas describes this postponement of being as a "distension in the tension of the 
instant" (TI 200/T AI 225), a distension first opened in the postponement of death, 
and then realized concretely in the transcendence of eros--where Levinas says 
there is "a characteristic reversal of the subjectivity issued from position, a 
reversion of the virile and heroic I which in positing itself put an end to the 
anonymity of the there is" (TI 248/TAI 270). The paternal relationship takes the 
relationship with alterity, and the dialectic of hypostasis, one step further. 
Through paternity the ego becomes other to itself. It accomplishes the dialectic 
of hypostasis in a temporal transcendence that does not only postpone death or 
even transcend it, but vanquishes it. This is the real meaning to Levinas' 
references to "victory over death."35 In paternity one faces up to death by facing 
35 See TA 67, 85/TO 78, 91. 
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the Other who is, without collapsing the difference between the ego and other, 
myself. Death is vanquished and the "I" is divested of its tragic egoism in a 
particular relationship Levinas ca1Is fecundity--a relationship with the future as the 
child. 
Paternity is a resolution of amorous subjectivity. I quoted a somewhat 
lengthy passage a moment ago, in which ems was said to go toward a future which 
is not vet and which I will be by virtue of a subjectivity which transcends 
absolutely. I ended the quotation with ellipses. I will quote this passage again, 
hut this time in its entirety: 
Eros does not only extend the thoughts of a subject beyond objects and 
faces; it goes toward a future which is not vet and which I will not n:~rely 
grasp, but I will be--it no longer has the structure of the subject which from 
every adventure returns to its island, like Ulysses. The I springs forth 
without returning, finds itself the self of an other: its pleasure, its pain is 
pleasure over the pleasure of the other or over his pain--though not 
through sympathy or compassion. Its future does not fall back upon the 
past it ought to renew; it remains an absolute future by virtue of this 
subjectivity which consists not in bearing representations or powers but in 
transcending absolutely in fecundity. (TI 249/TA 271; emphasis mine) 
This passage is meant to demonstrate a crucial point in the Levinasian analysis: 
eros is not only one possible mode of relating to the Other, preceding the 
paternal only analytically--it engenders the future to be accomplished in paternity 
and fecundity! Levinas explains: 
Love seeks what does not have the structure of an existent, the infinitely 
future, what is to be engendered. I love fully only if the Other loves me, 
not because I need the recognition of the Other, but because my 
voluptuosity delights in his voluptuosity, and because in this unparalleled 
conjuncture of identification, in this trans-substantiation, the same and the 
other are not united but precisely--beyond every possible project, beyond 
every meaningful and intelligent power--engender the child. (TI 244 /TAI 
266) 
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Levinas' point here, as he later explicitly says, is that the erotic encounter with the 
Other as feminine is a prerequisite for the accomplishment of the "future of the 
child," or fecundity--my future, which is nevertheless not my possibility, but a 
possibility of myself and the other in relation which comes to pass from beyond 
'bl 36 the poss1 e. 
Absolute transcendence consists in the transcendence of trans-
substantiation produced in paternity, where the "I" is an other in the child. 
Levinas reminds us that one does not simply have a child, as one would have a 
possession. Rather, in some way one "is" one's child. The very being of the "is" in 
this instance is multiple and transcendent, and the future that opens before this 
being is not a future of the same, but an absolute future and an infinite time--the 
time of infinite being, the time of fecundity. Infinite time does not simply renew 
the parent in the child, because the exteriority of the one to the other is still 
maintained in paternity;37 one still ages, one still dies; the subject does not 
realize eternal life, but something better--according to Levinas: "the discontinuity 
of generations, punctuated by the inexhaustible youths of the child" (TI 246, 
250/T AI 268, 272). The transcendence of fecundity is better than eternal life 
36 See TI 245/TAI 267; also TA 15/TO 36. 
37 Levinas writes, "paternity is not simply the renewal of the father in the son 
and the father's merger with him, it is also the father's exteriority in relation to 
the son, a pluralist existing" (TA 87 /TO 92). 
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because it founds goodness: "fecundity engendering fecundity accomplishes 
goodness" (TI 24 7 /TAI 269). In paternity there is both an identification and a 
distinction within that identification such that "the meaningful continues beyond 
my death," as Levinas says elsewhere.38 A future opens before being, a time in 
which it is possible to both be and not be. In the time of fecundity accomplished 
in paternity, there is finally an absolute transcendence, a liberation of existing 
from the unity and solitude of the existent. 
In the relationship with the Other existing itself becomes multiple. Levinas 
ends Le temps et l'autre with the pronouncement that death, sexuality, and 
paternity introduce a duality into existing whereby the Eleatic notion of being is 
overcome and time is manifest as being's ultimate event. In a passage that could 
well have been written at the end of Le temps et l'autre, but appears instead 
toward the end of Totalite et infini, Levinas writes: "\Ve have sought outside of 
consciousness and power for a notion of being founding transcendence. The 
acuity of the problem lies in the necessity of maintaining the I in the 
transcendence with which it hitherto seemed incompatible" (TI 253/TAI 276). 
The task for Levinas from the beginning was to find a redemption from the 
definitiveness of the present produced in mastering anonymous existence. His 
strategy was to search for that liberation in the instant of hypostasis itself, at the 
limit of existing and the existent, in the interval, or "dead time," where there 
appears a "rupture of continuity, and continuation across this rupture" (TI 
38 "Diachrony and Representation," Time and the Other, 116. 
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260/TAI 284). What he discovered was that hypostasis has two moments and 
existing itself is plural, and thereby temporal. Because of the future opened in 
the second moment the subject is never completely born, and thus never 
definitively condemned to a solitary being-toward-death. Now we can see why the 
spectral nature of the definitive subject is the very trace of the Other and its 
redemptive interruption of definitive being, which could be seen as a 
condemnation only within the narcissistic perspective of the solitary ego. Levinas 
writes: 
By virtue of time, the being defined, that is, self-identical, by reason of its 
place within the whole, the natural being (for birth describes precisely the 
entry into the whole that preexists and outlives), has not yet reached its 
term, remains at a distance from itself, is still preparatory, in the vestibule 
of being, still this side of the fatality of the non-chosen birth, not yet 
accomplished. The being defined by its birth can thus take up a position 
with regard to its nature; it disposes of a background and, in this sense, is 
not completely born, remains anterior to its definition or its nature. One 
instant does not link up with another to form a present. The identity of 
the present splits up into an inexhaustible multiplicity of possibles that 
suspend the instant. (TI 214-215/T AI 237-238) 
Fecundity opens an absolute time which reveals the present to be the phantom 
apparition it is, and does so be evincing a unity that engenders multiplicity and 
accomplishes time. 
Levinas says in Totalite et infini that in articulating existing as time, the 
philosophy of becoming seeks to disengage itself from the category of a 
permanent and stable one, which compromises any attempt to transcend that 
singularity. Existing is thus freed from the unity of the existent by a time that is 
the very relation between a being and what is otherwise than being, a relationship 
88 
accomplished in the dialectic of the instant, but which is not reducible to it. He 
pointed out in the preface to Le temps et l'autre that as a mode of finite being 
time would indeed be nothing more than the temporal dispersion of Being into 
mutually exclusive instants, while eternity would be nothing more than a delusion 
of the imagination, a phantastic composite of what cannot be composed (TA 
9 /TO 31).39 The main discovery of Le temps et l'autre reveals, to the contrary, 
that time is not a mode of finite being and a degradation of eternity. The 
completion of time is not death, Levinas insists; it is messianic time, "where the 
perpetual is converted into the eternal" (Tl 261/TAI 285). Time is infinition 
itself. The being produced in infinite time, while being, is not yet being. By 
virtue of time, being remains in suspense; Levinas says that across this distance 
with regard to being, the definitive is always not yet definitive--and it is for this 
reason that being can commence and the existent can be a subject, an origin, a 
commencement: 
39 "As a modality of finite being time, time would indeed signify the dispersion 
of the being of a being into mutually exclusive moments, which are, besides, as 
instants unstable and unfaithful even to themselves, each expelled into the past 
out of their own presence, yet furnishing the fulgurating idea--and the non-sense 
and sense, the death and life--of this presence that they would thus suggest. But 
then eternity--the idea of which, without borrowing anything from lived duration 
[la dun~e vecue], the intellect would claim to possess a priori: the idea of a mode 
of being, where the multiple is one and which would confer on the present its full 
sense--is it not always suspect of only dissimulating the fulguration of the instant, 
its half-truth, which is retained in an imagination capable of playing in the 
intemporal and of deluding itself about a gathering of the nongatherable? In the 
final account, would not this eternity and this intellectual God, composed of these 
abstract and inconstant half-instants of the temporal dispersion, be an abstract 
eternity and a dead God?" (TA 9/TO 31) 
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Time no longer expresses the unintelligible dispersion of the unity of being, 
wholly contained in the first cause, in an apparent and phantasmal series of 
causes and effects; time adds something new to being, something absolutely 
new. . . . Time is the non-definitiveness of the definitive, an ever · 
recommencing alterity of the accomplished--the "ever" of this 
recommencement. The work of time goes beyond the suspension of the 
definitive which the continuity of duration makes possible. There must be 
a rupture of continuity and continuation across this rupture. The essential 
in time consists in being a drama, a multiplicity of acts, where the following 
act resolves the prior one. Being is no longer produced at one blow, 
irremissibly present. Reality is what is, but will be once again, another 
time freely resumed and pardoned. Infinite being is produced as times, 
that is, in several times across the dead time that separates the father from 
the son. (TI 260/TAI 284-85) 
Because of the Other, there is time; because of time and the Other, being itself is 
infinite. Hence, any phenomenology must account for the Other in accounting for 
time, or it cannot hope to understand the meaning of being. 
PART TWO 
THINKING LETTING-PRESENCE, ABSENCE, AND THE A-PROPRIETY 
OF TIME IN THE LATER WORK OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER 
The Kehre from Being and time to time and Being reflects, Heidegger 
says, a fidelity to the matter of thinking, and calls upon thought "to undergo a 
change whose movement car-responds with the reversal."1 It will be the aim of 
the second part of this work to show that in remaining responsive to the question 
of the meaning of Being, and in thinking the withdrawal and source of time by 
way of the essence of poetry and language, Heidegger sees a need to go beyond 
phenomenology and propositional thinking. Heidegger shows in "Zeit und Sein" 
that the awakening to Ereignis must be experienced, as all thinking of Ereignis 
remains inadequate. And yet, this experience cannot be strictly 
phenomenological, since the giving source of time and Being withdraws from all 
disclosure and does so essentially. Hence, if it can be experienced, it must be 
experienced in a manner appropriate to its ex-propriative character and essential 
absence. The task of the third chapter will be to suggest that Heidegger's 
attunement to this ex-propriation and essential absence is sharpened, if not 
1 William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenolof!V to Thought 
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), xviii. 
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initiated, in attempting to think the essence of poetry in response to the work of 
Friedrich Holderlin. In the fourth chapter I will try to follow the path of 
Heidegger's attempts to think about the movement of Ereignis/Enteignis with 
direct reference to the question of time, and in the fifth chapter I will consider 
some of his conclusions regarding its implications for phenomenology. 
CHAPTER 3 
HEIDEGGER AND THE ESSENCE OF POETRY: VENTURING 
THE REDETERMINATION OF TIME AND MAN 
AT THE LIMITS OF PROPRIETY 
"What are poets for in a destitute time?" asks Holderlin in the seventh 
strophe of the poem "Brod und Wein." This question about the poet is asked by 
the poet in what would appear to be the very act that determines him as such and 
brings him into his own. What can it mean, then, for Holderlin to ask in his own 
work about the essential propriety and timeliness of that work? What must one 
think of poetry that asks about the proper role of the poet who asks? What is the 
proper role of those who once sung praises to the gods, but who must now sing in 
a godless time--an untimely time, perhaps, for poetry? And what is the 
significance to poetry and thinking of such a question? How are we to understand 
poetry that questions the proper relation between the poetic task and the time to 
which it belongs--a time perhaps inappropriate to poetry? 
Heidegger's essay "Wozu Dichter?" takes an abbreviated form of 
Hmderlin's question as its title. The first line of the text repeats Holderlin's 
question in its entirety: " ... And what are poets for in a destitute time?" (HW 
248/PLT 91). Heidegger appropriately observes that we hardly understand the 
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question today, and follows this observation with a question of his own, a question 
prompted by the poet's question: "How, then, shall we grasp the answer that 
Holderlin gives?" Holderlin's question and Heidegger's questioning response are 
then followed by yet another repetition of Holderlin's question: " ... And what are 
poets for in a destitute time?" 
These three questions initiate a remarkable meditation on metaphysics and 
holiness, a meditation that not only addresses the limits of each, but subtly 
transgresses those limits in thinking them. But that transgression is subordinate to 
yet another: Heidegger discovers in Holderlin's poetry a site wherein philosophy 
can think the metaphysical together with the holy, which in Der Begriff der Zeit 
was suggested to be beyond the purview of the metaphysician,2 but in doing so, 
the meditation must first broach the proper limits of philosophy and poetry by 
dislocating the respective logoi of each and then rethinking its proper function in 
conjunction with that dislocation and the disclosures that ensue. The essay 
accordingly begins with this transgression. Let us note that Heidegger carefully 
brackets his philosophical question within two repetitions of the poetic question, 
thus logographically situating the entire philosophical meditation within the poetic 
dimension opened by the poem--a dimension traditionally considered to be alien 
to philosophy, as Heidegger himself notes later in the essay, saying that 
2 Heidegger says the philosopher can say nothing of God since by nature the 
philosopher does not believe ("Der Philosoph glaubt nicht"), while God is 
knowable only in faith. See Martin Heidegger, Der Begriff der Zeit: Vortrag vor 
der Marburger Theologenschaft Juli 1924 (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 1989), 5-6. 
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philosophers would consider such a move to be "a helpless aberration into fantasy" 
(HW 252/PLT 96). Let us also observe that the poetic question is preceded by 
ellipses, which, while underscoring its belongingness to the poem as a whole, and 
thus the resituation of philosophical thought, also signals a detachment of the 
poetic question from its proper context by the philosopher--thereby indicating a 
resituation of poetry as well. Heidegger says this poetic resituation would meet 
with equal resistance from the scholarly world, which would consider it "an 
unscientific violation of what such scholarship takes to be the facts" (HW 
252/PLT 96). But this discomfiture does not prevent the mutually destabalizing 
and transgressive resituation from occurring. In fact, Heidegger says that the 
disruptive dialogue between poetry and thinking belongs to the destiny of Being, 
and that destiny pursues its course untroubled by our protestations. 
In accordance with this unusual beginning, the text ends with yet another 
disruption of our expectations: Heidegger does not answer the question posed by 
the poet and repeated by the philosopher, nor does he point to an answer given 
by the poet in the poem. Rather, he defers back to poetry, announcing that only 
the poet's own poetry can answer the question regarding to what end the poet is a 
poet, whither the poet's song is bound, and where the poet belongs in the destiny 
of the world's night. This deferral opens a space for genuine dialogue, an interval 
in which both the philosopher and the reader must wait for an answer, and wait 
for the means to grasp that answer when it is given. In the end, then, we lack an 
answer. "Es fehlt uns eine Antworte," we might say. In fact, we might say we lack 
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even the power to anticipate that answer. We can only ask the question and wait 
for a response. This deference returns us thematically to Heidegger's original 
question and to the poem in response to which it was asked, while underscoring at 
the same time an uncharacteristic passivity on the part of philosophy, an unusual 
lack of virility. But this passivity, in its turn, opens upon a curious kind of time, a 
time other than the proper time of the virile subject. The time glimpsed in this 
passivity is that of a future that must come to the thinker, and come from beyond 
any ecstatic horizon, unprojected and unanticipated. 
Heidegger composed "Wozu Dichter?" in 1946--eleven years after writing 
"Der Ursprung des Kuntswerkes" and ten years after writing "Holderlin und das 
Wesen der Dichtung," but less than a year before writing the "Humanismusbrief·--
in which the Kehre was first formally acknowledged. In considering this essay and 
the poem it locates at it!, origin, I wish not only to accentuate the philosophical 
monstrosity of the meditation in its transgressive rethinking of philosophical limits, 
but the remarkable attunement of both the thinker and the poet to a time and a 
holiness that belong to the destiny of Being, without belonging to Being itself and 
without being accomplished within Being. I will first provisionally address 
Heidegger's own reading of the poem. I will then turn to the poem itself and 
offer some insights of ITT)' own, referring to other thinkers and returning to 
Heidegger's texts when and where such responses are called for hy the reading. 
What I hope to ultimately explore are some of the possible reasons why 
Heidegger chose to investigate the issues raised in this particular essay in the 
margins of this particular poem, and what those reasons may indicate about the 
Kehre and Heidegger's understanding of the relation of Being to time. 
96 
Heidegger says of Holderlin's question that the destitute time in which the 
poets find their task questionable is our time, the era to which we ourselves still 
belong. According to Heidegger, it is our time that is identified hy the poet as 
the time of the world's night, a time of default and darkness precipitated expressly 
by the birth and death of a god: 
For Holderlin's historical experience, the appearance and sacrificial death 
of Christ mark the beginning of the end of the day of the gods. Night is 
falling. Ever since the "united three"--Herakles, Dionysos, and Christ--have 
left the world, the evening of the world's age has been declining toward its 
night. The world's night is spreading its darkness. The era is defined by 
the god's failure to arrive, by the "default of God." (H\V 248/PLT 91) 
The "default of God" translates the German Fehl Gottes. Fehlen means "to be 
lacking," "to be missing," "to be away or absent." For example, to say something is 
"fehl am Platz" means that it is out of place, or lacking a proper place. Fehl 
refers specifically to an absence that calls attention to itself and announces itself 
as a deficit or lack. It is not an incidental and insignificant absence that the 
whole can do without, an unnecessary and unnoticed absence. It is an absence 
that renders the whole deficient and incomplete. 
And yet, the "default of God" does not mean for Heidegger the simple 
absence of that which was once present or should be present, the absence of that 
which belongs to the whole and renders the whole incomplete only by its 
displacement, subtraction or departure. This would bespeak a lack belonging to 
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the whole and proceeding from it. Heidegger does not say it is because of the 
god's departure that the world's night is spreading its darkness; it is because of the 
god's failure to arrive: Der Fehl Gottes is not just the absence of the god, it is the 
god's default. What is more, the phrase Fehl Gottes is set off by quotation marks 
in Heidegger's text--which explicitly calls attention to it. In granting that special 
attention we discover that the default of god is a peculiar absence. It is akin to 
the absence produced in awaiting an arrival that is overdue; it is like the absence 
of someone who has not come precisely after creating the expectation that he or 
she was going to come. Leaving creates an absence through the privation of what 
was previously present. This privative kind of absence is produced by a 
movement that goes from me and leaves an emptiness where before there was 
fullness. But the absence of one who has failed to arrive is a different kind of 
absence altogether: it is an absence added to absence; it is an absence produced 
by what was not before present, even as absent--and that is its peculiarity. It is 
not produced as a departure from presence of that which was present, but as an 
unaccomplished coming to presence of that which is not yet present, even as 
absent. This kind of absence renders the whole incomplete from without and 
comes from beyond the totality of what is present. It comes to me, and does so in 
place of whoever or whatever I await, preceding the coming of that which has not 
yet come or is not yet even coming, moving before it, opening a space in which 
what was not before present can be absent. This absence is an essential absence, 
defined not in relation to presence, but as its other. The god is not only absent, 
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but essentially absent and waited upon as such by the poet. The god is in 
"default," his coming is overdue, and this default announces itself to the poet from 
beyond Being as the trace of an essential absence. 
But added to that absence is oblivion. Heidegger explains that the world's 
night is spreading its darkness and becoming ever more destitute precisely 
because only the poet recognizes the god's default. Heidegger says the default of 
god means that no god any longer visibly and unequivocally gathers men and 
things unto himself, thereby disposing history and our sojourn in it. But in our 
time the divine radiance of the gods has been extinguished so thoroughly that 
even their essential absence goes unnoticed by men: our time has grown so 
destitute it can no longer even discern the default of god as such, and this makes 
our time wholly and absolutely destitute. Heidegger therefore calls our time 
"night's midnight"--because it is so enveloped in darkness that it is no longer 
capable even of experiencing its own destitution. Our time is such that there is 
no longer even the hope or expectation of a coming god by virtue of which a god 
could appear even as absent. Much less is there a place for the god to actually be 
absent, a place that recognizes or maintains that absence, an empty abode to 
which he could be returning, were such a return to become possible. 
Heidegger then adds, however, that the destitute time of the poet, our 
time, is therefore an abysmal time, a groundless time: "Because of this default, 
there fails to appear for the world the god that grounds it" (HW 248/PLT 92). 
He says our time hangs in an abysmal absence of ground [Abgrund]. This 
99 
declaration seems, at first, abrupt and unjustified: it seems we could well ask what 
relation the default of god has to an abysmal absence of ground. Is not the 
ground precisely the ground of that which is, while the destitute god is the trace 
of that which is essentially absent? How, then, does a forgetfulness of the latter 
lead to absence of the former? In the first essay of Unterwegs zur Sprache 
-
Heidegger says that we speak 'bf an abyss where the ground falls away and is 
lacking, "where we seek the ground and set out to arrive at a ground, to get to the 
bottom of something" (UZS 13/PLT 191). But if ours is a godless time in which 
we are not even aware of the default of god, how then can our time be 
groundless? How can there be an abyss precisely where we are not seeking to 
"get to the bottom" of the default of god? We must carefully consider the passage 
in which Heidegger draws this disorienting conclusion: 
Because of this default, there fails to appear for the world the ground that 
grounds it. The word for abyss--Abgrund--originally means the soil and 
ground toward which, because it is undermost, a thing tends downward. 
But in what follows we shall think of the Ab- as the complete absence of 
ground. The ground is the soil in which to strike root and to stand. The 
age for which the ground fails to come, hangs in the abyss. (HW 248, PLT 
92) 
Let us attend specifically to the beginning of the above quotation: "Because of this 
default, ... " [Mit-<liesem Fehl, ... ]. Which default? Not the original default, 
but the default that is not even recognized as a default, the absence even of 
absence, the lack even of lack. Because of this default, he says, the ground fails 
to appear for the world. Our world [Welt] and its era [Weltalter] are destitute 
because the god has failed to arrive, but the destitute world and era defined by 
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that default have become so completely destitute that even the recognition of the 
default has been obscured, and thus precluded. Even the default is in default. 
our time does not cease to be abysmal because of its absolute destitution, it 
merely hangs in that abyss, suspended there by the blindness of a complacency 
that cannot tend downward because it does not yet recognize its groundlessness. 
The ground that would define, or ground, were we turned toward it, is therefore 
in default along with god, and the Welt and Weltalter it would ground, were it to 
so arrive, remain without a fundamental orientation. 
Heidegger says it is from the very groundlessness of this abyss that 
Hc>lderlin asks his question and in asking turns toward it. Yet Heidegger also 
says that a turn remains open for the destitute time only if the world turns 
fundamentally away from the abyss. In order to turn fundamentally away from 
the abyss the fundament or ground must first come--and this can happen, he 
explains, only if in our destitute time an abode is first prepared for the returning 
god, a place for the god to be absent and awaited, a place for the absent god to 
be held in default. Man must first attend to the god's failure to arrive, and in so 
attending, tend towards the coming of a ground. The god cannot arrive where 
there is no destination, where no one awaits that arrival. The return thus depends 
upon man: 
The turning of the age does not take place by some new god, or the old 
one renewed, bursting into the world from ambush at some time or other. 
Where would he turn on his return if men had not first prepared an abode 
for him? How could there ever be for a god an abode fit for a god, if a 
divine radiance did not first begin to shine in everything that is? (HW 
249/PLT 92; emphases mine) 
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In another poem, "Mnemosyne," Holderlin says that the heavenly powers cannot 
do all things, but that mortals must reach into the abyss. Heidegger says, in fact, 
that the very nature of men and women lies precisely in this, "that mortals must 
reach into the abyss sooner than heavenly powers" (HW 250/PLT 93). Humanity 
must first prepare an abode to which the god can be coming, a place from which 
the god can be awaited and missed. What this means, says Heidegger, is that 
before a turn from destitution is possible, men must first find the way to their own 
nature (HW 250/PLT 93). 
Heidegger is indicating here that there is something essential to man 
himself, something belonging to his own nature, that has passed into obscurity 
along with the default of god--something that would be reaffirmed in reaching into 
the abyss and in preparing an abode for the returning god. In other words, he is 
suggesting that there is something belonging to man's very nature that necessitates 
a turn toward the essential absence of the divine. This appears somewhat 
contrary to his early attempts to carefully segregate philosophy and theology. It 
also contrasts in a very provocative way with the beginning of Sein und Zeit, 
where it is precisely the question of the meaning of Being that "has today been 
forgotten [ist heute in Vergessenheit gekommen]" (SZ 2/BT 2): in this essay the 
ground that does not come is very clearly associated, not with the Vergessenheit 
of the Seinsfrage, but with the Vergessenheit of the god who does not come. 
While we have yet to discover what that association entails and what it may mean 
for philosophy and phenomenology, it is nevertheless undeniable that there is an 
association, a fundamental association, between the two. And while this 
association admittedly does not by any means efface the difference between 
philosophical and theological metaphysics, it certainly complicates it. 
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Having thus suggested that there is something essential to man that would 
be reaffirmed in reaching into the abyss and in thus awaiting the returning god, 
Heidegger says that mortals must reach into the abyss opened by the default of 
god sooner than heavenly powers. The reason for this, he says, is because mortals 
remain closer to the abysmal absence, being touched by presence, the ancient 
name of Being. In Sein und Zeit the oblivion of the question of the meaning of 
Being indicates a forgottenness of what Dasein pre-ontologically is; that oblivion 
is an existential event, in other words, an event by virtue of which man has lost 
the way to his own nature. But here Heidegger seems to be suggesting that the 
forgottenness of our relationship to the holy, also an existential event, may be as 
fundamental an oblivion--and thus may necessitate the reawakening of a question 
as fundamental as that concerning the meaning of Being. In Sein und Zeit, 
Heidegger determines Dasein to be the clearing within which presence gets 
disclosed and beings get disclosed in their presence: that is, through an 
attunement to what he calls the existential constitution of "the there," the da- of 
Dasein, Heidegger discovers that only Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has a sense 
of place belonging to it existentially, and thus Dasein alone is the clearing or site 
where the disclosure and understanding of Being can take place. But this text 
would suggest that insofar as a remembrance of the default of god entails a return 
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to man's own disclosive nature, our relationship with the alterity of an absent god 
and our relationship to the Being of beings must be, at the very least, 
equiprimordial events--and perhaps even two moments the same event! 
It is explicitly within the logos of Being as presence, within the attempt to 
categorically think Being in terms of what is present--independently of that which 
is essentially absent, or wholly refractory to the categories of Being as presence--
that philosophy has traditionally identified the nature of man. Heidegger's work 
began by calling precisely this identity into question, by suggesting that the nature 
which lies within the scope of categorical identification is not man's own: Sein und 
Zeit determined both that the question concerning the essence of man lies 
proximate to the question concerning the meaning of Being (as Dasein is, pre-
ontologically, that very question), and that the meaning of Being is time--in which 
absence and alterity have always been recognized to play an obscure, but essential 
role. Although in the death analysis Heidegger thinks literally at the threshold of 
an "other" time by explicitly recognizing the problem of the interruptive 
coincidence of the ownmost and othermost character of death,3 Heidegger still 
predominantly thinks time in the existential analytic as the ecstatic "upon-which" 
of the ontological projection that makes existential care possible--that is, as 
preeminently proper to Dasein, as the primordial temporality of Dasein. In the 
end, even though the alterity of time is glimpsed in Sein und Zeit, it is still 
3 See John Sallis, "Mortality and Imagination," Echoes: After Heidegger 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 118-138. 
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thought as an other somehow proper to the same. However, in the coming-
wgether of philosophy and poetry to think the essence of poetry in a destitute 
time, Heidegger discovers a way to think the alterity of time in its essential 
relation to the Being of Dasein, without first appropriating or compromising that 
alterity in the process: as the radical absence opened upon in thinking the default 
of god, where thought finds the trace of an a-proper time, a time that can come to 
Dasein without first having belonged to the Being of Dasein. 
In thinking what he calls the "order " and "inner coherence" of five key 
passages from Holderlin's work that address the subject of poetry, Heidegger 
concludes that the essence of poetry must be thought historically, which means: in 
its essential relation to time. The structure of "Holderlin und das Wesen der 
Dichtung" is chiasmic (and thus reflects, as we will see shortly, the structure of 
"Brod und \Vein"). The question of the essence of poetry presupposes and leads 
to the question of the essence of language, which in turn leads to the question of 
the Being of the gods and all things named by language, and the essence of that 
naming. This inaugural naming is the focal point of the essay, and justly so, for it 
corresponds to "the founding and naming of Being and of the essence of all 
things" (EHD 40/HEP 88), and thus, to the inaugural grounding of human 
existence as fundamentally poetic--meaning that man, at the most fundamental 
level, both dwells in the presence of the gods and is concernfully exposed to the 
essential proximity of things. After reaching this chiasmic apex, Heidegger then 
returns to the question of the essence of language, now understood to be poetry 
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itself, which speaks essential names and thereby founds Being in language. And 
lastly he returns to rethink the essence of poetry in the light of this timely and 
appropriate understanding of essence. What he concludes in the essay is that the 
proper essence of poetry must be an historical essence, a temporalizecl essence, an 
essence both determined and determinative of its time. 
That time, in Holderlin's case is the destitute time of the god's default. 
Heidegger explains in "Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung" that poetry in a 
destitute time is both the most innocent of all crafts and the most dangerous of all 
works, because in poetically founding human existence, the poet is directly 
exposed to the "lightning" [Blitzen] and "hints" [Winke] of the god, and thus to a 
"super-abundance of inspiration" [Uhermass des Andrangs ].4 Drawn into the 
liminal interval between gods and men [der Zwischen], and thus into the 
"excessive light" [iibergrosse Helle] of the god, the poet captures these hints and 
sends them on to his fellow mortals.5 These hints are clearly what Heidegger has 
reference to in "Wozu Dichter?" when he speaks of the "marks" [Merkmale] and 
"traces" [Spuren] of the fugitive gods. He says there that the abyss--the 
indeterminate Zwischen itself--holds and remarks everything, even absence, since 
presence which conceals itself is already absence. The poet is he among mortals 
who is said to reach into the abyssmal Zwischen, because he is drawn ahead of 
other mortals into the interval between gods and mortals, thus coming to know 
4 EHD 41, 44/HEP 89, 92. 
5 EHD 43 /HEP 91. 
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the marks the abyss remarks specifically as the trace of the fugitive gods, and 
coming to know this sooner and otherwise than other mortals. The poet comes to 
know the alterity of the fugitive god and the groundlessness of the interval in a 
way others do not. His poetry, says Heidegger, must then be thought in terms of 
this abysmal reach beyond other men and women. \Vhen so thought, the 
utterance of the poet is shown to consist in a divinely inspired interpretation of 
the "Voice of the people" [Stimme des Volkes],6 a dangerously manic saying 
provocatively similar to that of the "light and winged and holy" poet in Plato's 
The Zwischen into which the poet is drawn is figuratively thought by 
Holderlin as the liminal interval between earth and sk.1 , and it is this evocative 
image that is at play in his own characterization of the poet as singularly exposed 
on the people's behalf to the lightning of the gods.8 Heidegger appropriates this 
image in his analysis of the poetic function of the Greek temple in "Der Ursprung 
des Kunstwerkes," and speaks of it in "Wozu Dichter?" as the place where the 
nature of wine is disclosed to be that which springing from the earth and blessed 
6 EHD 43-44 /HEP 91-92. 
7 Ion, 534b. 
8 The last stanza of "Wie wenn am Feiertage," quoted in EHD 41/HEP 89, 
reads as follows: 
Yet it behooves us, 0 poets 
To stand bare-headed beneath God's thunderstorms, 
To seize the Father's ray itself 
\Vith our own hands and, wrapped in song, 
To offer the heavenly gift to the people. 
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by the sun brings together earth and sky, the respective domains of the mortal and 
the divine, the same and the other. It is this site, he says, where the wine-god 
Dionysis still guards the being-toward one another of earth and sky--and thus, it is 
the site where the trace of the fugitive gods still remains, the interval in which the 
holy can be traced. 
What is essential to this site is identified in more detail in "Der Ursprung 
des Kunstwerkes." Through the analysis of a Greek temple, which secures the 
figure of the god, Heidegger is able to phenomenologically show that the artwork 
gathers around itself the open relational context of a world within which a 
clearing and illuminating occurs that allows things to emerge in their presence and 
allows earth to emerge as their native ground. More precisely, the temple opens 
up the world as it first fits together and simultaneously gathers around itself the 
unity of those paths and relations which acquire the shape of destiny for human 
being, for Dasein. Through the standing-there of the temple is manifest the 
breadth of the sk')' and the emergence of earth as native ground, as that to which 
in the process of phusis everything emergent is as such sheltered and secured. It 
is within this clearing interplay of earth and world, Heidegger says, that mortals 
first come to presence and, at the same time, an abode is prepared for the absent 
god. The artwork is set up [aufstellen] within the world, which is reciprocally set 
up hy the artwork. This reciprocal aufstellen liberates the Open of the holy and 
invokes the god into the openness of this gathering presence. But it also takes the 
\Vork and sets it forth from [herstellen] the earth. As that which is set forth from 
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the earth, the work is, in its presencing, a productive setting-forth of the earth. 
Through this poetic disclosure the artwork thus moves the earth itself into the 
Open of a world and keeps it there as self-secluding--thereby instigating and 
preserving the standing strife of earth and world, and setting truth to work as the 
primal strife of the Open to which they belong. The truth thus set to work and 
fixed in place is figure, Gestalt, and it is here--in the Open of the primal polemic 
fixed in place by the figure of the absent god and the temple that gives place to 
that figurative absence--that the coming together of men and gods, and the 
determination of man as man, can then take place. 
Heidegger says that in the destitute time it is the poet who initiates the 
communion of men and gods by producing a work which thus situates and secures 
the Open where the gods can return--when and if there is a turn among men. 
The poet situates the Open and conditions a turn toward the absent god by 
preparing a site where man can testify to who he is. Heidegger explains: 
Man is who he is, precisely in the testimony he gives of his own existence. 
This testimony does not refer to an incidental expression of human nature; 
it is a determining part of the human way of being. What is it that man 
has to bear witness to? To his belonging to the Earth. Man belongs to the 
Earth, because he inherits and learns from her in all things. Things, 
however, stand in opposition to each other, and what keeps them apart and 
thus, by the same token, links them together is what Holderlin calls 
inwardness [Innigkeit]. Man bears witness that he too belongs to this 
inwardness by his creation of a world; the rise of worlds as well as their 
decline and destruction is the sign of human existence on earth. (EHD 
34/HEP 82) 
It is in this act of bearing testimony, which comes to pass in the form of history, 
that man truly fulfills himself as man. Language has been given to man, explains 
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Heidegger, precisely in order to make this history possible. Hence, in bearing 
witness to his belonging to the earth and to his creation of a world, man is always 
already bearing witness to his appropriation of language, which first had to be 
given to man. He is therefore also bearing witness to the poetic essence of 
language and the primordial relation of the poet to the absent gods. It is only 
thus that the poet, in tracing the way for his kindred mortals toward a turn to the 
absent god, can at the same time trace the way toward man's own nature. 
Heidegger henceforth concludes: "To be a poet in a destitute time means: to 
attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet in the time 
of the world's night utters the holy" (HW 251/PLT 94). 
But the poet is able to utter the holy only by virtue of his attunement to 
the unholy. Heidegger says that the holy, as the track to the holy, remains 
concealed unless there are mortals capable of seeing the unholy in man's relation 
to Being itself. The poet discerns the holy concealing itself in the abyss that 
underlies all beings, and he does so by reaching sooner into the abyss, the place 
of the turning. But how can we other mortals reach into the abyss when we are 
not even aware of the default of God and thus are not seeking to "get to the 
bottom" of our destitution, not tending downward toward the ground of that 
destitution? We cannot. That is precisely the point. That is also the reason for 
the absolute destitution of our Weltzeit. We must first come to see, like the poet, 
the destitution of our era for what it is: the mark of an age in which something is 
fundamentally amiss, fundamentally unholy. By attending to the unholy as the 
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absence of the holy, we initiate a turn toward the abyss where, Heidegger explains 
to our surprise, we can fall upward: 
If we let ourselves fall into the abyss ... , we do not go tumbling into 
emptiness. We fall upward, to a height. Its loftiness opens up a depth. 
The two span a realm in which we would like to become at home, so as to 
find a residence, a dwelling place for the life of man. (UZS 11/PLT 191-
92) 
We fall upward, because in attending to the abysmal nature of our destitute 
relation to the absent gods we turn toward the trace of the holy, the height and 
interval that separates mortal and divine. The poet finds the trace of the holy 
precisely by attending to what is unholy in man's relation to Being itself--by 
turning toward the danger inherent in our relation to Being specifically with an 
eye to what is unholy about it. In other words, our relation to Being is not a 
neutral relation--it is essentially holy or unholy. Heidegger says later in "Wozu 
Dichter?" that this day is the world's night because the integralness of the whole 
of what is remains obscured, the wholesome and sound remains withdrawn, and 
the world thus remains unholy and without healing. The holy in our relation to 
Being is thereby concealed and even the track to the holy effaced and nearly 
obliterated. Mortals must see the threat of the unholy, discern its danger--which 
is the danger, and in so doing turn toward it. "It may be," he says, "that any other 
salvation than that which comes from where the danger is, is still within the 
unholy" (HW 273/PLT 118). It is in this context that Heidegger's now famous 
remark in the Der Spiegel interview must be understood, I think: 
Only a god can save us. The sole possibility that is left for us is to prepare 
a sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing, for the appearance of 
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the god or for the absence of the god in the time of foundering 
[Untergang]; for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder. 9 
The danger inherent in our foundering in the unholy is revealed to the poet who, 
otherwise than other mortals and sooner than they, attends to the unholy, to what 
is amiss in man's relation to Being--and thus to the question and trace of the holy 
itself, from whence alone salvation can come. 
The more obscure the traces become, the less can a single mortal in 
reaching into the abyss attend to them, however. With reference to the third 
stanza of "Brod und Wein" Heidegger says: "it is then all the more strictly true 
that each man gets farthest if he goes only as far as he can go along the way 
allotted to him" (HW 251/PLT 95). What is allotted to the poet is a particular 
locality historically defined by the manifestness of Being within metaphysics: 
The poet thinks his way into the locality defined by that lightening of Being 
which has reached its characteristic shape as the realm of Western 
metaphysics in its self-completion. Holderlin's thinking poetry has had a 
share in giving its shape to this realm of poetic thinking. His composing 
dwells in this locality as intimately as no other poetic composition of his 
time. (HW 250-51/PLT 95)10 
9 This interview was conducted on September 23, 1966, but--at Heidegger's 
request--it was not published until after his death. It finally appeared in Der 
Spiegel on 31 May 1976, (no. 23, pp. 193 ff). The English-language translation by 
Maria P. Alter and John D. Caputo was published in Philosophv Today, winter 
1976, pp. 267-284, and was entitled: "Only a God can Save Us: Der Spiegel's 
Interview with Martin Heidegger." The passage I have quoted is found on page 
277 of that issue. 
10 The German word Lichtung. translated here as "lightening," is perhaps 
better rendered as "clearing." In either case one must recall both the visual and 
kinetic senses of the German word. 
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In so reaching into the abyss the poet becomes the most ventured and daring of 
mortals, and hence, the most mortal of mortals. By being more venturesome than 
the ground, he ventures to where all ground breaks off--he transgresses the 
determinate nature of man; the ground disappears because what the poet glimpses 
in tracing the god's fugitive absence is that, as Heidegger insisted in Being and 
Time, man erroneously finds his nature as zohon logon echon determined in the 
interpretation animal rationale.11 As the poet ventures beyond the metaphysical 
limits of determination to where man's proper nature remains as yet 
undetermined--that is, as he prepares the way toward man's proper nature by 
turning toward the abyss and rethinking man's essential relation to the holy and 
unholy--he quite literally ventures where there is no ground. His poetry--as 
Heidegger suggests in response to the question "What are poets for in a destitute 
time?"--is that venture. 
The task for the poet in the destitute time, then, is to trace the way toward 
man's nature in the light of that venture. And yet, if the time's destitution has 
made the whole being and vocation of the poet a poetic question, the essence of 
that poetic venture is itself questionable and must he rethought together with that 
venture. It is this double necessity that Heidegger seems to have in mind when he 
says that poets in a destitute time must especially gather in poetry the nature of 
poetry (HW 250/PLT 94 ). The problem for the thinker is correspondingly 
double. Heidegger explains that the locality to which Hc)lderlin came is a 
11 See SZ 25, 48/BT 47, 74. 
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manifestness of Being, "a manifestness which itself belongs to the destiny of Being 
and which, out of that destiny, is intended for the poet" (HW 251/PLT 95). It is 
the very history of Being that leads thinking into a dialogue with poetry--that 
dialogue and the resituation of philosophy and poetry that it precipitates are 
realized as the very destiny of Being.12 First, then, the questionability of the 
12 Heidegger writes: 
But this manifestness of Being within metaphysics as completed may even 
be at the same time the extreme oblivion of Being. Suppose, however, that 
this oblivion were the hidden nature of the destituteness of what is 
destitute in the time. There would indeed be no time then for an aesthetic 
flight to Holderlin's poetry. There would be no moment in which to make 
a contrived myth out of the figure of the poet. There would then be no 
occasion to misuse his poetry as a rich source for philosophy. But there 
would be, and there is, the sole necessity, by thinking our way soberly into 
what his poetry says, to come to learn what is unspoken. That is the 
course of the history of Being. If we reach and enter that course, it will 
lead thinking into a dialogue with Being. (HW 252/PLT 95-96) 
For Heidegger, this dialogue occurs in thinking the essence of poetry. 
In "Dichterisch wohnet der Mensch ... "we read that poetry and thinking 
think the same when the difference between them is sustained and preserved in 
that thinking. The dialogue does not occur as a mere dissolution of thinking into 
poetry or the reverse; Heidegger insists that there can be no "poetic thinking," by 
which he means no identity of poetry and thought: 
Poetry and thinking meet each other in one and the same only when, and 
only as long as, they remain distinctly in the distinctness of their nature. 
The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent 
oneness of what is merely identical. The equal or identical always moves 
toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a 
common denominator, The same, by contrast, is the belonging together of 
what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only 
say "the same" if we think difference. It is in the carrying out and settling 
of differences that the gathering nature of sameness comes to light. The 
same banishes all zeal always to level what is different into the equal or 
identical. The same gathers what is distinct into an original being-at-one. 
(VA 218/PLT 218-19) 
To transgress the limits of poetry and thought in thinking them together is not to 
destroy those limits or ignore them; there can only be a transgression where there 
are limits to be transgressed. But by the same token, any transgression of limits 
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poetic venture in its ontological significance must be rethought in a way that is 
proper to the matter to be rethought. But in addition, the thinker must rethink 
the mutually constitutive relation between the destitute time of the venture, the 
time that shelters Being, and the coming-together of poetry and thought in the 
manifestness of Being in that time to think time and its destitution. Heidegger 
says that where poets gather in poetry the nature of poetry on the way toward the 
destiny of the worlds age, "we others must learn to listen to what these poets say--
assuming that, in regard to the time that conceals Being because it shelters it, we 
do not deceive ourselves through reckoning time merely in terms of that which is 
by dissecting that which is" (HW 251/PLT 94). Only thus can the meaning of 
Being and the nature of man be properly rethought. 
But what does it mean to say the philosopher must listen to the poet? 
How, in the alien margins of poetry, is philosophy to think the proper essence of 
necessarily disrupts those limits, as well as what is delimited thereby. Poetry and 
thought think the same when they are gathered together by their difference, by 
their alterity, to think what is disrupted and wrenched out of oblivion by that 
dialogue. 
Thinking that preserves the integrity of the poetry it thinks takes place as a 
response to what is to be heard in the poem, not as an appropriation of what is 
said in the poem--since what is to be heard in the poem is what is unsaid, what 
poetry cannot say. If the destitution of our time has made the whole being and 
vocation of the poet a poetic question, then presumably it is within this dialogue 
that the poetic question might be raised and a turn away from the abyss might 
become possible, because it is within this dialogue that the unholiness and errancy 
of the age becomes apparent. The poet thus functions like Nietzsche's music-
playing Socrates of Die Geburt der Tragc)die, or his poet-philosopher who 
counters the nihilistic movement of philosophy and emerges from that counter-
movement to give form to beings as a whole, beginning with man as the disclosive 
place, or Dasein, of this Gestalt. 
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poetry? We will take our bearings from the essay appropriately entitled 
"HiHderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung." Heidegger explains there that an 
encounter with just any poetry will not yield an understanding of its essence, even 
though that essence may be realized therein. The categorical understanding of 
essence, which, as a universal concept, applies equally and indifferently to every 
particular, can never become properly essential. Holderlin's poetry is chosen by 
Heidegger because "Holderlin is concerned in his poetry solely with the essence of 
poetry. He is for us emphatically the poet of poetrv" (EHD 32/HEP 80). \Vhen 
Heidegger says in "Wozu Dichter?" that "we others must learn to listen to what 
these poets say," he therefore means that we must attend, not to just any poet, but 
to those who are concerned with the essence of poetry and are thus on the way to 
the destiny of the world's age (HW 251/PLT 94). 
What Heidegger then listens for in listening to the poet of poets are what 
he calls "basic words," "essential words" and moments of "genuine saying"--pointers 
or passages that address the subject of poetry with special regard to its essence, 
and which thereby indicate what is necessarily left "unsaid" in the poem. These 
genuine sayings would be veiled in their ordinariness and simplicity were it not for 
the attunement of the thinker to the question of poetry with regard to its essence-
-a question granted only as a matter of destiny, that is, tied inextricably to the 
time and history of its thinking. 
With regard to that time, which in Holderlin's case we can say is the 
destitute time of the god's default, the essence of poetry is realized, as we have 
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already glimpsed, in a diachronic event of divine inspiration and inaugural 
naming. In order to explicate more fully the dynamism and particularly the 
diachrony of this event, and in preparation for a consideration of how Heidegger 
approaches the second part of the philosophical task demanded by the coming-
together of poetry and philosophy, that is, the need to think the mutually 
constitutive relation between the destitute time of the venture and the coming-
together of poetry and thought in the manifestness of Being to think that time, let 
us now turn to the venture that gives place to both the poet's task and the 
philosopher's thinking in response to it: the poem "Brod und \Vein," in which the 
poet preeminently attends to the approach within proper time of an a-proper 
time. We will then be in a position to consider in the next chapter Heidegger's 
remarkable response to Holderlin's poetry: the effort to carry out a proper 
rethinking of time and Being, and a redetermination of the nature of man in 
accordance with that rethinking. 
"Brod und \Vein" begins within the circumspective restfulness of a town at 
twilight, when nightfall approaches as a restful end to the restless activity of the 
day. A town by nature shelters and surrounds, it is a delimited domain within 
which men and woman can rest securely from the tasks and dangers that are left 
outside the city walls at nightfall. Der Tag is first thought in the poem as a secure 
and delimited temporal domain similar in all essential respects to the spacial 
domain of the town. It is rigorously parceled up like city districts into a day-time, 
a clock-time, an economic time of numbered and delimited "spaces" for purposeful 
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activity. Die Nacht is first thought as nothing more than the delimiting end of der 
Tag: the night for "a sensible head" ( ein sinniges Haupt) is a neutral time 
meaningful only as a complement to the day, a space in which to balance the 
proportionate gain and loss of the day's activities and to rest for the new day. 
This is the night of sleep, that sleep which, in Maurice Blanchot's words, "ends the 
day but in order to make the next day possible."13 The night-time correlative to 
the night which ends the day is also accordingly thought in the poem as a 
consequence of diurnal delimitation, security, and fixity; the watchman--literally, a 
number-watcher [ein Wachter die Zahl]--shouts the hours throughout the night, 
continually and explicitly appropriating night-time to day-time. 
This day-time and appropriated night-time parallels Heidegger's public 
time, the time with which we concern ourselves. This is the time of Sorge, the 
time of which Heidegger says the day is the "most natural" measure because its 
circumspective character needs the possibility of light and sight. Heidegger 
explains that this time has already made itself public because Dasein, as 
"ecstatico-temporal," is already disclosed, and because understanding and 
interpretation both belong to existence--thus allowing one to concernfully interpret 
and reckon time, and concernfully direct oneself according to that reckoning. 
13 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 267. 
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This public time is conditioned by Dasein's thrownness, which makes possible this 
lived interpretation of temporality. 14 Heidegger explains: 
The Being of Dasein is care. This entity exists fallingly as something that 
has been thrown. Abandoned to the 'world' which is discovered with its 
factical "there", and concernfully submitted to it, Dasein awaits its 
potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world; it awaits it in such a manner that it 
'reckons' on and 'reckons' with whatever has an involvement for the sake of 
this potentiality-for-Being--an involvement which, in the end, is a distinctive 
one. Everyday circumspective Being-in-the-world needs the possibility of 
sight (and this means that it needs brightness) if it is to deal concernfully 
with what is ready-to-hand within the present-at-hand. \Vith the factical 
disclosedness of Dasein's world, Nature has been uncovered for Dasein. In 
its thrownness Dasein has been surrendered to the changes of day and 
night. Day with its brightness gives it the possibility of sight; night takes 
this away. (SZ 412/BT 465) 
In the "Humanismusbrief' Heidegger says the public realm is the dictatorial, 
subjective realm in which Dasein is predominantly absorbed in its everydayness. 
Here, what is intelligible and unintelligible is decided in advance through an 
unconditional objectification of things that amounts to a devastation of language 
as the "house of Being" (UZS 166/OWL 63; WM 149-50/BW 197-98). Public 
time is, accordingly, the time in which beings zuhanden and vorhanden are 
encountered in their everydayness as within-time. It is the dictatorial time in 
which beings can be present. This time needs the possibility of illumination and 
visibility precisely because it is the time of objective presence. 
The night appropriate to the day may take away the light necessary to 
sight, but it does not take away the understanding of presence granted by light. 
14 Heidegger says: "we must say that Dasein's thrownness is the reason why 
'there is' time publicly" (SZ 411-412/BT 464). 
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The night of day still allows us to deal concernfully with what is present as still 
here and subject to our power, even though it may be "out of sight." This night of 
day therefore resembles what Blanchot calls the first night, a construction of the 
day, day's night. At its most extreme this night is but the edge of what is not to 
be ventured upon: 
Night then is accepted and acknowledged, but only as a limit and as 
the necessity of a limit: we must not go beyond. So says Greek 
moderation. Or, night is what day must finally dissolve: day works 
at its empire; it is its own conquest and elaboration; it tends toward 
the unlimited, although in the accomplishment of its tasks it only 
advances step by step and observes limit and barriers strictly. So 
says reason, the triumph of enlightenment which simply banishes 
darkness. Or again, night is what day wants not just to dissolve, but 
to appropriate: night is thus the essential, which must not be 
destroyed but conserved, and welcomed not as a limit but for itself. 
Night must pass into day. Night becoming day makes the light 
richer and gives to clarity's superficial sparkle a deep inner radiance. 
The day is the whole of the day and the night, the great promise of 
the dialectic. 15 
Because this first night is the night of day, it is the true night, Blanchot says, for 
its truth is the truth of day. When we rest in this night we rest in the truth of day, 
secure and unconcerned because all our concerns, if not met, have at least been 
enlightened and made present concerns--concerns appropriate to the day. 
But in Holderlin's poem this true night is no sooner "affirmed" than it is 
marginally transgressed: man's retreat indoors to rest follows the retreating sun as 
a natural consequence, and yet this parallel retreat is thought by Holderlin with a 
metaphor that is anything but restful--the "rushing away" [Rauschen] of carriages 
15 Blanchot, 167. 
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with their torches ablaze. Rauschen properly denotes frenzied intoxication. So, 
Hi>lderlin's metaphor recalls, even before the recollection becomes thematic, a 
distinctly restless vision of drunken bacchants with blazing torches rushing about 
in the halflight of dusk. Similarly, while sensible men rest oblivious to the passage 
of nighttime, music restlessly drifts from the gardens, a breeze restlessly ruffles the 
coppice and carries the hourly call of a restless watchman. Ever so subtly, then, a 
restless night emerges that is decisively other than the restful night that would 
belong to day-time. This other, restless night opens upon a time that is alien and 
burdensome for all those not secured by the day and its economic time, but 
wanting that security. It is, for example, the time of the insomniac--for whom, as 
Levinas has shown, there is no rest and no security because there is no subject, 
but only an anonymous restless wakefulness in an unfamiliar world, an involuntary 
participation in the restless rumbling of the "there is." 
The time of this other, restless night is also curiously "feminine." 
Holderlin's other Nacht, rather than simply completing the masculine Tag as its 
delimiting extreme, turns out to be something wholly other: "the stranger to all 
that is human," he says. This night is fantastical, astonishing, mysterious, and 
sacred--but preeminently, this night is a woman: "Marvelous is her favour, Night's, 
the exalted, and no one knows what it is or whence comes all she does and 
bestows."16 Day-time and its appropriate night-time may be such that rational 
16 "Wunderbar ist die Gunst der Hocherhabnen und niemand Weiss von 
wannen und was einem geschiehet van ihr." Friedrich Hmderlin, Poems and 
Fragments, trans. Michael Hamburger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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man may master and use it, suggests the poem, but there is an other night-time 
which is somehow inappropriate to the day and beyond the masculine grasp 
conditioned by visibility. Not only is it inappropriate to day-time, it calls the very 
power of appropriation proper to the day into question: Holderlin says this night 
so consistently transgresses any attempt to comprehend "her" that "not even wise 
men can tell what is her purpose."17 
By contrast, Die Stadt--within which the poem locates us, we recall--first 
takes shape in the poem as that which shelters and surrounds, as that secure and 
delimited domain within which men and women can organize their activities, 
come together in commerce and go home to rest. The structure and function of a 
city reinforces the appropriating enterprise of day-time as the masculine domain 
of the sensible person--he or she who loves the rational light of the masculine day 
[ der besonnene Tag] more than the "lunacy" of the feminine night. 18 But \Vhile it 
1980), 242-53. All subsequent quotations of the poem are from this translation. 
17 "Selbst kein \Veiser versteht, was sie bereitet." 
18 Socrates, after all, seldom ventures outside the boundaries of the polis in 
Plato's dialogues--and when he does it is always in the very shadow of the walls, it 
is always during the day and always involves a phallic encounter--a beautiful 
young boy in the Lvsis, a phallic scroll hidden beneath his companion's robe in 
the Phaedrus, etc. Similarly, in the ideal polis of the Republic there is no room 
for the irrational poet--even though he be garlanded and worshiped as a sweet 
and holy and wonderful being. In contrast, the wine-god of Euripides' Bacchae 
cannot possess his maidens while they are inside the city limits, and he accordingly 
seduces them into the wilds well beyond the fortified walls. His claims to divinity 
are vehemently opposed by the sensible men of the city and most strongly hy the 
king, the every personification of the polis and rational resistance, whose 
paradoxical voyeurism is ultimately exposed to the enraged maenids when the tree 
he clings to slowly straightens like an erect phallus, bearing him aloft and into the 
domain of the visible. 
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is within the city limits that man's rational subjugation of the immoderate and 
inappropriate is most clearly seen in "Brod und Wein," so it is also here that the 
discord between the sensible and the sensual is most keenly felt. The metonymic 
Haupt (significant for philosophy since Plato, where it represents the telos of any 
true logos) denotes the predominance and supposed self-sufficiency of the 
rational, but this denotation is immediately transgressed by the whispered 
connotation of disembodiment, incompletion and alienation: while sensible men 
retreat within the artificial womb of the polis, deceptively replete with the day and 
circumspectively secure from the world's immensity and disquietude, we find at 
the center of the strophe the disembodied nostalgia of lovers and the lonely, 
figures who are essentially incomplete. These figures, like the poet, respond with 
fascination or disquietude to the seductive attraction of the other night that 
remains essentially outside. 
Holderlin's restless and feminine other night parallels what Blanchot calls 
the second night. In the first night, the night of day, everything disappears. 
Blanchot says: "here absence approaches--silence, repose, night. . . . here the 
sleeper does not know he sleeps, and he who dies goes to meet real dying."19 
But in the second night what appears is precisely that everything has disappeared: 
Night is this apparition: "everything has disappeared." It is what we 
sense when dreams replace sleep, when the dead pass into the deep 
of the night, when night's deep appears in those who have 
disappeared. Apparitions, phantoms, and dreams are an allusion to 
this empty night. . . . What appears in the night is the night that 
19 Blanchot, 164. 
appears. And this eeriness does not simply come from something 
invisible, which would reveal itself under cover of dark and at the 
shadows' summons. Here the invisible is what one cannot cease to 
see; it is the incessant making itself seen.20 
B]anchot says this other night is not, though we dress it up as a kind of being. 
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The first night is welcoming; we enter into it to rest, to sleep, and to die. But the 
second night does not welcome, does not open to us. In it one is always and 
essentially outside because one is outside even the opposition inside/outside. 
Blanchot observes that this night is inaccessible because "to have access to it is to 
accede to the outside, to remain outside the night and to lose forever the 
possibility of emerging from it."21 
This other night, which properly speaking is not, cannot be thought or 
perceived in the same vvay one conceptualizes and experiences things that are. 
Hc>lderlin's response to this difficulty is to think the essential absence of the other 
night by way of its trace. The language of the trace seems more proper to 
Heidegger than to HcHderlin, and the notion of the trace is certainly more closely 
associated with Heidegger. But that association is more a testament to 
Heidegger's sensitivity as a reader than a comment on Hcllderlin's poetry, where 
the trace plays a subtle, though significant role. In this poem, the trace is evoked 
in the very beginning, when the market at night is described as being empty of 
everything--where there were blossoms and grapes and hand-made goods, now 
'J(' 
-
1 Blanchot, 164. 
21 Blanchot, 164. 
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there is only the trace that indicates, not nothingness, but absence, and when the 
gardens at night, while distant and invisible, are said to impinge on what is 
proximate and present by virtue of their aromatic traces. Holderlin does not 
sense here the tangible remains of some determinate being, but the very essence 
of the trace: absence itself, the primal absence, the absence that first grants 
presence--what he will come to understand as the absence of the gods. Through 
this attunement to the trace Holderlin discovers, in a surprising reversal of what 
first appeared to be the case, that rationality and its derivative day-time are in 
fact given place by this indeterminate time of nocturnal absence. 
According to Richard Unger, Jochen Schmidt observed in HcHderlin's 
Elegie "Brod und Wein" that the poem is structurally tripartite and thematically 
chiasmic: the first three strophes address the night, the second three elegize the 
bright day of Greek culture, and the last three thematically return to night, now 
understood as the Hesperian night of the gods' absence, the night of the western 
world.22 Unger further observed that there is a focal point to the poem in the 
exact center of the elegy--the fifth distich of the fifth strophe, where the gods 
reveal themselves "in truth" to the ancient Greeks.23 
But this focal appearance of the gods in truth sharply contrasts with the 
absence and darkness that characterize the nocturnal strophes that surround it. 
22 Jochen Schmidt, Holderlins Elegie, "Brod und Wein" (Berlin, 1968), 8-10; 
quoted in Richard Unger, Holderlin's Major Poetry (Bloomington; Indiana 
University Press, 1975), 234. 
23 Richard Unger, 69. 
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Moreover, the heautiful vision of the godhead is recalled by Hc>lderlin not as an 
real appearance, but as a dreamlike vision given place by the night! Ulmer does 
not notice this detail, yet it is all-important: the central triad of the poem, 
imagining as it does the resplendent day of Greek community, occurs essentially 
as a dream--it occurs between the first and third nocturnal triads as a dream given 
place by the night! Consider a few indications of the dream-nature of the 
celestial vision from among a sizable number of references scattered throughout 
the poem: Hc)lderlin clearly signals the advent of a dream in the second strophe; 
the god approaches as a dream figure in the third; the mere Schein of the 
dreamlike vision is betrayed twice in the fourth strophe--once in the reference to 
the sacred slumber of Delphi where the gods communicate to their oracles 
specifically through dreams. and again when the poet explicitly describes the 
swelling strength of the word (the name of the god, Yater Aether) as it is spoken 
by day and dreamed of hy night. 
But essential to a proper understanding of the dream and its significance 
for the poet is the fact that the dreamlike apparition of the gods is ultimately 
given place within Hc>lderlin's poetry not by the first night, the night of day, but 
by the indeterminate time of the second night: the poem's proper night--composed 
of the first and third nocturnal triads that ostensibly provide in their midst a 
between-time for the second triad, the dream--is itself possible only by virtue of 
the other night, the night that withdraws. If we now recall that the poem that 
gives place to both nights of the poem and the dream within them, is given place 
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hy the default of god in the destitute night of our Weltzeit, then what immediately 
hecomes apparent is that there is a correspondence to be thought between the 
dream vision in the poem and the poem itself. Both "visions" are dream-like 
responses to the trace of an essential absence, and both "visions" end in the 
appropriation and consequent disappearance of what is given in each: the holiness 
of the other, that which is essentially refractory to all vision and presence. 
Let us consider in this regard Blanchot's reading of the Orpheus myth. 
B!anchot notes that when Orpheus descends toward Eurydice, his art is the power 
which opens the night. It is because of art's strength that night welcomes him. 
But this night opened hy art is the first night; the dream veils Eurydice, the limit 
of art, the essence of night. Over the essence of night art has no power: "For 
[Orpheus] Eurydice is the furthest that art can reach. Under a name that hides 
her and a veil that covers her, she is the profoundly obscure point toward which 
art and desire, death and night, seem to tend. She is the instant when the essence 
of night approaches as the other night."2-1 Blanchot suggests that Orpheus' work 
is not to ensure Eurydice's approach, but to bring her hack to the light of day, and 
to give her visible form, shape and reality in the day. Orpheus' work is to make 
visible, to uncover the veil that covers Eurydice in her nocturnal obscurity and 
infinite distance. But in the turn toward Eurydice--a turn made expressly in order 
to look upon her invisibility directly, upon the night that night hides--Orpheus 
forgets the work he is to achieve and thus sacrifices both his art and the 
z-1 Blanchot, 171. 
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relationship he would otherwise have with that upon which he desires only to 
look. Eurydice cannot be made visible in her invisibility without being lost to the 
virility of that attempt. 
In thinking the dream appearance of the gods, we may say that Holderlin 
likewise is capable of everything except a direct vision of the essence of night in 
the night. He can descend toward it, he can draw it to him and lead it upward, 
but only by turning away from it--that is, only by dreaming. Hc)lderlin can thus 
only call to us, urging us to dream with him and feel the same "draw" he feels: 
"Let us go, then!" he cries, "off to see open spaces, where we may seek what is 
ours, distant, remote though it be!"25 Heidegger says in "H()!derlin und das 
\Vesen der Dichtung" that poetry appears dream-like and free of decisive action 
because the essence of poetry seems to vacillate between the tangible reality in 
which we believe we are at home, and the illusory light of dream-like unreality 
created by poetry itself.26 And yet, he adds, essential reality lies in what the 
poet says and undertakes. The essence of poetry rests firm, while appearing 
within an illusory light of its own creation, not because it is grounded in the 
tangible, but because poetry's essence consists in its ability to ground--that is, to 
found, to name, and thereby to appropriate specifically "what has not yet come to 
pass" (EHD 43/HEP 91). 
25 "So komm! dass wir das Offene schauen, dass ein Eigenes wir suchen, so 
weit es auch ist." 
26 EHD 33, 42/HEP 81, 90. 
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Holderlin's call within the dream to dream with him is a call to seek in the 
dream-like light of poetry what is essentially "our own." The call is not to search 
for what is alien and other, but for what is our own--and to seek it within the 
poem along with the poet. The call is to seek in the poetic act that which while 
remote is also most proper to man. Two questions demand our attention at this 
point: what is it, that is most proper to man, which the poet urges us to seek with 
him; and what is the character and source of this propriety? 
With regard to the first question, compare H()Jderlin's dream and the 
drawing call he feels compelled to share and respond to, with Nietzsche's 
description of Apollonian art, which both produces a delimited dream image and 
impels the dreamer into that world, into the contemplation of the dream. 
Nietzsche specifies three characteristics of the Apollonian dream images: they are 
beautiful in that they delight us; they are only a matter of Schein and betray 
themselves as such; and lastly, they are perfections of their everyday originals and 
serve as transfiguring mirrors to justify the Dionysian horror of human life and 
existence. The poetic and sculptural images created by the Apollonian artist, in 
turn, mimetically reflect those images produced naturally in the dream state and 
thus perfect them.27 The Apollonian dream experience and its mimesis on an 
artistic level indicate an elemental portion of the complex schema of 
transfiguration within which Nietzsche specifically located art. In Die Geburt der 
27 For an unsurpassed reading of this work, which has thoroughly guided my 
own, see John Sallis, "Apollo's Mimesis," Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology 15, no. 1 (January 1984), 16-21. 
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Tragi)die he declared: "Art is not merely imitation of the reality of nature but 
rather a metaphysical supplement of the reality of nature, placed beside it for its 
overcoming."28 For Nietzsche, art is a dynamic process through which the 
abysmal reality underlying the finite natural world which gives it birth is 
transfigured and overcome. Nietzsche concludes that art is thus the proper task 
of life, life's life-affirming meta-physical activity. But in Die Geburt der Tragl>Clie 
Nietzsche does not see past the abysmal reality of the Dionysian, too terrible to 
endure without mediation, and the dream-like images of the Apollonian, which 
veil and thereby mediate our experience of the abyss. The gods themselves, for 
Nietzsche, are but the figurative products of the two basic energies of nature. 
Nietzsche does not turn in the abyss toward the holy; he sees the horror of 
groundlessness in the abyss, hut not the unholy concealing itself therein. He thus 
he does not see the marks of the holy the abyss remarks. 
Heidegger says in Nietzsche: der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, composed in 
1936-7 immediately after writing "H6lderlin und das \Vesen der Dichtung," that 
for Nietzsche art implicitly affirms what philosophy inherently denies: that the 
sensuous world is the true world, as "the sensuous, the sense-semblant. is the verv 
element of art."29 According to Heidegger, Nietzsche understood art as the basic 
28 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragcklie, section 24. Translation by 
John Sallis, "Apollo's Mimesis.'' 
2
') Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausg~1be 43 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1985), 85; hereafter GA 43. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: The \Viii to Power as 
Art, trans. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979), 73; 
hereafter WP A. 
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occurrence of all beings and thus as the distinctive counter-movement to nihilism, 
since the artist's work is to create and give form, and this is metaphysical activity 
pure and simple. To the extent that they are, beings are self-creating and self-
created--and thus artistic in the general sense of the word. When understood 
more narrowly as that activity in which creation emerges perspicuously and for 
itself, art is the supreme configuration of the will to power. Hence Nietzsche's 
belief, notes Heidegger, that every deed, and especially the highest deed--and thus 
the thinking of philosophy as well--must be determined by it. For Nietzsche, "the 
will to semblance, to illusion, to deception, to Becoming and change is deeper, 
more 'metaphysical' than the will to truth, to reality, to Being" (GA 43: 87 /WPA 
74 ). For Nietzsche, in fact, we have art specifically in order not to perish from 
the truth. But what truth is this? A truth that emptily negates the present? A 
nihilistic truth? The will to this truth, says Heidegger, is the disingenuous will to 
a supersensuous world, to "Platonic" being in itself; in this sense, truth is indeed a 
negation of the genuine world, the world of the sensuous present. But does not 
Nietzsche also ask in a propaedeutic to the transvaluation of all values, "supposing 
truth is a woman--what then?"30 This other truth, according to Nietzsche, cannot 
allow herself to be won; she remains essentially beyond the grasp of the 
philosophical eros. 
3° Friedrich Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 2. 
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The will to grasp the truth that is other than truth, the truth that gives 
place to truth, is the will of the poet in "Brod und Wein." This is his response to 
the draft of the abyss. Heidegger says the guiding and grounding questions of 
philosophy ask what beings and Being in truth (thought as aletheia, dis-closure) 
are. When we ask about the essence of Being, the question is such that "nothing 
remains outside the question, not even nothingness" (GA 43: 79 /WPA 68), 
hecause the question about Being in truth also implicitly asks about the essence of 
the truth or disclosedness in which Being itself would be disclosed--hence, it 
brings truth to stand \Vith Being in the realm of the grounding question of 
philosophy as its "space." This implicit question thus begs yet another, notes 
Heidegger: "how both [Being and truth] are united in essence and yet foreign to 
one another, and 'where,' in what domain, they somehow come together, and what 
that domain itself 'is"' ( GA 43: 79 /WP A 68). These are questions, admits 
Heidegger, which inquire beyond Nietzsche. Indeed they do. They inquire 
beyond phenomenology, as well. 
Such questions as these manifest a desire to disclose what lies essentially 
beyond the powers of disclosure, and, moreover, they desire to disclose it precisely 
as what lies essentially beyond those powers. Hc)lderlin's dream in response to 
the draft of the abyss inquires beyond even the grounding question of philosophy, 
as it initiates a turn toward the essential absence of an other night and to the 
trace of an other truth. HcHderlin turns directly toward this alterity as toward 
Eurydice, but in this turn the dream is immediately undone to return among the 
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shades. When he looks back, he looks beyond the gods' appearance to the 
essence of night, now inessential--to the truth of the withdrawal that gives place to 
the truth of disclosure, to the time of the other night that gives place to day-time 
and night-time and the illuminated presence they occasion. In the destitute time 
the poet can have no relation to the absent gods except in the dream of their 
approach. The poet has life and truth as a poet only after the dream and because 
of it. As Blanchot says of Orpheus: 
Not to turn toward Eurydice would be no less untrue. Not to look would 
be infidelity to the measureless, imprudent force of his movement, which 
does not want Eurydice in her daytime truth and her everyday appeal, but 
wants her in her nocturnal obscurity, in her distance, with her closed body 
and sealed face--wants to see her not when she is visible, but when she is 
invisible, and not as the intimacy of a familiar life, but as the foreignness of 
what excludes all intimacy, and wants, not to make her live, but to have 
living in her the plenitude of death.31 
Yes, HcHderlin loses the dream because he desires to reach beyond the measured 
limits of the poem, but this loss is necessary to the poem as it redefines those 
limits and reaffirms the desire to transgress them. Hc>lderlin's loss would answer 
Nietzsche with this response: the sensuous may be the element of art, but not its 
essence. 
Holderlin's poetry does not venture a redetermination of man simply by 
discerning as in a dream the appearance of the gods and the subsequent 
transfiguration of Greece, and certainly not by emptily imitating the function of 
past poets in singing untimely praises to the absent gods. l-Wlderlin traces the 
31 Blanchot, 172. 
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way toward man's own nature by thinking this recollected transformation as a 
dream given place hy the night of the gods' absence, and by then moving beyond 
it to think the significance of our need to restlessly think that absence as such. 
All genuine thought subsequent to the "dream" must think in relation to that 
dream. Thus Panthea admits of the title character in Holderlin's tragedy 
Empedokles: "To be him, that is / Life, and all of us are the dream thereof' 
(EHD 42/HEP 90). In a passage that provocatively recalls Critias' dream in the 
Timaeus, from which he is unable to escape in speaking of it, Holderlin says of 
the gods, in "Brod und Wein": "ever after our life is dream about them." As 
Nietzsche's Apollonian dream images transfigure and justify the night that gives 
them place, so Holderlin's dream recollection transfigures and justifies our time as 
a night of destitution wherein mortals must first discern the gods' essential 
absence and then attend to what that absence means. 
For Hc)lderlin we have the dream in order not to perish from the night, but 
it is night that gives place to the dream. For Nietzsche we have art in order not 
to perish from the truth, but it is truth that gives place to art. Truth is a "woman," 
for Nietzsche. Night is a "woman," for HcHderlin. Without discounting the 
differences between these two thinkers we must listen to what they speak in 
common. As "woman," Nietzsche's other truth and HcHderlin's other night are like 
Plato's chora, the indeterminate other that gives place to presence and absence. 
As other than time, Nietzsche's other truth and Hmderlin's other night evoke a 
time that gives place to time, the time of time. The determinate nature of the 
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dream, as well as the night and time that harbours it, are all made possible by the 
indeterminate absence of the other night and its other time. While this other 
time is thought by the poet specifically as the withdrawal that gives place to hoth 
presence and absence--that is, to the dream of presence and absence--it is not 
thought as something appropriated by the movement of thought. It is thought as 
the indeterminate Abgrund within which the poet must venture; it is thought as 
that indeterminate "time" which gives place to the venture, and thus to the word-
event that names the gods. This event, says Heidegger, in which man bears 
witness to what he is, harbours the act "by means of which man truly fulfills 
himself as man" (EHD 34/HEP 82). 
We must finally consider, now, that event--the event that conditions the 
ground for the existence of man. Holderlin's poetic venture takes place both 
within the poem and as the poem. What is sought in both cases is "our own," 
what is most proper to man--his own nature. What poetry discloses in the course 
of that venture is a dream world of glorious communion which climaxes in the 
appearance of the gods. This epiphany marks an essential moment in the 
existence of mortals. The glorious day of Greek culture at the center of "Brod 
und \Vein" is the sacramental moment when the naming of the gods and their 
subsequent appearance brings man and god together in the holy rapture of a face 
to face encounter, an event that grants a ground for discourse and human 
community: 
Father Aether! one cried, and tongue after tongue took it up then, 
Thousands, no man could bear life so intense on his own; 
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Shared, such wealth gives delight and later, when bartered with strangers, 
Turns to rapture; . . . 
So do the Heavenly enter, shaking the deepest foundations, 
Only so from the gloom down to mankind comes their Day.32 
The splendour of man's full possibility begins with a cry that names the 
approaching god, and results in a rapture so intense it must be shared--and can be 
shared, because the coming of the gods brings a light as intense as the rapture 
which that coming occasions, a light in which the faces of the gods, and all other 
beings, are revealed. 
The fifth and center strophe of the poem represents the fullness of the 
sacramental feast: 
Unperceived at first they come, and only the children 
Surge towards them, too bright, dazzling, this joy enters in, 
So that men are afraid, a demigod hardly can tell yet 
\Vho they are, and name those who approach him with gifts. 
Yet their courage is great, his heart soon is full of their gladness 
And he hardly knows what's to be done with such wealth, 
Busily runs and wastes it, almost regarding as sacred 
Trash which his blessing hand foolishly, kindly has touched. 
This, while they can, the heavenly bear with; but then they appear in 
Truth, in person, and now men grow accustomed to joy, 
And to Day, and the sight of the godhead revealed, and their faces--
One and All long ago, once and for all, they were named--
\Vho with free self-content had deeply suffused silent bosoms, from the 
first and alone satisfied every desire. 
Such is man; when the wealth is there, and no less than a god in 
Person tends him with gifts, blind he remains, unaware. 
First he must suffer, but now he names his most treasures possession, 
32 "Vater Aether! so riefs und flog von Zunge zu Zunge / Tauschenfach, es 
ertrug keiner das Leben allein; / Ausgetheilet erfreut solch Gut und getauschet, 
mit Fremden, / Wirds ein Jubel, ... / Denn so kehren die Himmlischen ein, 
tiefschi.itternd gelangt so / Aus den Schatten herab unter die Menschen ihr Tag." 
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Now for it words like flowers leaping alive he must find. 33 
This sacramental strophe is singularly instructive. The "heavenly" approach and 
are named in response to that approach. That naming, in turn, engenders a turn 
among men to each other because the rapture must be shared, with friend and 
stranger alike. At first the gods are not seen, however; and when they are 
perceived, it is the children who first perceive them. In fact, only the children 
perceive them. But as men grow accustomed to the holiness of the divine and the 
joy of communion, the faces of the gods become visible--and this is precisely what 
leads to their death and departure. 
Notice that the central line of the poem refers both to the god appearing 
in truth and men growing accustomed to joy. Can that co-incidence be purely 
coincidental? It marks the apex of the poem and dream. As apex, it is not only 
the uppermost point of an incline; it is also the point of decline. The incarnation 
of Christ, his "assuming a shape that was human," crowned and concluded the 
33 "Unempfunden kommen sie erst, es streben entgegen / Ihnen die Kinder, zu 
hell kommet, zu blendend das Glilk, / Und es scheut sie der Mensch, kaum weiss 
zu sagen ein Halbgott, / Wer mit Nahmen sie sind, die mit den Gaaben ihm 
nahn. / Aber der Muth von ihnen ist gross, es fiillen das Herz ihm / Ihre Freuden 
und kaum weiss er zu brauchen das Gut, / Schafft, verschwendet und fast ward 
ihm Unheiliges heilig, / Das er mit seegnender Hand thc>rig und gtitig beri.ihrt. / 
Mc>glichst dulden die Himmlischen diss; dann aber in Wahrheit / Kommen sie 
selbst und gewohnt werden die Menschen des Gli.iks / Und des Tags und zu 
schaun die Offenbaren, das Antliz / Derer, welche, schon !angst Eines und Alles 
genannt, / Tief die verschwiegene Brust mit freier Guntige gefiillet, / Und zuerst 
und allein alles Verlangen begliikt; / So ist der Mensch; wenn da ist das Gut, und 
es sorget rnit Gaaben / Seiber ein Gott fiir ihn, kennet und sieht er es nicht. / 
Tragen muss er, zuvor; nun aber nennt er sein Liebstes, / Nun, nun mi.issen dafi.ir 
Worte, wie Blumen, entstehn. 
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feast, writes H<Hderlin. With Christ's incarnation and subsequent death the "day" 
and the "dream" both decisively end--what was holy and other has been seen and 
appropriated, and thus become part of the same. So, once again gods exist only 
elsewhere. The poet laments at the beginning of the seventh strophe: "But, my 
friend, we have come too late. Though the gods are living, / Over our heads they 
live, up in a different world."3--l The presence and vision of the gods satisfies 
every desire for their coming, making of their holiness nothing but "sacred trash." 
The consequent oblivion of the gods' essential alterity plunges men and women 
once again into the abysmal absence of night, in which men can only wander 
"friendless as we are, alone, / Always waiting."35 Thus, says Hc>lderlin at the end 
of the center strophe: "Such is man; \Vhen the wealth is there, and no less than a 
god in / Person tends him with gifts, blind he remains, unaware."36 The poetic 
naming is initially a response to the approach of the god, and as such it brings joy 
and communion. But the accomplishment of naming that which essentially can 
only approach, transforms it--reducing to presence and propriety that which is 
named (the named become a "treasured possession," we recall). Insofar as the 
poetic naming ends in that appropriating satiation, it concludes the sacramental 
moment with which the naming event began. Thereafter the gods' presence can 
3--l "Aber Freund! wir kommen zu spat. Zwar leben die GcHter, / Aber Liber 
dem Haupt droben in anderer Welt." 
3~" • h G / S ] · . . . w1e so o ne enossen zu seyn, o zu rnrren " 
36 "So is der Mensch; wenn da ist das Gut, und es sorget mit Gaaben / Seiber 
ein Gott fiir ihn, kennet und sieht er es nicht." 
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onlv be invoked in their absence--by the sacramental tokens referred to in the ., 
poem's title. 
The sacrament of bread and wine speaks primarily of communion, of 
community. But the community of which it speaks is a curious kind of 
community--a community gathered together and given place by the invocation of 
an absent god. The believer who puts the holy sacrament to his lips invokes the 
presence of the god whose flesh and blood it betokens--but not the bodily 
presence of that god; the god is invoked in his essential absence. Around that 
invocation and in the space granted by that absence, a community can take place. 
This community awaits the absent god and thus holds the god in default. Any 
such sacramental event accomplishes--without realizing that accomplishment in a 
work which endures after the event, thereby preserving its essential structure--a 
templum. 
The image of the ever resourceful spring in the first strophe of "Brod und 
Wein," continually nourishing the ground around it, speaks eloquently of the 
communal ground granted in the naming event--a granting forgotten by the 
Socratic man in his appropriative preoccupation with the ground and what is 
granted along with it--the virility of intelligibility and adequate knowledge. While 
the polis as the hub of human activity should ideally be a model of communal life, 
this is not the case for modern man, suggests H()]derlin. The appearance of the 
gods is necessary to human community, and thus to human nature, yet we have no 
temple at the city's center and no holy retreats on its fringes. Man no longer 
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prepares a space for the gods to be absent: after a day ruled by individual 
concerns and rational economics, the market has been stripped bare of grapes and 
blossoms; the gifts of the gods, no longer even seen as such, have been used up in 
commerce. Rather than joyfully ending a day of glorious communal achievement 
with a night of orgiastic unity or even shared devotion, each individual in the 
closure of his coach rushes away from others and the possibility of community. 
Rather than gathering around a communal fire or uniting individual torches in a 
central clearing where men and women, once gathered, could experience the 
blessing and appearance of the gods, lonely people now wander alone in the 
darkness--mesmerized not by the rising flames, but by the rising moon, a "shadowy 
image" in comparison, "mournful" and "little concerned about us." 
For Heidegger, proper discourse consists precisely in this naming of the 
gods that lets worlds appear: "It must be stressed, he says, that "the presence of 
the gods and the appearance of a world are not consequences of language, hut 
simultaneous with it. The conversation (which we are) consists actually in the 
naming of the gods and in the world becoming language" (EHD 37 /HEP 85). But 
Heidegger further says that the gods can be named only after they first claim us. 
Thus, proper discourse happens only as response: "The gods can come into the 
realm of the word only when they themselves address us and place their claim on 
us. The word that names them is always a reply to their claim" (EHD 37 /HEP 
85-86). Heidegger's event of essential naming, like Levinas' event of hypostasis, 
has two essential moments. The poet names the gods only in answer to a prior 
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claim made upon him by the gods. Before the coming of the gods, before even 
their absence, is a responsive turn toward them, toward their alterity and holiness. 
Quite clearly, this means that for Heidegger there must be a primordial 
relationship with the holy other. And it is this primordial relationship that opens 
upon a true future, a future unimaginably new. 
Heidegger says that poetry creates works out of the realm and the "matter" 
of language. He sees in Hmderlin's poetry the indication that language is given 
man in order that he might bear witness to what he is. In discourse, man testifies 
that he belongs to the earth and to the standing tension of things by his creation 
of a world, and this is the act by means of which man truly fulfills himself as man. 
Thus, Dasein is properly defined as zohon logon echon only insofar as logos is 
understood in this definition, not as reason, but as discourse. Man is "that living 
thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality for discourse" (SZ 
25/BT 47); man is misunderstood as animal rationale; his nature lies in the 
potentiality for discourse--a potentiality granted prior to presence. 
Heidegger shows in thinking the coming-together of poetry and thought 
that discourse itself is made possible by the approach of the essentially other. 
The subsequent response of the poet to the claim of the gods "heard" in the turn 
toward them, is a turn toward what is holy in man's relation to Being. The 
potentiality for discourse is granted in the relationship with the approach from on 
high of what is radically other, at once distant and divine. What Hc)lderlin 
ventures in reaching into the abysmal night of our time, and what Heidegger 
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clearly recognizes in that venture, is a tentative and provisional redetermination of 
man as essentially related to the height and holiness of the other, to the essence 
of alterity itself. Insofar as this potentiality is somehow granted in the very event 
of Being, moreover, Heidegger also sees in this relationship a way of rethinking 
both the approach of death and the approach of the future--in other words, a way 
of rethinking the primordial clearing before death and presence within which 
Dasein can take place and thus become the place of disclosure the existential 
analytic determined it to be. 
At this point, clearly, Heidegger and Levinas are much closer in their 
findings than either apparently realizes. The parallels are most provocative: for 
Heidegger, in asking the question concerning the essence of poetry and in 
recalling the absence of the gods, we are led to acknowledge a lack of virility in 
the questioner, a deferral to the absent other; for Levinas, the idea of the infinite 
and the essential absence of the Other similarly mark an interruptive lack of 
virility in the ego; for Heidegger, the fundamental oblivion of the question of the 
meaning of Being opens inexorably upon a primordial oblivion of the default of 
God, while the moment and event of essential naming can occur only in resµonse 
to a prior moment in which a claim upon us is first made; similarly for Levinas, 
the first moment of hypostasis, in which definitive being is accomplished and the 
alterity of the other is dissolved, marks the oblivion of a prior relationship with 
the Other; for Heidegger, our relation to Being is discovered to be essentially holy 
or unholy, and thus, in a certain sense, ethical from the beginning; again, for 
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r.,evinas we could say virtually the same thing; for Heidegger, the nature of Dasein 
is properly grounded in discourse, which happens only as response; while for 
r.,evinas (although we have not attended to this aspect of his work), the social 
relation is essentially one of discourse. Indeed, in the texts on language, 
especially, and in other texts like "Conversation on a Country Path," it is more 
difficult to preserve the differences between these two thinkers than it is to see 
the similarities in their thought. 
The coming together of poetry and thinking in the question of the 
propriety and a-propriety of time thus opens for Heidegger onto the possibility of 
rethinking both the nature of man and the meaning of time. In Heidegger's last 
writings this rethinking is at once more complicated and more focused than it is in 
the Hmderlin essays--most explicitly in Zur Sache des Denkens, where in thinking 
the interplay of Ereignis and Enteignis, Heidegger is able to link the disclosure of 
Being to both the abysmal absence of Being and the time that belongs to that 
absence. 
What I hope to have at least suggested in this chapter is that what might 
otherwise appear as a leap from Being and Time to "On Time and Being" may 
actually be the result of a series of thoughtful encounters with the poetry of 
Hc)lderlin and a careful investigation into the essence of poetry and language. 
CHAPTER 4 
TIME AND BEING: THINKING THE MATTER OF THINKING 
Heidegger says in "Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung" that in naming 
the gods, and thus in founding Being in language, the poet seizes upon and holds 
fast that which comes to him from the realm of the holy out of the "torrent of 
time" tearing by. He founds mortal existence as one conversation by 
appropriating the present out of a time that comes to him. This appropriation 
stays the flow of time in its inexorable approach, disclosing in it persistence and 
presence, and thus unity and identity: 
One-ness and same-ness can come to light only within the 
framework of stability and endurance, and stability and endurance 
come into existence only when persistence and presence flash up. 
This occurs when time opens up its dimensions. Since man has 
established himself in the presence of something enduring, he can 
expose himself to change, to the coming and going of events and 
occurrences; for only where there is endurance can there be change. 
Only since the "torrent of time" has been torn up, as it were, into 
present, past and future, has it become possible to agree upon 
something which persists through all change in time. We have 
become one conversation ever since the time that "time is." Ever 
since time has arisen and its flow has been stayed, we have become 
historical. To be a conversation and to be historical is one and the 
same; both belong together and are in fact the selfsame thing. 
(EHD 37 /HEP 85) 
The Greeks found something of stability and endurance as a consequence of the 
poet's naming of the god: the one-ness and same-ness of the historical 
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conversation which we are. Mortal existence is grounded in this essentially poetic 
event of appropriation [Ereignis], in this naming and authenticating of what is 
given to man in his response to the draft of the abyss. The appropriating of this 
appropriation is not yet thought as such, as Ereignis; but the appropriating of 
Being is precisely what is underway in the work of the poet in the destitute time 
and in Heidegger's thinking with regard to that work. 
Blanchot asks if the destitution of the holy in Holderlin's question might 
not express the essence of art more profoundly than any essential presence: It 
seems, he says, that: 
Art owes the strangest of torments and the very grave passion that 
animate it to the disappearance of the historical forms of the divine. 
Art was the language of the gods. The gods having disappeared, it 
became the language in which their disappearance was expressed, 
then the language in which this disappearance itself ceased to 
appear. This forgetfulness now speaks all alone. The deeper the 
forgetfulness, the more the deep speaks in this language, and the 
more the abyss of this deepness can become the hearing of the 
word.1 
The poet dwells in the god's default, the region where truth lacks. The time of 
the destitution designates, for Blanchot, "the time which in all times is proper to 
art." As the gods can appear only in the dream, they are always already 
essentially absent, and approach us only in the passage from one era to another--
only in the experience of the disaster.2 Time as finitude is always already 
1 Blanchot, The Space of Literature, 245-46. 
2 Compare this "disastrous" passage from one era to another with Levinas' 
"catastrophic" passage from one instant to the next. 
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destitute, but this always already '" precisely what marks the advent of the 
disaster, which is outside history, and thus, outside the one conversation which we 
are. Blanchot says it is "the time when one can no longer--by desire, ruse, or 
violence--risk the life which one seeks, through this risk, to prolong."3 It is the 
time of motionless transgression, the passiveness of the passage beyond. This is 
the destitute time that Holderlin discovers, the truth of time, the pre-condition for 
art and for naming, which in turn is the neutral space where intelligibility can 
encounter its other and recognize it as its limit. 
After the coming-together of poetry and thought to think the disastrous 
approach of time and its appropriation alongside the approach of the fugitive god, 
how are we now to rethink the nature of man and the meaning of time? In 
answer to the question "Who are we?" posed midway through "Zeit und Sein," 
Heidegger answers: 
It might be that that which distinguishes man as man is determined 
precisely by what we must think about here: man, who is concerned with 
and approached by presence, who, through being thus approached, is 
himself present in his own way for all present and absent beings. 
Man: standing within the approach of presence, but in such a way 
that he receives as a gift the presencing that It gives by perceiving what 
appears in letting-presence. (SD 12/TB 12) 
If man were not the constant receiver of the gift, he says, man would not be man: 
"because Being and time are there only in Appropriating, Appropriating has the 
peculiar property of bringing man into his own as the being who perceives Being 
3 Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 40. 
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by standing within true time. Thus Appropriated, man belongs to Appropriation" 
(SD 24/TB 23). By perceiving Being, and thus by standing within true time, man 
belongs to Ereignis itself. 
We will see in "Zeit und Sein" that Ereignis is what determines both time 
and Being, in their own and in their belonging-together. But in Appropriation, 
Heidegger says, the sending source keeps itself back and withdraws what is most 
fully its own from boundless unconcealment. Thought in terms of Appropriation, 
this withdrawal, then, is Expropriation, Enteignis, the preservation of what is 
Appropriation's own. In asking about the impossible justification of the relation 
Heidegger establishes between Ereignis as event--as Eraugnis, in other words (in 
which we glimpse the word "eye," which suggests that Being looks to us), which 
association the definitive German dictionary Duden sanctions--and Ereignis as 
that which discloses what is proper to us--a play on the word eigen, which 
etymology the Duden expressly disqualifies, Blanchot asks in timely fashion: 
Why eigen, why "proper" (how else can this word be translated?), 
and not "improper"? Why this word? Why "presence" in its 
stubborn patient) affirmation, which makes us repudiate "absence"? 
Earlier, in Sein und Zeit, the opposition between "authenticity" and 
"inauthenticity" (a superficial translation) prefigured--in a way that 
was still traditional--the more enigmatic question of the "proper," 
which ultimately we cannot welcome in the same way we do the 
undecidedness in "a-propriation" (Derrida). The "proper" cannot be 
welcomed in the lack of a place and of truth. Yet without this void, 
the gift of writing, the gift of sheer Saying--giving life as well as 
death, and being as well as not-being--would no longer be the 
expenditure which dislocates every event. "Improper" or "a-
propriation," inasmuch as the "proper" is admitted in these 
expressions which at the same time disqualify it, calls to what 
obligates us limitlessly and cannot possibly be authorized by any 
truth, not even by one understood as nontruth. Thus does straying 
stray along its own path.4 
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For Heidegger, Ereignis must therefore always be thought together with 
Enteignis, its retreat, its withdrawal. In "Zeit und Sein" Heidegger says presence 
means the constant abiding that approaches man, reaches him, and is extended to 
him. But he immediately thereafter questions the source of this extending reach 
to which, he says, the presence belongs as presencing. It is in the wake of this 
question--and in the wake of his counsel to attend to the path of his thinking, 
rather that the propositional logic of his thought, in order that man might be 
determined by what must be thought--that Heidegger proceeds to think not 
presence, but absence--the absence that gives place to presence and ultimately to 
the interplay of the four dimensions of time. 
Before the time that "time is," is the approach out of an essential absence 
of what "is not yet"; before the waking light of essential names and historical 
presence, before even the dream-vision of the god can give place to the naming 
event, there is the dark night of the god's default. Heidegger says that while man 
relates to the absent as constantly as he does to the present--explicitly in the 
modalities of past and future, thought as the no longer present and the not yet 
present--there is an absence more primordial still, an absence that gives place to 
that relation in opening up what he calls time-space. Heidegger says it is this 
interplay of time's three dimensions that proves to be the true extending, the 
4 Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, 98-99. 
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fourth dimension, of time. Dimension, he says, is not only the area of possible 
measurement, but the giving and opening up of the reach. It is, he says, this 
giving that determines all. But the source of this giving remains always refractory 
to the light and appropriation it makes possible. 
I will suggest that in thinking this giving Heidegger follows the trace 
discovered by Holderlin--the trace of an a-proper "time" that is in no way man's 
product or projection; "there is no production here," Heidegger says explicitly in 
"Zeit und Sein,"--there is only giving in the sense of extending which opens up 
"time-space" (ZS 17 /TB 16). But the source of the Es gibt remains undetermined: 
it "remains"--a remainder to every possible calculation. What remains to be 
thought, then, in rethinking the nature of man and the meaning of time, is the Es 
giht and the indeterminate source of that gratuity. But thinking remains, in 
relation to this task, essentially inadequate. 
The first few paragraphs of "Zeit und Sein" are most interesting, even 
though they were apparently ignored during the Protokoll sessions that followed 
the lecture, for Alfred Guzzoni makes absolutely no mention of them in his 
summary. 
In the first paragraph, Heidegger refers to two specific paintings by the 
Swiss-German artist Paul Klee, "Heilige aus einem Fenster" and "Tod und Feuer." 
Both these works were painted, points out Heidegger, in the year of Klee's death. 
In the second paragraph, Heidegger refers to Georg Trakl's short poem 
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"Siebengesang des Todes." In the third, he recalls Heisenberg's "Weltformel." 
The point Heidegger explicitly makes with these references is that none of these 
works are immediately intelligible [unmittelbare Verstandlichkeit], nor are they 
commonly expected to be. He says we should want to stand before the paintings 
for a long time, and would abandon any claim to immediate intelligibility; we 
should want to hear the poem recited often, and would abandon any claim to 
immediate intelligibility; and even after carefully listening to Heisenberg's 
explanations, out of an entire audience of listeners, only two or three at most 
would even be able to follow him, while the rest would happily abandon any claim 
to immediate intelligibility. In each of these cases we would, without protest, 
abandon any claim to immediate intelligibility--while, to the contrary, says 
Heidegger, this is patently not the case with philosophical thinking, that thinking 
which is supposed to offer Weltweisheit, or worldly wisdom leading to the blessed 
life. 
Heidegger's point is that philosophical thinking is in our time called to 
reflections far removed from such practical wisdom: "It might be that a kind of 
thinking has become necessary which must give thought to matters from which 
even the painting and the poetry which we have mentioned and the theory of 
mathematical physics receive their determination" (ZS 1/TB 2). However, what is 
most interesting about this beginning is not Heidegger's conclusion or his explicit 
means of reaching it, but the many striking images of death and finitude 
occasioned by his examples. If his point were simply that philosophy is called to 
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think what requires even more thought than painting, poetry, and theoretical 
physics, then why, out of an almost infinite field of less accessible and certainly 
less disturbing paintings, does Heidegger choose these particular paintings--both 
of which were painted by an artist famous, not for his difficulty, but for his 
ideographic simplicity and self-interpretive titles; both of which address with 
discomforting figures the limits and finitude of material existence alongside the 
apparent limitlessness of spiritual or immaterial existence; and both of which were 
painted in the very year the artist died (and expressly identified as such)? Why, 
among the many possible examples of less morbid, yet uncontestably obtuse or 
difficult poetry, does Heidegger choose a fairly straightforward and little known 
poem by Trakl, and why a poem explicitly about death? Why, of all the possible 
examples of emotionally neutral, yet extremely demanding thinking from 
theoretical physics, does Heidegger refer to the search for a cosmic formula by 
the author of the uncertainty principle, that principle which is arguably most 
elegant in its simplicity, and yet most destabilizing in its implications for finite 
thought? Without a doubt, the references are deliberately chosen to call into 
question not only the demand for immediate intelligibility, but in order to 
figuratively introduce the matter he will subsequently attempt to think--the 
relationship between time and Being alongside an unspoken horizon of death and 
human finitude. 
Also of particular interest at the beginning of this text are the multitude of 
references to listening, hearing, and speaking. Even for Heidegger, there are a 
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considerable number of such references and word plays in "Zeit und Sein"--no less 
than a dozen in the first few pages alone. The example Heidegger cites of 
something that "is," in point of fact, is the lecture hall [Hc)rsaal]--literally, the 
"listening hall"--in \Vhich he is speaking. "This lecture hall ~," he says; only to 
then add, "The lecture hall is illuminated" (ZS 3/TB 3). These references 
accentuate the remarkable relationship implicitly explored in this text between 
seeing and listening, a relationship subtly defined as at once complementary and 
antagonistic, and subtly shown to he, even working together, inadequate to the 
task of thinking. Consider some of these initial references: he mentions the 
illuminated Hc)rsaal in which are gathered listeners to hear the speaker, who has 
just affirmed the need to hear often what must be thought and the need to listen 
to Being, but specifically without a view to its being grounded in terms of beings, 
as there is no longer the possibility of bringing the Being of what "is" explicitly 
into view; he gives a hint on how to listen, which consists precisely in following 
the movement of showing; he declares that presencing speaks out of the present, 
and that the determination of Being as presence by time is sufficient to introduce 
a relentless and increasing disquiet [Unruhe] into thinking; and he then asks why, 
in what way, and from what source something like time can speak in Being. 
These references not only call our attention to the similarities and pronounced 
differences between sight and vision, and between what is heard and what is seen; 
they ultimately suggest that in thinking the relationship of time and Being, hearing 
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and seeing must work together in order to move thinking--still inadequate--beyond 
both. 
Showing requires speaking and seeing requires hearing, and an analysis 
which attends only to what shows itself or to what is brought to appear--in other 
words, a pure phenomenological analysis--is not commensurate to the task of 
thinking the relation of Being and time; Guzzoni says the "experimental quality of 
the seminar was due to precisely this difficulty: 
On the one hand, it [the seminar] wanted to point directly at a matter 
which in accordance with its very nature is inaccessible to communicative 
statements. On the other hand, it had to attempt to prepare the 
participants for their own experience of what was said in terms of an 
experience of something which cannot be openlv brought to light. It is thus 
the attempt to speak of something that cannot be mediated cognitivelv, not 
even in terms of questions, but must be experienced. (ZS 27-28/TB 26; 
emphases mine) 
The "matter" to be thought cannot be adequately expressed, much less 
comprehended, Heidegger says. In thinking this relation between time and Being 
one must thus move definitively beyond phenomenology to one's "own experience" 
[eigene Erfahrung] of what remains, of necessity, unseen and unsaid. Guzzoni 
says that one of the last questions raised in the Protokoll concerned the meaning 
of this "experience" and whether or not it demanded an abdication of thinking. 
Heidegger's response apparently consisted in pointing out the eigene Erfahrung to 
which he had reference essentially involved awakening from the Vergessenheit of 
Being: 
Experiencing is nothing mystical, not an act of illumination, but rather the 
entry into dwelling in Appropriation. Thus awakening to Appropriation 
remains indeed something which must be experienced, but as such is 
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precisely something which is at first necessarily bound up with the 
awakening from the oblivion of Being to that oblivion. (ZS 57 /TB 53) 
Thinking is not yet the experience, but like Holderlin's poetry, he says, thinking 
can direct us toward the site of Appropriation. 
Presumably proceeding with this in mind, then, Heidegger notes that 
language itself "says" that what we call the temporal is what is in time, and thus, 
what is determined by time as what passes away with time. Time itself passes 
away and does so constantly. Hence, in constantly passing away it remains as 
time--which means, it does not disappear, it presences. As presence. however, 
time is thus determined by a kind of Being, which in turn raises the question of 
how Being is then supposed to be determined by time, and how time can remain 
constant without being something temporal like beings in time. 
Something like time speaks out of Being. A kind of Being speaks out of 
the constancy of time. Note the curious indeterminacy that characterizes Being 
and time when Heidegger "listens" to what "speaks" in them: it is not time that 
speaks out of Being, but "something like time" [dergleichen wie Zeit]; it is not 
Being that speaks out of time, but "a kind of Being" [ein Sein]. This 
indeterminacy echoes Heidegger's point, that Being and time when thought 
together appear differently than when they are thought apart. \Vhen thought 
together they appear to be codeterminate and codetermined--and thus strangely 
indeterminate: "Being is not a thing, thus nothing temporal, and yet it is 
determined by time as presence. Time is not a thing, thus nothing which is, and 
yet it remains constant in its passing away without being something temporal like 
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the beings in time" (ZS 3/TB 3). Being and time determine each other 
reciprocally, but not in such a way that they determine each other as temporal or 
as a being--in other words, when thought together they determine each other in a 
way unlike the way they each determine temporal beings. 
Heidegger says the contradictions in which we thus find ourselves adrift 
when attempting to think this reciprocal determination cannot be dialectically 
synthesized without evading thereby the very matters [Sachen] and issues 
[Sachverhalt] that need to be thought. We read in the Protokoll proceedings the 
following about the word Sache: 
Taken in the old sense of the word, the expression "matter," "matter of 
thinking," which occurs frequently in the lecture means the contested case, 
what is contested, the matter in question. For the thinking not yet 
determined, the matter is what gives thought, that from which this thinking 
receives its determination. (ZS 41/TB 38) 
In thinking through the matter, therefore, we must struggle not to reconcile Being 
and time, and thus close off [ ausgeschlossen] the question of the relation 
[Verhaltnis] between them; we must attempt to proceed in such a way as to admit 
and involve [ einlassen] ourselves properly with those matters in their relation. 
What, then, would constitute a proper involvement? Heidegger answers: an 
attempt to think Being and time, time and Being, carefully and cautiously in their 
conjunction as the Sachverhalt for thought. The word "Sache" means, he explains, 
"what is decisively at stake in that something inevitable is concealed within it" (ZS 
4 /TB 4 ). Time and Being are each the matters for thinking and must be thought 
as such and in their relation, which relation is then the matter for thought. 
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In order to more fully understand what Heidegger is trying to say in this 
regard, we must consider in the original German what is one of the most crucial 
passages in the entire text, for what is marked in this passage, but left unsaid, is 
almost completely lost in the Stambaugh translation. The passage reads: 
Sein--eine Sache, vermutlich die Sache des Denkens. Zeit--eine Sache, 
vermutlich die Sache des Denkens, wenn anders im Sein als Anwesenheit 
dergleichen wie Zeit spricht. Sein und Zeit, Zeit und Sein nennen das 
VerhU!tnis beider Sachen, den Sachverhalt, der beide Sachen zueinander 
halt und ihr Verhaltnis aushalt. Diesem Sachverhalt nachzusinnen, ist dem 
Denken aufgegeben, gesetzt, dass es gessonnen bleibt, seine Sache 
auszuharren. (ZS 4) 
Halten means "to hold"; verhalten means "to retain" or, more literally, "to hold 
back"; aushalten means "to endure" or, more literally, "to hold out" or ''to maintain 
a hold"; Verhmtnis means a "relationship" or, more literally, "what holds together"; 
Sachverhalt means "issue," "matter at stake," or, perhaps, "matter held together in 
being held back." In all fairness to Joan Stambaugh, it is nearly impossible to 
translate this passage into a form that is both accurate and readable. But as 
accuracy is critical to an understanding of what language itself "says" in this text--
which is precisely what Heidegger is attempting to "listen" to, after all--I will 
venture a translation that more literallv reflects what is indicated bv the word . . 
plays and italicized portions of the German text, even though the result is 
admittedly ponderous and awkward: 
Being--a matter, presumably the matter of thinking. Time--a matter, 
presumably the matter of thinking, if indeed, in Being as presence, 
something like time speaks. Being and time, time and Being, name the 
being-held-together of both matters, the matter-held-hack which holds both 
matters toward each other and maintains-a-hold on their being-held-
together. It is assigned to thinking to meditate on this matter-held-back, 
assuming that thinking remains meditatively-intent on waiting out the 
matter of this matter-held-back. 
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By attending now to the accentuated words and portions of words, we can more 
readily see what Heidegger means by "listening" to language--which, we have 
learned, is the "House of Being."5 Heidegger is listening to the "hold" that speaks 
in hfilt, Verhaltnis, Sachverhalt, and aushalt. He is then listening to the "and," or 
und. that holds Being and time, time and Being, together and thinking of it 
precisely as that hold, or halt. He is thereby attempting to hear what is whispered 
about Being and time by and in that hold! A5 so held together, the two in 
holding together and being held back, or kept in issue, constitute the matter of 
thinking. V✓hat must be thought then, without dialectically synthesizing the two 
held together in their difference into an undifferentiated whole, is the matter that 
speaks out of their being-held-together-in-issue which is prior to both in their 
separation, and more fundamental than each alone. 
Why is this passage so critical? Because it is here that Heidegger "hears" 
that the matter-held-together-and-in-issue does not hold either Being or time as a 
being or as something temporal, but as matters within the matter-held-together-in-
issue. So considered, we cannot say of them Sein ist and Zeit ist; we must say es 
gibt Sein and es gibt Zeit: "We say of beings: they are. With regard to the matter 
"Being" and with regard to the matter "time," we remains cautious. We do not 
say: Being is, time is, but rather: there is Being and there is time" (ZS 4-5 /TB 4-
5 See WM 164/BW 213. 
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5). The move from "Being is, time is" to "it gives Being, it gives time" is not, as 
Heidegger himself is careful to point out, a mere change in idiom--it is a move 
that turns us away from beings and back to the matter, a move occasioned by· 
listening to what speaks out of the matter-held-together. 
Heidegger now brings back into play the references to vision. He says that 
in order to get beyond the idiom and back to the matter of thought, we must show 
how this es gibt can be caught sight of [ erblicken ]. The appropriate way is to look 
ahead [vorzublicken] to the "it," or es, which gives Being and time. Said 
differently, we must look ahead to what is given in the it gives--that is, what 
"Being" and "time" mean as given. Heidegger himself encloses Being and time in 
quotation marks, indicating that when thought as given, they are no longer the 
same Being and time they are when thought metaphysically. 
By so looking ahead, we become foresighted [vor-sichtig] in yet another 
sense, he says: we try to bring the es itself and its giving into view, capitalizing "it" 
and making of it Es; we look ahead to the It which gives Being and time. In 
order to accomplish this we must first think Being so as to think it itself into its 
own [ es selbst in sein Eigenes ], and then think time in order to think it itself into 
its own [sie selbst in ihr Eigenes]. Notice here the shift of the pronoun from 
neuter to feminine. The "it" in each case must clearly be referring, not to the Es 
of Es gibt, as the Stambaugh translation implies by capitalizing the "it," but to 
Being, on the one hand, and time, on the other: Being and time must each be 
thought into its own. And yet, by using the pronouns instead of the nouns, 
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Heidegger is certainly suggesting some connection to the pronoun in Es gibt. The 
next passage of the text says that in consequence of thinking Being and time each 
into its own, the way will show itself how "it gives being and how it gives time" 
[Dadurch muss sich die Weise zeigen, wie es Sein, wie es Zeit, gibt] (ZT 5). 
Though awk"Ward, this passage indicates that the "it itself' of Being and the "it 
itself' of time come together into a cooperative and neuter "it" which "gives"; the 
giving issues forth out of the being-held-together of the two. He then says that in 
this giving, the giving of the two, it becomes apparent [ersichtlich] how that giving 
is to be determined which, as a Verhaltnis, first holds [hmt] the two toward each 
other and yields [er-gibt] them. By hyphenating the word ergehen Heidegger is 
clearly indicating that Being and time, each in its own, is given over to its own hy 
the giving of Es gibt--which giving is here expressly identified as Being and time, 
the being-held-together, the Verhaltnis, that holds them together as and in the 
matter-held-together. 
In first thinking, the it itself of Being into its own, what then becomes 
apparent is that Being means presencing, and thought with regard to what 
presences, presencing shows itself specifically as letting-presence, which in turn 
shows itself in bringing into unconcealment. I emphasize the "in turn" in order to 
show the turn that is at play here, a turn indicated in the text when Heidegger 
says, "but now we must try to think this letting-presence explicitly insofar as 
presencing is admitted" (ZS 5 /TB 5). The "but now . . . " was the subject of 
much discussion in the seminar, and indicates a shift from the focus on letting-
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presence "Anwesenlassen," to letting-presence, "Anwesenlassen" (ZS 40).6 In the 
first case, letting-presence is related to beings, to what has been freed to be 
something present by letting-presence. In the second case, letting-presence is 
thought as presencing itself, as the letting or giving that admits to presence. This 
turn in focus is essential to the move from thinking Being as the ground of beings 
to thinking the unconcealment and generosity of Being as Appropriation, because 
"from the perspective of Appropriation it becomes necessary to free thinking from 
the ontological difference" (ZS 40-41/TB 37). This turn thus amounts to the pivot 
point in both the text and in the effort to think the matter as such. 
To let presence, understood as letting-come-to-presence, thus means: to 
unconceal, to bring into openness. It is in this unconcealing that Being as letting-
presence is at play. Here we see why Heidegger returned to the visual references, 
because what was "heard" as a giving of Being in the objective sense of the 
genitive is "seen" as an unconcealing of Being in the subjective sense; what is at 
play [spielt] in unconcealment is precisely a giving, says Heidegger, but it is the 
generosity of Being--that is, the giving by Being. This is why Heidegger ends the 
sentence by saying: " ... d.h. Sein gibt." Heidegger then says in parentheses, \Vhich 
indicates, according to Stambaugh, that it was written in the lecture but not read: 
"(To think the matter "Being" explicitly requires our reflection to follow the 
direction which shows itself in letting-presence. But from unconcealing speaks a 
6 Again, the accentuated portion of these two words is missing in the 
Stambaugh translation, which effectively obscures the whole point. See TB 37. 
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giving, an It gives)" (ZS 5/TB 5; emphases mine). Why was this passage not 
read? Perhaps because the point it makes would have been redundant in the 
spoken version, in which Heidegger could have made the same point by vocally 
emphasizing the etymological references to hearing and seeing that I have tried 
specifically to attend to references that do not easily call attention to themselves 
in the written text. 
Being as letting-presence is seen as a giving by Being, but the matter 
"Being" is heard as a gift. This difference between what is seen and heard in each 
case is substantial--and it is underscored by Heidegger's use of emphasis marks 
around Being in the second case, as well as by his repeated use of the word 
verwandeln: in thinking Being as letting-presence, Being is transformed! 
Heidegger says that in order to think Being itself we must disregard Being insofar 
as it is grounded and metaphysically interpreted in terms of beings as their 
ground. We must, rather, attend to the concealed giving at play in 
unconcealment, the giving of the Es gibt. When we do so, by turning away from 
what appears, we see that as a gift, Being undergoes a substantial change: 
Being belongs, as the gift of this It gives, in the giving. As a gift, Being is 
not expelled from giving. Being, presencing is transformed. As letting-
presence, it belongs in unconcealing; as the gift in the giving it is retained. 
Being is not. It gives Being as the unconcealing of presencing. (ZS 6/TB 
6)7 
7 Once again I have had to significantly alter the Stambaugh version, which--in 
addition to its translation problems--contains a truncated typesetting reduplication 
of the last three sentences of the paragraph. 
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This is a remarkable pronouncement, effectively adding a whole new dimension to 
what was said in Sein und Zeit and the "Humanismusbrief," where Heidegger 
appeared to be attending only to the giving, the "self-giving," that is Being itself.8 
8 In the "Brief uber den Humanismus" Heidegger refers to a passage in the 
section from Sein und Zeit on "Reality and Care," where he said "Of course only 
as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically 
possible), 'is there' Being [Allerdings nur solange Dasein ist, das heisst die 
ontische Moglichkeit von Seinsverstandnis, 'gibt es' Sein)" (ZS 212/BT 255). He 
says in response to the French translation of that passage "il y a l'Etre," that it 
translates es gibt imprecisely: "For the 'it' that here 'gives' is Being itself. The 
'gives' names the essence of Being that is giving, granting its truth. The self-giving 
into the open, along with the open region itself, is Being itself [Denn das 'es,' was 
bier 'gibt,' is das Sein selbst. Das 'gibt' nennt jedoch das gebende, seine Wahrheit 
gewahrende \Vesen des Seins. Das Sichgeben ins Offene mit diesem selbst ist das 
Sein selber)" (W 165/B\V 214). 
The seminar notes tell us, contrary to what appears to be the case--and 
contrary to what some in the seminar apparently thought to be the case--that the 
term "Being itself' in the passage from the "Humanismusbrief' already names 
Appropriation: 
In the Letter on Humanism (Klostermann edition, p. 23) we read: "For the 
It which gives here is Being itself." The objection arose that this 
unequivocal statement did not agree with the lecture "Time and Being" in 
that the intention of thinking Being as Appropriation led to a 
predominance of Appropriation, to the disappearance of Being. The 
disappearance of Being not only conflicted with the passage in the Letter 
on Humanism. but also with the passage in the lecture where it was stated 
that the sole intention of the lecture was "to bring Being itself as 
Appropriation to view." 
To this we answered first that in the passage in question in the Letter on 
Humanism and thus almost throughout, the term "Being itself' already 
names Appropriation. (The relations and contexts constituting the 
essential structure of Appropriation were worked out between 1936 and 
1938). Secondly, it is precisely a matter of seeing that Being, by coming to 
view as Appropriation, disappears as Being. Thus there is no contradiction 
by the two statements. Both name the same matter with different 
emphasis. (ZS 46/TB 43) 
The passages in Sein und Zeit, on the other hand, are described in the seminar as 
adequate attempts to give the Seinsfrage direction, but as inadequate attempts to 
think the giving sense of letting-presence (ZS 4 7 /TB 44 ). 
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Understood as a gift of the Es gibt Being is transformed [verwandelt]. As letting-
presence, Being belongs to unconcealing. It is not, at its most proper, a dispenser 
of truth, but the proper gift of truth. 
Heidegger encourages us to pay heed to the "wealth" of this 
transformation--for, as he points out, there are many other transformations of 
Being! He says that the attempt to ponder on the abundance of Being's 
transformations [ der Wandlungsfiille des Seins] gets firmly underway when we 
think Being as presencing, which characterization is binding for thinking, and has, 
moreover, derived its binding force precisely from the unconcealment of Being 
that is occasioned in realizing that Being as presencing can be "said," and thus 
thought. There many such transformations of presencing: presencing as the hen, 
the logos, idea, ousia, energia, substantia, actualitas, perceptio, monad, .objectivity, 
the will of reason, of love, of Geist, of power, in will to will, etc. These 
transformations of Being are all ways in which Being takes place--that is, they are 
ways in which It gives Being. This is why we must listen to what speaks in Being, 
to the giving itself, the It gives: what we see, what gets historically disclosed, is not 
the giving of Being, Being in its Own; what we see are transformations of Being. 
The It gives retains Being in the giving, retains Being in its Own. The It gives and 
the proper Being retained in the giving does not come to presence. It withdraws 
and remains concealed. This is why Heidegger writes: "In the beginning of 
Western thinking, Being is thought, but not the "It gives" as such. The latter 
withdraws in favor of the gift which It gives. That gift is thought and 
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conceptualized from then on exclusively as Being with regard to Beings" (ZS 8/TB 
8). What is thought in thinking Being in its many transformations and actualities 
is the gift that is given, not the giving of the gift, which is the vary capacity to 
yield and give Being. This gratuitous capacity as such withdraws from the open of 
truth and unconcealment in which Being can take place as a transformation of the 
Being that most properly belongs to the Es gibt as its essential capacity. 
Heidegger says that a giving that gives in this way, holding itself back and 
withdrawing in the giving, is called a sending [Schicken]. So more properly 
thought, the Being that is given in its various transformations, is what is sent. 
And since what is sent always has a destiny, we can say that each transformation 
is destined in its sending--it is sent forth in destining. Similarly, as the It v-:hich 
sends, as well as the sending itself, hold back from self-manifestation, each destiny 
has as its concealed fundamental counterpart an epoche, an epoch. Thus, the 
history of Being as such is a history of obscurity, a history of the manifold ways in 
which the original sending of Being has been concealed.9 
At his point Heidegger returns to the question of time, since we recognized 
at the outset that Being as presence has a time-character, though we had no clear 
9 In the seminar notes we read: 
Metaphysics is the history of the formations of Being, that is, viewed from 
Appropriation, the history of the self-withdrawal of what is sending in favor 
of the destinies, given in sending, of an actual letting-presence of what is 
present. Metaphysics is the oblivion of Being, and that means the history 
of the concealment and withdrawal of that which gives Being. The entry of 
thinking into Appropriation is thus equivalent to the encl of this 
withdrawal's history. The oblivion of Being "supercedes" [hebt auf] itself in 
the awakening into Appropriation. (ZS 44 /SD 41) 
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understanding of how this is so. Obscure and misunderstood as this 
characterization may be, however, it suggests that the It which gives Being might 
be found in that element of the Sache des Denkens which we call "time." 
Nevertheless, as belonging to the Sache des Denkens, any proper thinking of 
"time" must be carried out in the light of what has already been discovered about 
Being, which also belongs essentially to that Sache. What, then have we 
discovered? We have found that what is peculiar [Eigentiimliche] to Being as a 
Sache is not anything having the character of Being--rather, what is peculiar to 
Being is sending, the way in which "It" is capable of Being. Thus, what is peculiar 
to time as a Sache will likewise lack the character of time. 
Heidegger begins the time analysis, therefore, by considered what is sent: 
Being as presence. But after fruitlessly attempting to think time as present in the 
sense of presence, Heidegger asks, in a move that provocatively recalls the 
decisive turn in the Augustinian analysis of time, "where is time? Is time at all 
and does it have a place?" (ZS 12/TB 11). In response, he says we must proceed 
cautiously and say: Es gibt Zeit. We must proceed carefully and look at what 
shows itself to us as time, by looking ahead to Being as presence, the present. 
What does the present in the sense of presence mean, he asks? Having looked, 
we must now listen. When we say presencing, what Sache are we thinking? What 
speaks in "die Rede vom An-wesen?" (ZS 12). To presence means to last--not 
merely to endure, but to abide and concern us. To presence, to let-presence, 
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means to offer to us what concerns us and approaches us as lasting. Presencing 
means to approach man as what is present. 
e?" w. 
It is at this point, the very center of the text, that Heidegger asks "Who are 
Let us consider this central and crucial passage. 
Who are we? \Ve remain cautious in our answer. For it might be that 
that which distinguishes man as man is determined precisely by what we 
must think about here: man, who is concerned with and approached by 
presence, who, through being thus approached, is himself present in his 
own way for all present and absent beings. 
Man: standing within the approach of presence, but in such a way that he 
receives as a gift the presencing that It gives by perceiving what appears in 
letting-presence. If man were not the constant receiver of the gift given by 
the "It gives presence," if that which is extended in the gift did not reach 
man, then not only would Being remain concealed in the absence of this 
gift, not only closed off, but man would remain excluded from the scope of: 
It gives Being. Man would not be man. (SD 12-13/TB 12) 
The location of this passage is most significant. First, by following the question 
"where is time?" it suggests a possible correlation between the Ort of Zeit, in the 
question regarding the place of time, and the Da- of Dasein, the preontological 
question of Being. Perhaps Augustine was not so far afield after all. Second, it 
explicitly situates the question of man at the very center of the meditation on time 
and Being, and thus at the very heart of the Sache des Denkens. This situation 
was already implicitly effected in the move to the Es 2:iht, since the Es gibt names 
a relation of availability to man, a relation of possible appropriation. IO Third, 
the location of this question marks the point at which we find ourselves "openly" 
confronted with the question of absence. 
IO See SD 41-43 /TB 38-40. 
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Following the apparent digression constituted by the above passage, 
Heidegger says that although the question of man appears to have led us astray 
from the question about time, we find ourselves as a result of asking that question 
much closer to the matter of time. Presence means, he continues, "the constant 
abiding that approaches man, reaches him, is extended to him" (SD 13/TB 12). 
Hence, the question leads us to where we can ask again, and more authentically, 
ahout the source of this extending reach to which the present belongs as the 
presencing of what concerns us. But what we notice in thinking the approach of 
the present together with who is thus approached, is that absence concerns us as 
constantly as does presence. At the very heart of the matter of thinking, we find 
ourselves confronted with the question of absence. How does absence concern 
us? As that which has been, and still concerns us. What is no longer present 
does not just vanish, and thus escape our concern; rather, what has been, 
presences in its own way, extending the present beyond what is actually present to 
that which is absent. Absence also concerns us as that which is not yet present. 
Absence is the presencing of what is not yet present, and concerns us as such. 
The future never just begins, says Heidegger, since what is not yet present always 
already concerns us. The future is that in which presencing is offered. Hence, we 
find in absence "a manner of presencing and approaching which by no means 
coincides with presencing in the sense of the immediate present" (SD 14/TB 13). 
Of consequence we must conclude, he says, that not every presencing is 
necessarily the present. He then adds laconically: "A curious matter." 
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Let us note at this point a certain complication in the analysis: in thinking 
the future as the not yet present we effectively dissolve the true futurity of the 
future and make of it a future that is and can be ours--we appropriate it, in other 
words. The future that is named here in "Zeit und Sein" is a future that is already 
essentially present. In coming into its Own, time and Being both become what 
can be owned. Appropriation is spoken of in this essay primarily to mean 
"making proper," "coming into one's proper element." Nevertheless, that which 
can be determined (even authentically) and thus made proper, can also be 
appropriated in the sense of being made property. The future as that which is 
present in its absence as the not yet present, may open upon the a-proper absence 
we traced earlier, in thinking the essence of poetry, but it is not that essential 
absence. It is, therefore, not yet a true future, the approach of that which cannot 
concern us as it is essentially beyond the reach of our concern and the power of 
our concernful dealings. As any form of the present, time is subject to disclosure. 
Such a time is not essentially other, and can therefore offer nothing essentially 
new. Hence, we may sense a certain disparity here between the sensitivity of this 
text, where what Appropriation appropriates is the belonging-together of Being 
and man, and the attentiveness of earlier texts in which what Appropriation 
appropriates was specifically thought as the belonging-together of Being and 
mortals--that is, within the four-fold relation of man, gods, earth, and sky, as in 
the essay "Das Ding." 
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Heidegger's present line of inquiry reflects the intent to discover the source 
of the giving and extending reach to which the present belongs. He accordingly 
asks and answers: "Does this giving lie in this, that it reaches us, or does it reach 
us because it is in itself a reaching? The latter" (SD 14/TB 13). In thinking 
through this question Heidegger determines that futural approaching brings about 
what has been, that what has been brings about futural approaching, and that the 
reciprocal relation of both brings about the self-extending, opening up of 
openness. In other words, by thinking the belonging together of future, past, and 
present, we think the way they offer themselves to each other: we think their 
unifying unity as determined by what is their own in offering themselves--in 
offering the presencing that is given in them. \Vhat opens up in this offering is 
what Heidegger calls "time-space" [Zeit-Raum]: "Time-space now is the name for 
the openness which opens up in the mutual self-extending of futural approach, 
past, and present" (SD 14-15/TB 14). The consequence of this is that what we 
call dimension and dimensionality belongs to time-space, authentic time; thought 
in terms of the threefold giving, authentic time is correspondingly three-
dimensional. 
But this discovery still leaves the question of the source of three-
climensional, authentic time unanswered. In venturing an answer Heidegger 
observes that insofar as the unity of time's three dimensions involves a reciprocal 
interplay of each toward each, this interplay can be said to be the true extending, 
or fourth dimension, of time. But even in finding authentic time to be four-
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dimensional, the giving source of the giving remains elusive--and it is the giving, 
Heidegger emphasizes, that determines all. The giving holds [hiilt] the past, 
present, and future toward one another in the nearness of three-dimensionality. 
But in proximity there is also distance. The past and the future are near to the 
present precisely because they are still distant, because their advent is denied, 
because they are withheld [vorenhalt]. The "nearing of nearness," dies Nahern der 
Nahe, holds the approach open by denying and withholding. The repetition of the 
root halt, to which we have previously been attuned, indicates that we are 
thinking here in the very heart of the matter-held-together, the Sache des 
Denkens. What we discover in thinking at the heart of the matter is that time is 
not, It gives time: "Die Zeit ist nicht. Es gibt die Zeit. Das Geben, das Zeit gibt, 
bestimmt sich aus der verweigernd-vorenthaltenden Nahe" (SD 16). The giving 
that gives time is determined by the denying and withholding nearness. But as so 
determined, the source of the giving still eludes our view. Heidegger says, clearly 
there is no time without man. But does this mean that it is in first receiving time 
that man becomes man? Or does it mean that it is in being received time first 
becomes time? Neither. Insofar as authentic time is both the proximity and 
distance of presencing it has always already reached man, so that he can be man 
only by standing within that reach wherein the reaching itself remains withheld. 
Heidegger says: "Time is not the product of man, man is not the product of time. 
There is no production here. There is only giving" (SD 17 /TB 16). Thus, 
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concludes Heidegger, we are still faced with the "enigmatic It," dem ratselhaften 
Es. 
Heidegger says that inasmuch as time is manifest in Being, it appears that 
the It might be the fourfold extending of the open--especially because absence too 
shows itself as presence. Thus, authentic time appears as the It which gives 
Being. But the time which appears, even as authentic time, itself remains a gift. 
So, once again what gives, withdraws; the It remains undetermined, and "we 
remain puzzled" (SD 18/TB 17). 
At this point in the text there is another (this time lengthy) section which 
was apparently omitted from the spoken lecture. This section directly precedes 
the discussion of Ereignis. What Heidegger points out in this section is that we 
remain puzzled because we allow ourselves to be deceived into thinking that what 
we are trying to think here must be capable of conforming to our thinking and the 
grammatical form of the language that informs that thinking: 
Are we puzzled now only because we have allowed ourselves to be led 
astray by language or, more precisely, by the grammatical interpretation of 
language; staring at an It that is supposed to give, but that itself is precisely 
not there. When we say "It gives Being," "It gives time," we are speaking 
sentences. Grammatically a sentence consists in a subject and a predicate . 
. . . The It, at least in the interpretation available to us for the moment, 
names a presence of absence. 
When we say "It gives Being," "It gives time," we are not making 
statements about beings. However, the syntax of sentences as we have it 
from the Greek and Roman grammarians has such statements exclusively 
in view. In view of this fact we must also consider the possibility that, 
contrary to all appearances, in saying "It gives Being," "It gives time," we 
are not dealing with statements that are always fixed in the sentence 
structure of the subject-predicate relation. And yet, how else are we to 
bring the "It" into view. (SD 19/TB 18-19; emphases mine) 
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This last sentence speaks volumes. In thinking the source of what gives Being 
and time, we are attempting to bring into view what is precisely not there, what is 
essentially absent. 
What determines both Being and time, in their own, is, we know, Ereignis, 
the event of Appropriation. But Heidegger is quick to add that what this word 
names "can be thought now only in the light of what becomes manifest in our 
looking ahead toward Being and toward time as destiny and as extending, to 
which time and Being belong" (SD 20/TB 19). What is thought, in that light, is 
the "and," the h~ilt, that names the indeterminate relation of the two as matters: 
"We now see," Heidegger explains, that "what lets the two matters belong 
together, what brings the two into their own and, even more, maintains and holds 
them in their belonging together--the way the two matters stand, the matter at 
stake--is Appropriation" (SD 20/TB 19). The It that gives Being and time thus 
proves to be Ereignis. "And yet ... ," adds Heidegger, while correct this 
statement is nevertheless untrue. \Vhy? Because it conceals the very matter at 
stake. \Vhat appears as Ereignis in the destiny of Being involves but another 
transformation of Being: to think Appropriation as a species of Being is but to 
continue metaphysics; even to reverse the terms, and say Being belongs to 
Appropriation, is a "cheap" inversion that does not escape the determination, says 
Heidegger. As is pointed out in the Protokoll, Heidegger wants to clearly 
distinguish the transformation of Being into Appropriation from the epochal 
transformations of Being: 
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We must sharply distinguish from this meaning of transformation, which 
refers to metaphysics, the meaning which is intended when we say that 
Being is transformed--to Appropriation. Here it is not a matter of 
manifestation of Being comparable to the metaphysical formations of-Being 
and following them as a new manifestation. Rather, we mean that Being--
together with its epochal revelations--is retained in destiny, but as destiny is 
taken back into Appropriation. 
Between the epochal formations of Being and the transformation of 
Being into Appropriation stands Framing. Framing is an in-between stage, 
so to speak. It offers a double aspect, one might say, a Janus head. It can 
be understood as a kind of continuation of the will to will, thus as an 
extreme formation of Being. At the same time, however, it is a first form 
of Appropriation itself. (SD 56-57 /TB 52-53) 
We seek an answer, a "saying that co-responds" to the matter at stake; and yet the 
matter at stake precludes any such saying. In thinking Appropriation as such our 
speaking remains indeterminate. 
Can we think or say anything more, then? "Along the way," says 
Heidegger, unterwegs, we already have--but not explicitly. \Vhat have we said? 
That to giving as sending, there belongs withholding and denial; to giving belongs 
withdrawal, Entzug: in sending, the sending source withdraws from 
unconcealment. In yet another parenthetical passage Heidegger says the 
following: 
Insofar as the destiny of Being lies in the extending of time, and time, 
together with Being, lies in Appropriation, Appropriating makes manifest 
its peculiar property, that Appropriation withdraws what is most fully its 
own from boundless unconcealment. Thought in terms of Appropriating, 
this means: in that sense it expropriates itself of itself. Expropriation 
belongs to Appropriation as such. By this expropriation, Appropriation 
does not abandon itself--rather, it preserves what is its own. (SD 23/TB 22-
23) 
To extend Heidegger's own metaphors, what we catch sight of in trying to bring 
the It which gives Being and time into view, is that seeing cannot look ahead far 
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enough--the source cannot be caught sight of. This is not because our sight is, as 
yet, incapable of seeing far enough. It is because what we wish to see is what is 
essentially invisible, essentially other than that which can be seen in any adequate, 
propositional thought. In glimpsing what Ereignis means, says Heidegger, we 
have arrived at nothing more than a thought-construct, asserting blindly that 
Ereignis must be something. However, "Appropriation neither is, nor is 
Appropriation there" (SD 24/TB 24). 
What remains to be said? Only this: "Appropriation appropriates. Saying 
this we say the Same in terms of the Same about the Same. To all appearances, 
all this says nothing" (SD 24-25 /TB 24 ). It says nothing, . . . but only as long 
as we only hear a mere said. If, however, we follow Heidegger's lead and take 
what has been said as a clue [Anh~ilt) for our thinking, then what is said "before 
all else" gives voice to a bond [Verbindlichkeit] that binds [bindet] all thinking. 
Our task, concludes Heidegger, is to leave metaphysics to its destiny and 
overcome the obstacles that render saying inadequate--while this lecture itself 
remains such an obstacle by speaking only in propositional statements. What it 
might mean to render saying adequate remains an issue. In fact, this is exactly 
the issue that is taken up in "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des 
Den kens." 
In conclusion we might say that there seems to be a kind of ambiguity 
operative in the Heideggerian texts that is decidedly unsettling. On the one hand, 
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in thinking the essence of poetry in the works of "poets of destiny," and in thinking 
the indeterminate relation between Being and time granted as the Sache des 
Denkens, and in numerous other essays, Heidegger appears to think on the very 
threshold of time in the Levinasian sense, at the very opening of the 
indeterminate relation with the Other. On the other hand, it often appears as if 
Heidegger sees only the need to overcome inadequate saying, and not the need to 
affirm that inadequacy and recognize what is other than Being in the measure-
taking effected in the turn toward the holy. This is the perspective that seems to 
open at the end of this text, and in the last section of the 1935 text Einfuhrung in 
die Metaphvsik, for example--the work in which Heidegger thinks Being as 
surmounted by the "ought," and the good as "beyond Being," but sees in this 
thinking only an "entanglement in the thicket of the idea of values" (IM 167).11 
Can we justifiably say that Heidegger's work reflects a brooding 
preoccupation with death and human finitude, while affirming only an 
insurmountable inadequacy of thinking to its task? What is said in the last 
paragraph of the Protokoll text would seem to indicate that was the implicit 
consensus of his audience: 
The finitude of Appropriation, of Being, of the fourfold hinted at during 
the seminar is nevertheless different from the finitude spoken of in the 
book on Kant, in that it is no longer thought in terms of the relation to 
infinity, but rather as finitude in itself: finite, end, limit, one's own--to be 
secure in one's own. The new concept of finitude is thought in this 
11 Ironically, it is this work which clearly provides Levinas with much of his 
vocabulary. 
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manner--that is, in terms of Appropriation itself, in terms of the concept of 
one's own. (SD 58/TB 54) 
But have we not glimpsed another way to read Heidegger? Does not the reading 
that sees only finitude ignore the redemptive opening upon the infinite that is 
caught sight of alongside the affirmation of limits? Do not the initial passages of 
this text accentuate not only the limits of intelligibility and existence, but 
underscore as well a persistent, consuming desire to transcend the limits of 
thought and definitive mortality? Is there not here, in the very evolution of 
Heidegger's work, the trace of a response to a "voice" and a "vision" that the 
thinker does not of himself produce? While Heidegger can still be said to he 
thinking the question of the meaning of Being, I would suggest that what we find 
at the end of Heidegger's work is that the thinking and the question that 
determine the path of that thinking are transformed in the process of following 
that path, and must be understood and re-traced in accordance with that 
transformation. 
CHAPTER 5 
PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE TASK OF THINKING 
AT THE END OF PHILOSOPHY 
"Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens" names the 
attempt, says Heidegger, at a reflection which persists in questioning. Clearly, 
questions are paths to an answer, but if an answer to the question philosophy 
must ask at its end could be given, he tells us, that answer would consist in a 
transformation of thinking--a transformation of thinking into something other than 
the logical manipulation of propositional statements. 
The preparation for that transformation is not complete, but it is underway. 
\Ve saw the incompletion of the preparation affirmed at the end of "Zeit und 
Sein," when Heidegger lamented that the lecture, concerned in no small part with 
the need for adequate saying, remained itself an obstacle to such saying, as it was 
spoken merely in propositional statements. \Ve also saw in "Zeit und Sein" that 
while the task of thinking is to experience and enter Ereignis in order to "say It in 
terms of It about It" (SD 25/TB 24), thinking is not yet even the experience of the 
awakening to Ereignis, much less the experience or thinking of Ereignis itself. 
Nevertheless, since the awakening to Ereignis is necessarily bound up in the 
matter-held-together with the awakening from the oblivion of Being to that 
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oblivion (SD 57 /TB 53), in asking the question of Being and attending to the 
subsequent questions raised by that question we are at least moving toward that 
double awakening. It is for this reason Heidegger says "Das Ende der Philosophie 
und die Aufgabe des Denkens" belongs to the attempt undertaken "again and 
again ever since 1930" to shape the question of Sein und Zeit in a more original 
way. He says the persistent attempts at reflection which characterize his work are 
nothing other than stages in an ongoing subjection to immanent criticism of the 
question that constitutes the point of departure for Sein und Zeit, the question of 
the meaning of Being. 
Heidegger says the critical question asks what the matter of thinking is. 
But we have seen that the matter of thinking in "Zeit und Sein" is Being and time, 
thought as the matter-held-together in thinking Being as the matter of thinking 
and time as the matter of thinking. The critical question asks about this matter 
as a matter: it thinks the question of the meaning of Being as a questionable 
question and does so from within the questioning in which that question is asked. 
What must now become clear in continuing that immanent criticism, says 
Heidegger, is to what extent this critical question necessarily and continually 
belongs to thinking. In other words, what must now become clear is how the 
questionability of the question of Being and time as the matter of thinking is 
related to the question itself, the very question whose preontological form is 
Dasein. What is brought into question at the end of philosophy is the 
questionable nature--not only of the question as such--but of that being who asks, 
continually and essentially, the question of the meaning of Being, and who now 
asks about the questionability of that question and the task of thinking. 
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As the questionability of the question of Being can thus be traced back to 
the questionability of the being which is that question, in its preontological form, 
there is yet another transformation that will accompany the transformation of 
thinking. We have seen in "Zeit und Sein" that at the heart of the Sache des 
Denkens lies the question "who is man?" We might well say this logographic 
centrality gives voice to a concern common to virtually all of Heidegger's 
investigations: a concern for the essential correspondence between thinking and 
human nature itself. In Sein und Zeit Heidegger chooses Dasein as the 
exemplary entity to be interrogated with regard to the question of the meaning of 
Being precisely because of the peculiar relation between Dasein and the question 
as such: the very asking of the question of Being is Dasein's mode of Being. In 
fact, so fundamental is the relation between Dasein and the question Dasein asks 
that Sein und Zeit is devoted throughout to an analytic of Dasein as that entity 
for whom the question of Being is an issue and as that entity for whom 
questioning in general is one of the possibilities of its Being. Later, in the 
"Einleitung" to Was ist Metaphysik?, Heidegger more explicitly points out that a 
change in thinking might be accompanied by a change in human nature: "As long 
as man remains the animal rationale he is also the animal metaphysicum. As long 
as man understands himself as the rational animal, metaphysics belongs, as Kant 
said, to the nature of man. But if our thinking should succeed in its efforts to go 
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back into the ground of metaphysics, it might well help to bring about a change in 
human nature, accompanied by a transformation of metaphysics" (WM 9/WGM 
267). Heidegger similarly says, in quoting from the first draft of Yorn Wesen der 
Wahrheit, 
Over and over again we must insist: In the question of truth as posed 
here, what is at stake is not only an alteration in the traditional conception 
of truth, nor a complement of its current (re )presentation; what is at stake 
is a transformation in man's Being itself. This transformation is not 
demanded by new psychological or biological insights. Man here is not the 
object of any anthropology whatever. Man comes into question here in the 
deepest and broadest, in the genuinely fundamental, perspective: man in 
his relation to Being.1 
What appears very clearly in Heidegger's work, right up through the poetic 
writings and "Zeit und Sein," is the insight that within the lived experience of the 
animal metaphvsicum lies concealed, as it were, a question and nature radically 
non-metaphysical. 
Assuming then, along with Heidegger, that man might well experience an 
essential change in his nature if a form of thinking more primordial than that of 
metaphysics could be retrieved, we might then ask what there is in this 
correspondence between thinking and human nature that leads Heidegger to 
specifically name the task of thinking together with the end of philosophy? 
"What does it mean that philosophy in the present age has entered its final 
stage?" is one of the two guiding questions Heidegger asks in "Das Ende der 
Philosophie und die Aufgabe des Denkens" (SD 61/TB 55). For Heidegger, 
1 Richardson, xx. 
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philosophy is fundamentally metaphysics, and the question which metaphysics asks 
is the question of the Being of beings. What has shown itself since the beginning 
of philosophy as the ground of beings is Being as presence: Heidegger says, "what 
characterizes metaphysical thinking which grounds the ground for beings is the 
fact that metaphysical thinking departs from what is present in its presence, and 
thus represents it in terms'-Of its ground as something grounded" (SD 62/TB 56). 
The end of philosophy means simply the completion of metaphysics in its most 
extreme possibility, and the most extreme possibility of metaphysics, as a 
metaphysics of presence, is the development of the positive sciences within the 
field opened up by philosophy, and at the same time, the separation and eventual 
independence of those sciences from philosophy. This, says Heidegger, is 
philosophy's legitimate end. Philosophy finds itself at this point of completion 
because it can now expressly formulate the question which metaphysics asks and 
subsequently recognize its own history and dissolution in the positive sciences to 
be the epochal realizations of this particular question's possibilities. 
And yet, the fact that the legitimate completion of philosophy lies in its 
development into the independent sciences does not mean that science has taken 
over the task of thinking--quite the contrary, in fact. In Was Heisst Denken? 
Heidegger emphatically states that although science always and in its own way has 
to do with thinking, "science itself does not think, and cannot think!" (VA 
127 /WCT 8). He says there lies an unbridgeable gulf between thinking and the 
sciences, which accounts for the flourishing development of science vis-a-vis the 
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fact that what must be thought about in thinking has long since turned away from 
man. He thus names the essence of what must be thought the "thought-
provoking," and observes that although the state of the world is becoming 
constantly more thought-provoking, what is most thought-provoking in our 
thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking (VA 124 /WCT 4 ). 
And yet, are we not capable of thinking? Yes. But we only begin to 
realize that capability when we incline toward what is to be thought, toward what 
provokes our thinking--not when we think metaphysically. Heidegger reminds us 
in Was Heisst Denken? that man is rightly called the being who can think in the 
metaphysical designation animal rationale, and essentially makes the same point 
in Sein und Zeit with respect to the Greek definition of man as Zohon logon 
ekon, but he also points out that metaphysical philosophy does not understand the 
truth of that designation in either case. According to the analogy in \Vas ist 
Metaphvsik? which Heidegger borrows from Descartes, philosophy is a tree which 
springs from metaphysical roots. Philosophy never escapes its metaphysical 
ground; whenever it leaves its ground or returns to think its ground it does so as 
an outgrowth of metaphysics (WM 9/WGM 266). Philosophy, therefore, cannot 
recall Being itself, nor think beyond it: 
Metaphysics, insofar as it always represents only beings as beings, does not 
recall being itself. . . . Metaphysics remains the basis of philosophy. The 
basis of thinking, however, it does not reach. When we think of the truth 
of Being, metaphysics is overcome. We can no longer accept the claim of 
metaphysics that it takes care of the fundamental involvement in "Being" 
and that it decisively determines all relations to beings as such. (WM 8-
9 /WGM 266-67) 
The possible questions which metaphysics, and philosophy as an outgrowth of 
metaphysics, can ask are always enframed within the confusion of beings and 
Being, and the insistence on Being as presence. As a result, even though 
philosophy is at an end, and perhaps even more so because of that end, 
philosophy as metaphysics remains "the barrier" which keeps man from the 
original involvement of Being in human nature (WM 12/WGM 269). 
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Not only is it erroneous to suppose that our capacity for this first possibility 
for thinking could depart from the metaphysical understanding of what is present 
in its presence, however, it would be equally misguided to attempt a recollection 
of the truth of Being by somehow surmounting this prevailing metaphysical 
understanding. Metaphysics does not recall Being in its truth because the 
elusiveness of its own ground never becomes an issue for metaphysics; Heidegger 
says, "metaphysics never answers the question concerning the truth of Being, for it 
never asks this question" (WM 11/WGM 268). Heidegger's concern throughout 
his work has been with stirring precisely that recollection, and thus overcoming 
metaphysics only by reawakening an understanding for the meaning of that 
question presupposed, but forgotten by metaphysics. If we return to Sein und Zeit 
we find that overcoming is intitiated by the very first words of the introduction: 
"This question has today been forgotten" (SZ 2/BT 21). Sein und Zeit begins 
with the forgotten perplexity regarding the expression Being as it is ostensibly 
recalled first by Plato's Eleatic stranger in the quoted passage from the Sophist, 
then by Heidegger himself as he ironically imitates the stranger by recalling it in 
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his own text. But while it is true that by attempting a recollection, or retrieval, of 
that forgotten perplexity, Sein und Zeit begins to overcome the Vergessenheit of 
Being, Heidegger observes numerous times that the Vergessenheit of the 
Seinsfrage is a destined structural event and not a mere oversight to be overcome 
simply at will; it is no mere coincidence that the oblivion of Being prevails today, 
and to such an extent that not only are we not thinking, but we are dogmatically 
avoiding that call. Metaphysics speaks of Being necessarily and continually, says 
Heidegger, but it does not induce Being itself to speak, for "metaphysics does not 
recall Being in its truth, nor does it recall truth as unconcealedness, nor does it 
recall the nature of unconcealedness" (WM 10-11/WGM 268). 
William Richardson, in Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, 
essentially divides Heidegger's work into two relatively distinct stages according to 
the problems, as he sees them, that these two stages address--the problem of 
Being and the problem of thought. However, in the letter that becomes the 
book's preface Heidegger says very plainly that such a clear division (which is 
reflected in Richardson's original title, From Phenomenology to Thought) would 
be justified in his opinion only through what is essentially a reductive 
misunderstanding of "phenomenology" as Husserl's philosophical position and 
"thought" as shorn of its ambiguity. He suggests, rather, that phenomenology be 
more correctly understood as the process of "allowing the most proper concern of 
thought [ der eigensten Sache des Denkens] to show itself', and that "thought" be 
understood as the "thinking of Being" in which Being "shows itself simultaneously 
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as that which is to-be-thought and as that which has want of a thought 
corresponding to it".2 Accordingly, Heidegger proposes an alternate title which 
Richardson adopted only in part: Through Phenomenologv to the Thinking of 
Being. 
What must be thought in the thinking of Being which phenomenology 
cannot think is precisely the withdrawal of Being from thinking. John Sallis 
observes that for Heidegger the asking of the question of Being is not to be 
thought of as a question to be followed and then abandoned when and if an 
answer is found. Rather, our questioning is directed back into the question in 
order to experience what calls upon us to think: 
Thinking as questioning is not its own ground. Questioning is such that its 
ground continually withdraws. The ground of our questioning elicits our 
questioning yet withdraws from it, and it was just this eliciting-with-drawing 
which remained unthought in metaphysics, which was not granted as that 
which grants thought to us, as that which calls upon us to think. What 
remained concealed in metaphysics was that "What withdraws from us 
thereby draws us along" (WD 5). 
Heidegger's thinking is a waiting to be drawn along in the withdrawal as 
that which calls forth thinking. The path of Heidegger's work is the path 
of this withdrawal.3 
In standing within this withdrawal of ground, we are drawn along into the 
withdrawal toward "what" draws. As we are thus drawn, our being-drawn-along 
has the character of pointing toward what withdraws. Heidegger says that man 
first is man in the pointing into this withdrawal: "His essential nature lies in being 
2 Richardson, xvi. 
3 Sallis, John, Heidegger and the Path of Thinking (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1970), 7. 
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such a pointer" (WCT 9). That the ground should continually withdraw from 
thinking and yet, that what withdraws should be that which calls forth thinking, is 
precisely what remains unthought in conjunction with the nature of that being 
from which the ground withdraws. 
Heidegger says in "Das Ende der Philosophie und die Aufgabe des 
Denkens," that there is what he calls a "first possibility for thinking," a possibility 
apart from the last possibility that became the development and dissolution of 
metaphysics in the technologized sciences. He characterizes this first possibility as 
that task "reserved for thinking in a concealed way in the history of philosophy 
from its beginning to its end, a task accessible neither to philosophy as 
metaphysics nor, and even less so, to the sciences stemming from philosophy" (SD 
65 /TB 59). This task seems to include the assertion, says Heidegger, that 
philosophy has not been up to the matter of thinking, and has thus become a 
history of mere decline. He insists that thinking must learn what remains 
reserved for thinking to concern itself with, and that thinking will prepare its own 
transformation thereby (SD 67 /TB 60). He later reaffirms the need for this 
education in thinking, as well as the need for "a knowledge of what being 
educated and uneducated in thinking means" (SD 80/TB 72). We must learn 
what concerns thinking in the turn to the Sache selbst. The proper task of 
thinking requires us to ask and learn what remains unthought in the call "to the 
thing itself," only if we ask what remains unthought in the matter of philosophy 
and its method (SD 71/TB 64). 
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What then is the task of thinking reserved in a concealed way in the history 
of philosophy's decline? It is the question of aletheia, the question of 
unconcealment as such. Our task is to learn from it while questioning it. 
Accordingly, says Heidegger: "We may suggest that the day will come when we 
will not shun the question whether the opening, the free open, may not be that 
within which alone pure space and ecstatic time and everything present and 
absent in them have the place which gathers and protects everything" (SD 73/TB 
66). Heidegger then asks in concluding the text if the name of the task of 
thinking would not accordingly change from "Being and time" to "Opening and 
Presence." But this change does not free us from the question raised in "Zeit und 
Sein," concerning the source of the giving of Being and time, for now we must 
likewise ask: "Where does the opening come from and how is it given? What 
speaks in the 'It gives'?" (SD 80/TB 73). The source of Being and time, and 
Opening and Presence, remains withdrawn, remains essentially absent and beyond 
all appropriation and disclosure--but concerns us nevertheless. It remains only to 
ask: is thought the proper response to this concern, and what does "thought" mean 
and entail, if it is? 
PART THREE 
THE QUESTION OF TIME AND BEING, THE QUESTION 
OF TIME AND THE OTHER, AND THE CRISIS OF 
UNIVERSAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY 
The last part of this work is largely speculative. Its aim is twofold. First, I 
wish to consider the possibility that after delineating in the Prolegomena zur 
Geschichte des Zeithegriffs and Sein und Zeit the genesis and structure of 
scientific crises in general, Heidegger works through the existential analytic of 
Dasein and the deconstruction of the history of ontology to precisely the point 
where universal phenomenological ontology--at least in its preliminary form as 
fundamental ontology--first becomes capable of a genuine crisis in its own basic 
concepts. This is so, I will argue, because an authentic grounding of universal 
phenomenological ontology requires a complete fundamental ontology of Dasein, 
which would consist in an explication of time as the transcendental horizon of the 
question of Being and a subsequent understanding of the concept of Being, and 
yet both of these demands call upon thinking to move definitively beyond the 
scope of phenomenology--thus transforming both thinking and the nature of man, 
and calling the basic concepts of phenomenology into question thereby. Second, I 
hope to suggest--and only suggest, as anything more would lie well beyond the 
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scope of this work--that Levinas' study of time as the relationship with the Other, 
a transcendental relationship that belongs essentially to the very existence of the 
subject, opens upon the possibility of rethinking the preontological question of the 
meaning of Being, completing the existential analytic, and thus authentically 
grounding universal phenomenological ontology. 
CHAPTER 6 
SCIENTIFIC CRISES AND THE TASK OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
The third section of the first chapter of Sein und Zeit contains an 
extremely condensed discussion about the relation of phenomenology to the ontic, 
or positive, sciences. Then within this condensation is yet another: a summary 
account of what turns out to be a very significant relation between the task of 
phenomenology as a science and the philosophical revolutions that occur within 
the ontic sciences and result in the revision of their fundamental concepts. In 
order to distill out, as it were, the matter contained in this double condensation, I 
will read portions of the section of Sein und Zeit entitled "Der ontologische 
Vorrang der Seinsfrage" alongside another text: the published lecture notes to the 
course entitled "Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs," which in their 
original form Heidegger took with him to the Black Forest when he wrote Sein 
und Zeit. This will be our task: first, to consider the relation of phenomenology 
to the antic sciences as it is laid out in the two texts; then, to address the relation 
between phenomenology and scientific crises in general; and lastly, to raise the 
question of the crisis with regard to universal phenomenological ontology itself. 
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In beginning let us recall that the lecture course which became the 
Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeithegriffs (incompletely translated in the 
English language edition as simply Historv of the Concept of Time) had a subtitle: 
"Prolegomena zur Phanomenologie von Geschichte und Natur." Heidegger says in 
the first chapter of the text that this subtitle simply expresses the need to state 
and stipulate in advance what must first be considered in any attempt to actually 
carry out a phenomenology of history and nature (PGZ 1/HCT 1).1 What 
exactly it is that must first be considered Heidegger says will be discovered in 
uttending to the suppositions already at play in our provisional understanding of 
what a phenomenology of history and nature would be. 
The relation of the title to the subtitle is a provocative one. Considered 
from the perspective of Heidegger's later works, the title and subtitle of the text 
(and especially the title of the English-language edition of the text) would seem to 
indicate that either the concept of time was Heidegger's sole interest in the course 
and a phenomenology of history and nature was simply the methodological means 
of working through a history of that concept, or that a history of the concept of 
time and a phenomenology of history and nature are essentially the same 
1 Theodore Kisiel, the English-language translator of Prolegomena zur 
Geschichte des Zeitsbegriffs, says that why Heidegger chooses to introduce the 
organization of the themes of the course through this particular subtitle and with 
reference to a phenomenology of history and nature is "not made clear, and there 
is a certain opaqueness to the opening sections because of this seeming detour." 
See "On the Way to Being and Time; Introduction to the Translation of 
Heidegger's Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeithegriffs," Research in 
Phenomenologv XV (1985): 193-219. 
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enterprise. But it is clear from Heidegger's introduction to the course that neither 
of these alternatives is correct. He says: 
\Ve wish to exhibit history and nature so that we may regard them before 
scientific elaboration, so that we may see both realities in their reality. 
This means that we wish to arrive at a horizon from which history and 
nature can be originally contrasted. This horizon must itself be a field of 
constituents against which history and nature stand out in relief. Laying 
out this field is the task of the "prolegomena to a phenomenology of history 
and nature." We shall approach this task of laying out the actual 
constituents which underlie history and nature, and from which they 
acquire their being, by way of a historv of the concept of time. (HCT 
5/PGZ 7) 
Heidegger's original aim in the Prolegomena was clearly to carry out the work 
\\'hich, while preparing the ground for a history of the concept of time in its own 
right, would also constitute a prolegomena to the phenomenology of histcry and 
nature. A history of the concept of time was undertaken as the means to both of 
these ends.2 
2 Kisiel also points out in the Research in Phenomenology article th~!t earlier 
in the same year of the lecture course, Heidegger had received from Husserl the 
as yet unpublished manuscript for Ideas II, which is expressly devoted to the 
question of the constitution of the domains of nature and spirit that underlie the 
natural and historical sciences. Kisiel judges--rightly, I believe--that it is this 
fundamental distinction, which in one form or another plagued all of early 
phenomenology, which Heidegger's course was designed to overcome. Kisiel 
explains: 
There is more than one indication here that Heidegger studied the newly 
acquired text of Ideas II intensively in preparation for his own course. The 
new text appears to have driven Heidegger to a renewed detailed 
examination of Husserl's work, especially the Sixth Logical Investigation, 
the Logos-Essay, and Ideas I. The result is the most sustained and specific 
confrontation of phenomenology in general and Husserl in particular that 
we are likely to get from Heidegger. It is therefore not without reason, no 
mere case of pedagogical dawdling, that the so-called Preliminary Part on 
the history and nature of phenomenology grows far beyond the "short 
introductory orientation" (11) which it was initially intended to be. Here 
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There is, thus, a subtle, though significant difference between the project 
conceived in the lecture course and that actually undertaken in Sein uml Zeit. 
Heidegger's concern here, as in "Der Begriff der Zeit," a lecture delivered in 1924 
and referred to by Hans-Georg Gadamer as the "Urform" of Sein und Zeit,3 still 
remains related to his interest in the function of time in the sciences, and more 
particularly, in its function with regard to the grounding of the sciences. The 
actual analysis of time in "Der Bergriff der Zeit" begins with a preliminary 
consideration of the understanding of time in contemporary physics and, 
specifically, in Einstein's theory of relativity. But perhaps even more revealing. 
Heidegger says in his introductory remarks that the reflections on time w11ich are 
to follow, and which eventually chart the course of his thinking on Dasein anJ 
temporality in Sein und Zeit, perhaps more properly constitute a Vorwissenschaft, 
and he then characterizes the function of this pre-scientific thinking as similar to 
policing a procession or parade of the sciences--a duty subordinate to the 
spectacle itself, but essential nevertheless (BZ 6-7). 
we find the fruit and climax of the close working relationship which 
Heidegger then enjoyed with Husserl, more than two years before the 
celebrated "falling out" between the two began. 
Kisiel thus concludes that this 1925 course comprises Heidegger's most profound 
appreciation and criticism of Husserl's founding contributions to phenomenology 
in the years when Heidegger was still struggling to move beyond Husserl. "On the 
\Vay to Being and Time," 195-96. (The number in parentheses in the quoted 
passage refers to the German text of Historv of the Concept of Time). 
3 See Thomas J. Sheehan, "The 'Original Form' of Sein und Zeit: Heidegger's 
Der Bergriff der Zeit (1924)," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenologv 
10 (May 1977), 78. 
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In speaking of the human and natural sciences in the Prolegomena, 
Heidegger says their separation comes first from the sciences themselves, which 
reduce history and nature, and their constituent elements to the level of fixed 
dnrnains of objects [Gegenstandsgebiete] and objects to be investigated as objects 
belonging to those domains. But he notes that the very separation of these two 
main groups of empirical science·'indicates that an original and undivided context 
of subject matter remains hidden in that separation. While we tend to understand 
history and nature generally in terms of the sciences which investigate them, he 
points out, such a tendency implies that history and nature are accessible only in 
the way they are thematized as objects of these sciences. But they are not. 
Heidegger shows quite clearly that the actual area of subject-matter [SachfelJ] (jut 
of which a science first fixes its proper domain and pre-scientifically thematizes its 
various objects is not identical with that domain as it is pre-scientifically 
thematized. Since scientific reality and what Heidegger calls "authentic reality" 
[eigentliche Wirklichkeit] do not coincide, and since science itself can neither 
open to us that original, authentic Sachfeld out of which it first emerges, nor 
ground and justify its own relation to that authentic reality, or its scientific 
appropriation and treatment of it, then what becomes interpreted as history or 
nature cannot be accessible only as it is divided and thematized by the sciences of 
history and nature. Hence, the purpose of the first part of Heidegger's 
subsequent analysis is to show that until this original context of subject-matter--the 
Sachfeld--is made transparent in its nature as the primordial and undivided 
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ground of pre-scientific experience, the sciences cannot themselves authentically 
appropriate that ground nor properly understand their relation to it. 
We must keep in mind as we read Heidegger that his observations in this 
regard are by no means a repetition of either the skeptical argument against the 
possibility of ever knowing the real or the modern renewal of that argument from 
the perspective of a transcendental ego. He is neither falling back into a 
nuumenal notion of reality, nor reinscribing science within prior metaphysical 
d:stinctions. Heidegger's intent, here as in Sein und Zeit, is first, to disturb our 
complacency--in this case by underscoring the fact that there is an original and 
essential field of experience presupposed by science which nevertheless remains 
closed to a potentially scientific disclosure, and indeed must remain closed if a 
science wishes to perform its proper function--and second, to return us 
phenomenologically to that very field of experience. 
How do we then proceed to access that which remains closed to the 
methods, intentions, and investigations of the ontic sciences and why is it 
important that we do so? Heidegger's answer to the first question is, of course, 
that we can rigorously access the original and essential field of pre-scientific 
experience only phenomenologically. He explains that a phenomenology of 
history and nature, in contrast to the reductive disclosure of the sciences, can 
disclose reality not as historical Sache or natural Sache, but precisely as what 
shows itself before all scientific inquiry, as the reality which is always already 
given to scientific inquiry--as the Sachfelcl, the field of the Sache selhst. But in 
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t[:e same vain, phenomenology can only perform this function if it definitively 
moves beyond the methodology of the reductive sciences in returning us to the 
Sachfeld. In other words, this return must be strictly phenomenological and not 
scientific per se, as Kisiel notes: "Heidegger makes it abundantly clear that a 
phenomenology of history and nature cannot remain enmeshed in the fact of 
science and what it has discovered, . . . but must disclose the reality of these 
domains precisely as they show themselves before scientific inquiry."-1 Any 
disclosure of what shows itself before scientific inquiry requires that we move 
hevond the facts and discoveries of the reductive sciences, a move onlv . . 
pi1enomenology can make, and a move phenomenology can make only in realizing 
its own distinctive possibilities. 
But before we can properly see how phenomenology effects this disclosure, 
we must note that phenomenology is not simply another pre-scientific experience 
or a contrived repetition of the pre-scientific experience that clears the ground for 
science in the first place, and is effected by any science in its nascent stages. 
Rather, this pre-scientific experience that belongs to science and entails an 
"anticipatory disclosure and conceptual penetration" of the potential domains of 
objects for the sciences, is a kind of naive phenomenology, observes Heidegger. 
This pre-scientific naive phenomenology, while it is accomplished in relation to 
the sciences and their interests, is actually philosophical since it can be 
accomplished only by "leaping over" the sciences and their various distinctive 
-1 Kisiel, 194. 
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operations (PGZ 3/HCT 2). In the Prolegomena Heidegger calls this anticipatory 
disclosure and conceptual penetration "productive logic." But productive logic is 
not the same as phenomenology, even though it is naively guided by phenomena 
in somewhat the same way. The relation of pre-scientific experience to the 
e:\.perience proper to the sciences--that is, the very belonging-together of pre-
scientific experience and scientific experience which is implied in calling it ~-
scientific--must not be overlooked. 
Productive logic is what leaps ahead into the Sachfeld of a potential 
science in order to make it available for the first time as a potential 
Gcgenstandsgehiet for that science. Both the fundamental structure of ti1e field 
of possible objects of a science and the potentially scientific way of relating to 
those objects are illuminated by productive logic, since it discloses what is 
essentially the constitution of the being of that primary field of pre-scientific 
experience. But productive logic discloses that field not as an authentic field of 
subject-matter, but specifically as a potential domain of objects for science. 
Heidegger does not say pre-scientific disclosure carelessly, he clearly intends that 
this disclosure be understood as both more originary than scientific experience 
itself, and yet, as determinately related to that experience. In other words, 
productive logic does not necessarily refer to a truly original disclosure, but to a 
philosophical disclosure which is simply more originary than that carried out by 
the sciences once they are assigned to a particular domain. A truly original 
disclosure of the Sac hf eld cannot be effected by the sciences on any level; it can 
only be accomplished by phenomenology--by what we might call a rigorous, but 
scientifically disinterested, turn to the Sache selhst. 
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Hence, as the fundamental concepts of a science are concepts which grow 
m:t of a pre-scientific disclosure and interpretation of the being of a particular 
field of subject-matter in its constitution as such, they are still the products of an 
experience fundamentally related to that of the sciences and therefore cannot but 
reflect from the beginning the interests and mode of questioning belonging to the 
sciences. Only phenomenology can disclose the Sachfeld in its original and 
essentially undivided form as the ground of those basic concepts. This is 
I-I :idegger's point. Thus he explains that the task of a phenomenology of history 
and nature would not be one of investigating the sciences themselves, nor even of 
phenomenologically disclosing the objects of those sciences. \Vhat each of the two 
kinds of empirical science itself calls for, and what this phenomenology would 
carry out, he says, is a phenomenological disclosure of the original kind of Being 
and constitution of both the sciences, and of history and nature as objects of these 
sciences. (PGZ 2/HCT 2) In this way--and only in this way, he insists--can the 
basis for a genuine theoretical philosophy of these sciences [Theorie der 
Wissenschaften] be created--not a philosophy of science in the traditional sense 
[traditionelle Wissenschaftstheorie], which only investigates the structures of given 
sciences after the fact, but one which could disclose and justify the genesis of the 
sciences from pre-theoretical experience and make transparent the foundation for 
their research by exhibiting the kind of access they have to that pre-given reality 
and the kind of concept formation which properly belongs to their scientific 
research. 
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Accordingly, in the Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs Heidegger 
concludes that in relation to the positive sciences phenomenology has a twofold 
task dictated to it by the sciences themselves: first, it must make the original and 
undivided area of the subject-matter comprehensible as it is before its scientific 
treatment; second, on the basis of the first disclosure it must ground that scientific 
treatment itself. 
If we now consider the corresponding discussion in Sein und Zeit, we find 
that Heidegger indicates there, as he did in the lecture course, that the function of 
ontological research is essentially twofold--but let us note that the twofold 
function as he explains it in Sein und Zeit differs somewhat from how he explains 
it in the Prolegomena: first, ontological research must give to the question of 
Being the ontological priority it deserves as the most basic and concrete of all 
questions; and second, it must clarify the meaning of Being. He rhetorically asks, 
with reference to the renewal of the question of Being in his own text: "Does it 
simply remain--or is it at all--a mere matter for soaring speculation about the 
most general of generalities, or is it rather, of all questions, both the most basic 
and the most concrete?" (SZ 9 /BT 29). His point here, it seems, is that while 
ontological inquiry into the various regions of the sciences (what, in the 
Prolegomena, he called productive logic) is clearly more primordial than the 
ontical inquiry of the positive sciences, even this kind of regional ontological 
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research, remains naive and opaque in its investigations into the Being of beings 
as long as it remains regional and fails to ascertain the meaning of Being in 
general; "All ontology," he reiterates in a passage that is italicized throughout, 
"remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequatelv 
clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental 
task" (SZ 11/BT 31). 
As before, Heidegger begins with the observation that all ontic sciences 
necessarily operate within a prior understanding of Being. The totality of beings, 
he says, can become a field [Feld] for the laying bare and differentiating of 
certain definite areas of subject-matter [Sachgebiete ], which in turn can serve as 
objects and themes of scientific investigation. Heidegger notes that the initial 
demarcation of these Sachgebiete is roughly and naively accomplished by scientific 
research, after the basic structures of these areas are worked out pre-scientifically 
through our common lived experiences of and with beings in the world--through 
our experience and interpretation of that region of Being [Seinsbezirkes] in which 
the area of subject-matter [Sachgebiet] is confined. The basic concepts generated 
by this pre-scientific experience, or productive logic, are what provide the clues 
and condition the possibility for then disclosing any area concretely for the first 
time. Why? Because these basic concepts are what "determine the way in which 
we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all 
the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by 
this understanding" (SZ 10/BT 30). Since every such area is itself obtained from 
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the totality of beings, the preliminary research from which these basic concepts 
are drawn, signifies nothing but the interpretation of those beings with regard to 
their basic state of Being. 
Though hardly enough to notice, Heidegger's discussion has already 
diverged somewhat from the analysis in the lecture course. \Vhat in the 
Prolegomena was thought within the differentiation between a Sachfeld and a 
Gegenstandsgehiet is now further complicated by the use of a third term, 
Seinshezirkes, and hence the possible implication of an horizon more primordial 
than that of the Sachfeld. More specifically, what Heidegger earlier called simply 
D Feld in opposition to the more determined Gebiet, which reflected the 
difference between the less determined Sache and the more determined 
Gegenstande, is now collapsed to a certain degree with the description of the Feld 
as an area for laying bare and delimiting various domains of Sachgehiete--as if the 
area, or Felt, either contained determined domains of subject-matter or was to he 
understood as similarly determined. In saying, then, that the basic structures of 
any Gehiet have always already been worked out through our pre-scientific 
interpretation of a Seinshezirke, Heidegger seems to be using the latter term in 
the same way he previously used Feld. 
Heidegger does not explain this change in vocabulary, and it may simply 
indicate a refinement or variation of exactly what was said in the Prolegomena. 
On the other hand, while in the Prolegomena Heidegger specifically identified the 
Sachfeld as the primordial domain to which phenomenology must turn, in Sein 
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und Zeit he says the Sachgebiete are themselves confined within a field more 
primordial still--a Seinsbezirkes. Whether this subtle difference indicates progress 
in his thought or just a more careful restatement of the same understanding is 
difficult to say with any certainty; generally speaking, the descriptions of 
productive logic in both texts are almost identical--at least to this point. But in 
either case the change in vocabulary underscores an important concern: the need 
to recognize an ontological horizon more originary even than the phenomenal 
horizon constituted by Sache. 
In comparing the two texts then, we can say that although in Sein uncl Zeit 
Heidegger is still attuned to the demand of the sciences for an ontologi~al 
disclosure of the area of subject-matter out of which their inquiries proceed, his 
concern has clearly shifted almost entirely away from an interest in the potential 
of phenomenology to ground productive logic and regional ontology--or at least to 
effect the disclosure which would make that kind of grounding possible--to an 
interest in the possibility of working through a fundamental ontology to a 
transcendental clarification of the meaning of Being in general. It is in the 
recognition of this possibility that Heidegger moves definitively beyond Husserl 
and his contemporaries, and it seems to be with reference to this possibility and 
this move beyond even the Husserlian conception of phenomenology that 
Heidegger says at the end of section 7 of the Introduction: "Our comments on the 
preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it 
does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 'movement.' Higher than actuality 
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stands possihilitv. We can understand phenomenology only hy seizing upon it as a 
possibility" (SZ 39 /BT 63). In Sein uncl Zeit Heidegger is not concerned, even 
secondarily, with working out the prolegomena to a phenomenology of history and 
nature, nor even with fundamental ontology as an end in itself; rather, his concern 
lies with the question of the meaning of Being and its significance as a lived 
comportment basic to all others, and his aim in departing from a hermeneutic of 
Dasein in investigating the meaning of Being is to realize what he calls a 
"universal phenomenological ontology" (SZ 38/BT 62): he writes on the very first 
page of Sein uncl Zeit that the aim of the treatise is to work out the question of 
the meaning of Being, and to do so concretely. A fundamental ontology is 
necessary to a clarification of this question because Dasein is the question o; th~ 
meaning of Being in its pre-ontological form. But Heidegger is ultimately 
concerned with accessing the Being of beings, and this most universal of 
ontologies is possible, he says, "only as phenomenology" (SZ 36/BT 60). 
This shift from the attempt at carrying out a phenomenology of history and 
nature to an effort at concretely working out the meaning of Being is a gesture to 
which we must carefully attend if we are to understand Heidegger's conception of 
phenomenology, and although Heidegger's revision in Sein und Zeit of the 
relation between phenomenology and the ontic sciences which is first elaborated 
in the Prolegomena produces a lucid argument for the ontological priority of the 
Seinsfrage, it both reveals that the move from the conception of phenomenology 
at work in the lecture course to that at work in Sein und Zeit involves 
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considerably more than a mere refinement of the former in the latter, and shows, 
in addition, that although Heidegger's concern is now almost exclusively focused 
on the question of the meaning of Being as a forgotten, but fundamental question, 
and although the discussion of the positive sciences in Sein und Zeit is almost 
exclusively meant to affirm the ontological priority of the question, the findings of 
fundamental ontology and the understanding of time that would result from an 
explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being would 
have, nevertheless, considerable importance for the positive sciences. 
Heidegger emphasizes in Sein und Zeit, as he did in the Prolegomena, that 
the fundamental concepts of a science can become genuinely grounded and 
transparent only through an ontological revision of the way in which each 
particular area is basically constituted. He says, moreover, that authentic progress 
[ eigentlicher Forschritt] in the positive sciences, while it manifestly follows the 
ontic discoveries and investigations the sciences themselves make and carry out, 
stems precisely from this revisionary inquiry, that is, from an ontological inquiry 
into the basic structures and concepts which first made those ontic investigations 
and discoveries possible. In other words, while ontological inquiry is animated by 
the findings and failings of ontic research, which itself is only possible on the basis 
of a pre-ontological understanding of the region of Being to which that ontic 
research is thus assigned, it is ontological inquiry and the resulting radical revision 
of basic concepts which produces real progress in the sciences. But this is not to 
say that this revision in and of itself constitutes anything like a fundamental 
204 
ontology. It does not. The basic concepts of a science are basic only with respect 
to that science--they are not basic in the sense of disclosing the ground of Being 
universally and as such. For this we require a universal and fundamental 
ontology. Heidegger is extremely careful in both Sein und Zeit and the 
Prolegomena to point out that neither productive logic nor the ontological 
revision of the basic concepts produced by productive logic, is fundamental 
ontology--even though they may more surely define a science's region and tasks. 
And a genuine grounding of the concepts generated and revised by the sciences 
themselves can ultimately only result from the revision made possible by a 
fundamental ontology. It is for this very reason that Heidegger can conclude in 
section 3 that the question of Being is given a certain ontological priority by 
ontological research itself, and in section 4 that fundamental ontology is that 
ontology from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise. 
Let us note at this point that for Heidegger the revision of basic concepts 
that constitutes real progress in any antic science, even though that ontological 
revisilm does not involve a fundamental return to the ground of Being it::;df, is 
experienced as a crisis within that science: 
The real "movement" of the sciences takes place when their basic cdnccnl-, 
undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to it~e'. :. T:Je 
level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is ca1'able of 
a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises the very relationship 
between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that 
are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. (SZ 
9/BT 29) 
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The transparent revision of fundamental concepts that constitutes authentic 
progress in a science, any science, announces itself and is experienced withi_n that 
science specifically as a crisis. 
This observation brings us to the point where we can now begin to consider 
the relation noted earlier between the task of phenomenology and the ontological 
revisions that constitute scientific revolutions in the antic sciences. Let us 
therefore return to the Prolegomena, where the concept of crisis plays a much 
more visible role in the analysis. 
Heidegger begins the second half of the first chapter of that work by 
reiterating that originary access to the fields of subject matter is expressly not by 
way of the theoretical vision belonging to the factually available sciences, and by 
suggesting that this is demonstrated precisely by the fact that the sciences are 
presently in a state of crisis. By crisis, Heidegger explains, he does not mean the 
Jespair contemporary man experiences in lamenting that he has lost an original 
relationship to the sciences. He says his reference is to what he calls "the real 
crisis," the crisis internal to the sciences themselves (PGZ 3-4/HCT 3). This 
second sense of crisis consists in the recognition that the basic relationship 
between a science and the subject matter it investigates has become 
fundamentally questionable and insecure. This second sense of crisis thus 
prompts a propaedeutic reflection on the basic structure of the sciences, a 
reflection which tends either to dispel the insecurity over the fundamental 
concepts of the science in question or seeks to secure those concepts within a 
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more original understanding of its subject matter. It is in this field of reflection, 
in this tendency to reclaim a particular domain of thematizable objects more 
originally, in this attempt to reclaim an original grasp of the area of subject 
matter out of which scientific research per se operates, and to do so through a 
reflection on basic structures, that what Heidegger calls in both texts "authentic 
progress" in a science occurs. 
Heidegger first says that the scope of this crisis is comprehensive, and he 
goes to great lengths to show how all the natural sciences are experiencing this 
sense of crisis in one way or another. He adds that the human, or historical, 
sciences are not yet experiencing it only because they have not yet reached the 
level of maturity necessary for a genuine scientific revolution. He then notes that 
the crisis can be fruitful only if we see that the expository reflection on basic 
structures that the sciences demand--but cannot themselves carry out--requires "a 
mode of experience and interpretation in principle different from those which 
prevail in the concrete sciences themselves" (PGZ 4/HCT 3). Heidegger 
concludes: 
if the sciences are not to be regarded as a spurious enterprise, founding 
their justification merely by invoking the prevailing currents of the 
tradition, but instead are to receive the possibility of their being from their 
meaning in human Dasein, then the decisive question, and the place where 
an answer to the crisis is to be found, is in bringing the subject matters 
under investigation to an original experience, before their concealment by 
a particular scientific inquiry. (PGZ 6/HCT 4-5) 
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In order to ground the sciences, which involves tracing the possibility of their 
Being to their meaning for Dasein, the subject-matters must be exhibited i_n their 
original mode of Being. 
Thus, in the Prolegomena the concept of crisis is appealed to in order to 
demonstrate that the path to the Sachfelde is not by way of scientific theory, and 
to show that the crises of the sciences can be resolved only through a 
phenomenological investigation of the Sache selhst. In Sein und Zeit the crisis of 
the sciences is also cited as evidence of fresh tendencies to reground scientific 
research, and of the need for a phenomenological disclosure of the basic 
constitution of the Seinshezirke. 
Universal phenomenological ontology is admittedly not conceived by 
Heidegger as a science like any other science, since its ultimate object of inquiry 
is ihe ,·ery Being of beings. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Heidegger does 
consider it a science. For some of the same reasons that Husserl wanted to make 
of philosophy the rigorous science it had always desired and often claimed to be, 
Heidegger desired for phenomenology a potential far beyond even what Husserl 
conceived. Husserl begins Philosophv as Rigorous Science, a text to which 
Heidegger refers in the reply to \Villiam Richardson as a work "too little 
observed,"5 with the notation that philosophy from its earliest beginnings has 
claimed to be rigorous science, though at no time has it lived up to this claim. 
Husserl says that it is the dominant characteristic of modern philosophy to 
5 William J. Richardson, xiv. 
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constitute itself as rigorous science by means of critical reflection and by ever 
more profound methodological investigations. So far, however, the only result of 
this effort has been to secure the foundation and the independence of rigorous 
natural and humanistic sciences and new mathematical disciplines.6 Husserl 
laments that philosophy itself still lacks as much as ever the characteristic of 
rigorous science, and in fact is still unclear regarding even its relation to the 
positive sciences it breeds: 
The question of philosophy's relation to the natural and humanistic 
sciences--whether the specifically philosophical element of its work, 
essentially related as it is to nature and the human spirit, demands 
fundamentally new attitudes, that in turn involve fundamentally peculiar 
goals and methods; whether as a result the philosophical takes us, as it 
were, into a new dimension, or whether it performs its function on the 
same level as the empirical sciences of nature and of the human spirit--all 
this is to this day disputed.7 
Husserl concludes that this continuing tendency towards disputation shows that 
even the proper sense of what constitutes philosophical problems has not been 
made scientifically clear. 
But this disputation regarding the questions, issues and problems proper to 
philosophy--disconcerting as it may be and despite what Husserl says--is not, at 
least according to Heidegger, indicative of a real crisis in philosophy. Heidegger 
makes it clear that the question regarding the proper method and object of 
6 Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," Phenomenology and the 
Crisis of Philosophy. trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper and Row, 1965; 
Harper Torchbooks, 1989), 71. 
7 Husserl, 72. 
209 
philosophical thought as it has occurred in its diverse historical forms, including 
Husserl's work, is not in and of itself constitutive of a genuine scientific crisis, nor 
is phenomenology as a philosophical position its solution. A crisis in any science 
is not even possible until its subject-area is provisionally disclosed, and for 
phenomenology this did not even get underway until Heidegger himself raised the 
question of the meaning of Being in its fundamental relatedness to Dasein as the 
place and preontological occurrence of the question. The vague average 
understanding of Being--in which we always operate and which "leaps ahead," in 
Heidegger's words, to disclose some area of Being for the first time--belong, in 
the end, to the essential constitution of Dasein itself. Part of the task of Sein und 
Zeit was to have been a demonstration of the fact that the tradition failed to even 
recognize the need for an ontology of Dasein, much less provide it. And yet, as 
Heidegger outlines in the introduction to Sein und Zeit, before fundamental 
ontology, and thus before universal phenomenological ontology, could ever 
authentically address the basic concept of Being it must first work its way through 
an Interpretation of Dasein as primordial temporality in order to show that time 
is the preontological relation to Being out of which Dasein tacitly understands and 
interprets something like Being. 
In chapter 5 of Being and Time Heidegger presents a short overview of the 
text as it was initially conceived, outlining the twofold task of the entire 
investigation and then explaining the three projected divisions of part I, which 
corresponded to the three stages and subordinate tasks of the first part of the 
mquiry. 
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He says the task of the first stage of the investigation was to carry out a 
preparatory analytic of Dasein within the horizon of everydayness--that is, to 
uncover the Being of this being without interpreting its meaning. The task of the 
second stage was then to interpret this meaning--that is, to expose temporality as 
the meaning of the Being of Dasein, as the horizon appropriate for an 
understanding of the Being of Dasein. In other words, the structures of Dasein 
provisionally exhibited in division I were to be interpreted over again in division II 
on a higher and authentically ontological basis, specifically as modes of 
temporality. The repetition of the preparatory analysis in division two would thus 
prepare the ground for the task that was to have been carried out in the third 
division: an interpretation of the meaning of Being, an analysis of Being against 
the horizon of time. 
The third division of part I and the second part of the twofold task to have 
been carried out in part II were, of course, never finished. The footnote at the 
Beginning of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie indicates that it was a new 
attempt to write the crucial third section of Sein und Zeit, which was to have 
been called "Zeit und Sein." But the Grundprobleme, like Sein und Zeit, falls 
short of that task. "Zeit und Sein," composed many years later, obviously takes up 
the task again--but by now, of course, the task itself has come to be conceived in a 
very different way. While continuing to think the basic issue of Sein und Zeit in 
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moving toward a thinking of time and Being, Heidegger has both remained 
faithful to phenomenology and its demands, and has moved beyond it--and this 
move beyond accordingly requires a thinking proper to its excessiveness. It is 
clearly for this reason Heidegger says in "Das Ende der Philosophie und die 
Aufgabe des Denkens" that the name of the task of Sein und Zeit will change in 
remaining faithful to the matter of thinking and in turning toward the task 
reserved for thinking at the end of philosophy. 
Heidegger points out in his reply to William Richardson's query about the 
"reversal" or "turn" in his thinking (first mentioned in yet another letter, the Letter 
on Humanism), that the very title "Zeit und Sein" marks the Kehre, which is in 
play within the matter itself: 
The thinking of the reversal is a change in my thought. But this change is 
not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the 
fundamental issue, of Being and Time. The thinking of the reversal results 
from the fact that I stayed with the matter-for-thought [ otl "Being and 
Time," sc. by inquiring into that perspective which already in Being and 
Time (p. 39) was designated as "Time and Being." 
The reversal is above all not an operation of interrogative thought: 
it is inherent in the very matter designated by the headings: "Being and 
Time," "Time and Being." For this reason the passage cited from the 
"Letter on Humanism" reads: "Here the Whole is reversed." "The Whole": 
this means the matter [involved] in "Being and Time," "Time and Being." 
The reversal is in play within the matter itself. Neither did I invent it nor 
does it affect merely my thought.8 
He continues a bit further in the letter: 
One need only observe the simple fact that in Being and Time the 
problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism ... for it to become · 
strikingly clear that the "Being" into which Being and Time inquired can 
8 Richardson, xvi->..-viii. 
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not long remain something that the human subject posits. It is rather 
Being, stamped as Presence by its time-character, [that] makes the 
approach to There-being. As a result, even in the initial steps of the 
Being-question in Being and Time thought is called upon to undergo a 
change whose movement car-responds with the reversal. 
And yet, the basic question of Being and Time is not in any sense 
abandoned by reason of the reversal. Accordingly, the prefatory note to 
the seventh unrevised edition of Being and Time (1957) contains the 
remark: [This] "way still remains even today a necessary one, if the 
question about Being is to stir our There-being." Contrary [to what is 
generally supposed], the question of Being and Time is decisively ful-filled 
in the thinking of the reversal. He alone can ful-fill who has a vision of 
the fullness.9 
The Kehre is called for from the very beginning and reflects a remarkable fidelity 
to the question of Being, not a divergence from it. 
\Vhile Heidegger thus maintains that the Kehre is at play in the matter 
itself and in no way marks an alteration or abandonment of the fundamental 
concern expressed in Sein und Zeit, I believe it also marks a point of crisis for 
universal phenomenological ontology--a point of aporeia, if you will, which c~llls 
for a radical revision of the basic concepts of phenomenology conceived as the 
fundamental science of Being. In other words, I am suggesting, even though the 
suggestion admittedly takes us on a different path than that followed by 
Heidegger in Sein und Zeit and the works that follow, that Heidegger's early work 
shows universal phenomenological ontology to be that science which alone can 
ground all other sciences and resolve the comprehensive crisis in which they are 
enmeshed, and yet, that what his later work seems to manifest, in the course of 
working through the fundamental ontology of Dasein and the deconstruction of 
9 I"). h d ... ,1c ar son, xvm. 
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the history of ontology--which must be completed before universal 
phenomenological ontology can come into its own and perform its functio_n with 
regard to regional ontologies, is that although its research and method are both 
ultimately guided by the question of Being, phenomenology as a science is 
nevertheless subject to the same hermeneutic progress as any antic science, and in 
progressing to the point where its basic concepts--the nature of Dasein and the 
relationship of phenomenoJogy as a science to its object, the Being of beings, 
among them--become fundamentally questionable, it becomes itself a science in 
crisis. Phenomenology as a science must seek the meaning of Being through the 
interrogation of phenomena, and principally through an existential analytic of that 
concrete being which existentially is the preontological question of Being, Dasein. 
Moreover, its basic concepts as a science cannot be fully grounded until that 
fundamental ontology is complete. And yet, fundamental ontology cannot he 
complete until the question of the meaning of Being and the nature of Dasein is 
at least provisionally brought into view. This latter requirement patently requires 
an explication of time sufficient for Dasein to come into its own, and thus, an 
understanding of the "matter" which continually recedes from the reach of 
representational thinking. 
What I think we thus find in a close study of Heidegger's work--with strict 
regard for the question of science--is that the science of phenomenology actually 
moves through the same kind of hermeneutic circle the positive sciences move 
through, progressing to a point of radical crisis in its basic concepts: it moves 
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problematically past various subtle interruptions of the existential analytic--
interruptions marked there and later in the poetic works by the trace of an a-
proper time, a time other than that realized in any projection or ecstasis--to where 
the very Sache selbst as initially conceived and the phenomenological approach to 
it becomes radically questionable; it moves to where the relationship between 
time and phenomenology as a science, and thus Being and phenomenology, begins 
to totter, in other words--even though Heidegger never explicitly calls attention to 
this crisis as such, at least not to my knowledge. 
I wish to emphasize, however, that I am not suggesting that this reflects in 
any way a failing on Heidegger's part. First, because the crisis--if, in fact, there is 
one--can only belong to the destiny of phenomenology hearkened to by 
Heidegger. Second, because the development of phenomenology as a rigorous 
science was not Heidegger's concem--at least not after the break with Husserl and 
the definitive attunement to the question of Being as such. For Heidegger, 
phenomenology, seized upon as a possibility, rather than as actuality (to recall the 
characterization from Sein und Zeit), came to mean "das Sichzeigenlassen der 
eigensten Sache des Denkens"--the releasing into self-showing of the most proper 
matter of thought. 10 But as such, phenomenology should open upon the 
possibility of a transformation of man, a transformation that would perhaps bring 
Dasein into its own and thereby realize a radically different understanding of 
man's relation to Being, and thus an authentic revision of phenomenology's basic 
10 Richardson, xvii. 
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concepts, which in turn might allow the positive sciences to secure their proper 
ground in the right way and for the first time. 
I wish to suggest in conclusion that this possibility might, in fact, be secured 
by turning away from the concern for truth and toward a concern for the holiness 
of the Other. 
For Levinas, intentionality is the origin of sense--that by which what is 
exterior refers to what is interior. Light, in turn, is the condition for phenomena, 
and thus, for meaning and intentionality. But Levinas, like Heidegger, finds that 
in certain pivotal human experiences "a method is called for such that thought is 
invited to go beyond intuition" (DEE 112/EE 66). The relationship with death 
and the other is one such experience, since, as he explains: "It is not possible to 
grasp the alterity of the other, which is to shatter the definitiveness of the ego, in 
terms of any of the relationship[s] which characterize light" (DEE 144-145/EE 
85). Levinas shows most effectively that phenomenology is limited in its operation 
to the world of light--it cannot disclose the other. Speaking of this limitation, he 
says: 
Phenomenological description, which by definition cannot leave the sphere 
of light, that is, man alone shut up in his solitude, anxiety and death as an 
end, whatever analyses of the relationship with the other, it may contribute, 
will not suffice. Qua phenomenology it remains within the world of light, 
the world of the solitary ego which has no relationship with the other qua 
other, for whom the other is another me, an alter ego known by sympathy, 
that is, by a return to oneself. (DEE 145/EE 85) 
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And yet, if Levinas is right in affirming that the relationship with the Other is 
fundamental to our very existence, then a turn toward the Other would be crucial 
to any ontology, and most certainly to phenomenology. 
Levinas shows throughout his work that phenomenology must do account 
for the other, and yet cannot of itself provide that account. He says, for example: 
"In positing the present as the mastery of the existent over existing, and in seeking 
in it the passage from existing to the existent, we find ourselves at a level of 
investigation that can no longer be qualified as experience. And if 
phenomenology is only a method of radical experience, we will find ourselves 
beyond phenomenology" (TA 34/TO 54). In investigating the concepts of death, 
eros, and fecundity, Levinas turns towards issues fundamental to human existence 
and fundamental to any understanding of Being, and thus crucial to 
phenomenology and the sciences, as outgrowths of that understanding. 
It is my belief that by returning to rethink fundamental ontology in the 
light of Levinas' discoveries, we might indeed realize a transformation of man and 
a resolution to the present crisis of the sciences. This is my parting suggestion. 
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